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Abstract 
 
Corporate governance is one of the most important topics in the business world, especially in 
developing countries. Solid corporate governance gives investors more confidence to invest their 
money in the markets of developing nations. Scholars have argued that the existence of good 
corporate governance regulations is a fundamental factor for the protection of the capital market 
from financial collapse. It is also widely believed that good corporate governance achieves better 
firm performance. 
This study aims to answer the question of whether a relationship exists between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the performance of non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Capital 
Market. As there was a major reform of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia in 2006, the study 
examines the period 2007–2011, to investigate the impact of the reform. Furthermore, this study 
seeks to explore the understanding of the concept of corporate governance in the Saudi Arabian 
environment among different stakeholders, and to evaluate current regulations of corporate 
governance.  
This thesis uses two approaches to answer these research questions: quantitative methods (OLS, 
2SLS, and GMM), and qualtitative methods (semi-structured interviews). The researcher 
employed triangulation to link and enhance the results, as well as to provide more details and 
explain the concept of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, adding credibility to the findings of 
the quantitative results. 
According to the OLS regression, the findings suggest that the corporate governance 
mechanisms have produced mixed results on firm performance. Most of the governance 
mechanisms were found to have positive relationships with performance. However, other 
variables such as family or individual ownership and foreign ownership have a negative effect on 
performance (based on Return on Assets). According to the 2SLS regression, results regarding 
corporate governance mechanisms were consistent with the OLS results.  
To ensure confidence in these estimates, the researcher applied the dynamic GMM to address the 
issues of endogeniety and unobserved heterogeneity. The dynamic GMM found that some 
corporate governance is driven by unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeniety, such as 
royal family board members, board sub-committees, financial firm ownership, and non-financial 
firm ownership. 
The main findings of the semi-structured interviews supported the quantitative results with 
greater detail and explanations. In addition, the semi-structured interviews seek to explore the 
concepts, definitions, and importance of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia’s environment. 
Lack of awareness, cost, and time are the most frequently faced difficulties and obstacles that 
interfere with corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the participants suggest that 
disclosure and transparency are needed to improve and develop in the listed companies. 
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Introduction 
1.1 PREAMBLE 
The phrase 'corporate governance' did not come into existence in the business environment until 
the 1980s (Tricker, 2012). In 1988, Cochran and Wartick published a 74-page annotated 
bibliography of corporate governance publications; Google now accesses over 12 million 
references for corporate governance (Tricker, 2012). The discussion about corporate governance 
has increased in recent years around the world, especially after crises and scandals such as Enron 
and WorldCom. After these crises, a number of countries adopted regulations to ensure good 
practices of corporate governance. The regulations of corporate governance are developed 
regularly. For example, in the United Kingdom, a new set of corporate governance guidelines 
was issued in September 2012. This new code deals with leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration, and relations with shareholders.  
A significant body of literature has discussed corporate governance in different disciplines, 
including management, finance, economics, law, and accounting. Durisin and Puzone (2009) 
described corporate governance as a multi-disciplinary subject and research topic. This may be 
why there is no generally accepted definition of corporate governance. Most of the definitions of 
corporate governance use two main approaches. These approaches almost always depend on two 
theories: the agency theory and the stakeholder theory. The agency theory-based approach is a 
simple pattern that describes corporate governance as a relationship between a company and its 
shareholders. The second approach, which depends on the stakeholder theory, is a more widely 
used pattern that describes corporate governance as a web of relationships between a company 
and its stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, and managers 
(Solomon, 2007, p. 12). Claessen (2006) stated that corporate governance affects growth and 
development via several channels: 
 Increased access to external financing by firms, which can lead to greater 
investment. 
 Lower cost of capital associated with higher firm valuation, which leads to more 
investment, increasing growth and development. 
 Better operational performance, better allocation of resources and also, better 
management that creates growth and development. 
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 The existence of good practices of corporate governance, which reduced the 
impact of the financial crisis. 
 Better relationships with all stakeholders, that lead to improved social and labour 
relationships. 
There are two general models of corporate governance: the Anglo-Saxon model and the 
European model. The model of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is concerned with 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth, which is influenced by the Anglo-Saxon model (Fallatah and 
Dickins, 2012). Therefore, the main objective of the corporate governance system in Saudi 
Arabia is to ensure the protection of all shareholders with stakeholder rights, such as the rights of 
dividends, disclosure and transparency, voting rights, and equal treatment between shareholders.   
The Saudi capital market has developed in many stages from 1934 until 2003. In July 2003, the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) delegated the responsibilities of the Saudi stock 
market operations to the Capital Market Authority (CMA), established in 2003 (Tadawul, 2012). 
In March 2007, the Council of Ministers agreed to establish the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) (Tadawul, 2012) as a joint stock company to look after the day-to-day transactions of 
the Saudi Market (Alshehri, 2012). Until 2006, there were no specific corporate governance 
regulations for the Saudi stock market. In February 2006, the Saudi stock market experienced a 
large crash that led to a loss of 25% of its value (Alshehri, 2012). After this crash, the Saudi 
Capital Market Authority approved the regulations of corporate governance as an important part 
of protecting shareholders and stakeholders.  
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has received great 
attention in accounting and finance literature, especially after 1997, when the East Asian 
financial crisis occurred. Furthermore, the studies of the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance have also received more attention after 2001, when the 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom occurred, which increased interest in studying the 
relationship between good corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. The notion 
of the present study comes from the crash of the Saudi capital market in 2006, and also the large 
drop of the general index of the Saudi capital market in 2008 and suspension of trading of a 
number of listed companies in the Saudi capital market. These events led to the present study of 
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the relationship between corporate governance, the new regulations in the Saudi business 
environment, and firm performance of the listed companies in the Saudi capital market.  
The main objective of this thesis is to determine whether strong corporate governance leads to 
enhanced and improved firm performance or not. A number of papers have attempted to answer 
this question using different methods and theories. The majority of these papers addressed this 
question in developed countries; only a few studies examined this relationship in emerging 
economies. Most of the literature found a positive relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance by using different measures of firm performance and different 
methodologies. On the other hand, a number of studies found an insignificant relationship 
between performance and governance. In effect, studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance have had different results from country to country. Moreover, 
the results of one country may differ depending on changes in the variables used in the study, 
whether dependent or independent variables. The techniques used to examine the relationship 
may change the results. For example, Beiner et al. (2004, 2006) studied the effects of board size 
on firm performance in Switzerland for two different periods (2001 and 2002); they found a 
negative effect on Tobin's Q for 2001 and a positive effect on Tobin's Q for 2002, using the same 
econometrics model. This indicates it may not be possible to apply the results of a study of one 
emerging economy, such as Malaysia or China, to Saudi Arabia, or even results from other 
countries in the Arabian Gulf such as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. Many different 
factors may affect the outcome, including culture, types of company structure, religion, and legal 
systems in a country.  
1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
Before 2006, little attention was paid to corporate governance and the protection of shareholders 
in Saudi Arabia. Most of the shareholders were fully satisfied with the Saudi capital market 
because they made great profits and the share index had reached its highest point (more than 
20000) before February, 2006 (Alshehri, 2012). In this situation, the shareholders were not 
focused on regulations to protect the investor; they had the view that the market did not need 
corporate governance, because investors were reaping profits. However, after the Saudi stock 
market crash in February 2006, also known as Black February (Falgi, 2009), investors, 
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academics, and other stakeholders demanded that regulations be issued to protect the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders, such as banks, suppliers and employees.  
The Saudi Arabian business environment is somewhat different from the governance systems in 
the UK and US, particularly in its ownership structure and mechanisms related to board 
structures. The ownership structure in Saudi Arabia often consists of large family or individual 
groups, foreign investors, and more active institutional government ownership, even when there 
are widely-dispersed shareholdings (Piesse et al., 2012). In addition, according to Piesse et al. 
(2012), there are some interesting differences in board structure between Saudi Arabia and the 
UK and US governance systems. For example, institutional investors are normally represented 
on the board of directors in Saudi Arabian companies only when the institution is government 
funded, while the presence of institutional investors in the UK and the US governance systems is 
more common. In addition, there is always a presence of large shareholders on the boards of 
Saudi companies, while they are less likely to be found on the boards of UK and US companies 
(Piesse et al., 2012). The method of appointment of the chairman of the board of directors is via 
the selection of the majority shareholders in Saudi Arabian companies; however, in UK and US 
companies, the chairman is selected by the board members (Piesse et al., 2012).  
The Saudi capital market is one of the more active markets in developing countries (Piesse et al., 
2012). Moreover, because of globalization and privatization, foreign investors have been 
attracted to investing in Saudi Arabia. However, the percentage of foreign investors in the listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia is very low. This makes the research outcome more important for 
foreign investors who aim to invest in the Saudi listed companies by providing them a full 
picture of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in 
Saudi Arabia. An increase in the percentage of foreign investors in the Saudi capital market 
could lead to enhanced economic growth and benefits for the Saudi infrastructure.  
This study will explore the corporate governance practices in the Saudi Arabian stock market. 
Saudi Arabia is one of the richest developing countries in the world (Piesse et al., 2012). Piesse 
et al. (2012) highlighted that Saudi Arabia has some characteristics that make it superior to other 
developing countries. For example, Saudi Arabia is one of the largest countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), has a higher level of annual income per capita than most other 
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MENA countries, and has the most active stock market in the MENA region. Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia is a member of many of economic organisations, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank and one of the largest oil 
producers in OPEC. These elements lend the study more importance in its analysis of how 
corporate governance mechanisms can affect an emerging economy with high income.  
Most of the previous studies of corporate governance focused on developed countries. Most of 
the literature discussed the characteristics of board structures. Other studies have investigated the 
impact of types of external shareholders and how they affect firm performance. This study seeks 
to fill the gap in the literature about corporate governance in emerging economies generally, and 
in Saudi Arabia particularly, as one of the largest countries among developing countries, and to 
understand the corporate governance practices in the one of the Arabian Gulf countries and an 
important country in the Islamic world.  
The current study will seek to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance by investigating many mechanisms and practices in Saudi Arabia, with 
consideration of the differences in culture and the application of Shari'ya law in business 
transactions. To conclude, this study will seek to offer a comprehensive view of how the 
characteristics and practices (board of directors and ownership structure) work together to 
produce different effects on firm performance.   
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The main aim of the current study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in the listed companies in the Saudi capital market. 
Furthermore, this study seeks to explore the understanding of the concept of corporate 
governance in the Saudi Arabian environment among different stakeholders, and evaluate the 
current regulations of corporate governance. This should provide a comprehensive study of the 
nature and practice of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia after the regulations were issued by 
the Capital Market Authority at the end of 2006.  
To achieve these aims, the current study seeks to investigate the following:  
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1. The effect of the board size on firm performance; 
2. The influence of non-executive members on firm performance; 
3. The relationship between family board members and firm performance; 
4. The role of royal family board members and how they affect firm performance; 
5. The relationship between board committees and firm performance; 
6. The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance; 
7. The influence of large block holders such as family or individual, government, foreign, 
financial or non-financial (corporations) ownership on firm performance; and 
8. The concept of corporate governance in Saudi business environment among different 
stakeholders, in order to evaluate the current regulations and discuss improving and 
developing the current regulations. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the defined aims and objectives, the main research questions in this study seek to answer 
the following questions: 
1. How is corporate governance understood in the Saudi Arabian environment? 
2. What is the level of compliance with corporate governance provisions of Saudi Arabia 
among Saudi Arabian listed companies? 
3. What are the main obstacles to corporate governance, as applied through the new 
regulations of the Saudi capital market? 
4. What are the main elements that corporate governance regulations need to improve and 
develop?  
5. Is there any relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance? If so, what are its effects? 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology in this study uses two complementary empirical approaches: 
quantitative and qualitative. The study uses quantitative (secondary) data, which combines three 
different regression analyses: Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Two Stages Least Square (2SLS), 
Generalized method of moments (GMM). Also, this study uses qualitative data (semi-structured 
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interviews) to achieve the research objectives. The quantitative data are analysed using statistical 
and econometrics tests which apply a number of techniques and models (OLS, 2SLS and GMM) 
to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
Moreover, the researcher uses semi-structured interviews to improve understanding of the 
research phenomenon and problem. Triangulation provided by the two types of data will lead to 
improving understanding and explain better the answers to the research problem. 
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Table ‎1-1 The link between the research aims, objectives, questions and data collecting methods. 
Research aims Objectives Research questions Research methods 
 To examine the 
relationship between 
corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm 
performance in the listed 
companies in the Saudi 
capital market; 
1. The effect of the board size on firm 
performance; 
2. The influence of non-executive members on 
firm performance; 
3. The relationship between family board 
members and firm performance; 
4. The role of royal family board members and 
how they affect firm performance; 
5. The relationship between board committees 
and firm performance; 
6. The relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance; and 
7. The influence of large block holders such as 
family or individual, government, foreign, 
financial or non-financial (corporations) 
ownership on firm performance. 
 
Is there any relationship 
between corporate 
governance mechanisms and 
firm performance? What are 
the effects? 
 
Main: regression analysis 
Support: semi-structured 
interviews 
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Research aims Objectives Research questions Research methods 
 To explore the 
understanding of the 
concept of corporate 
governance in the Saudi 
Arabian environment 
among different 
stakeholders, and evaluate 
the current regulations of 
corporate governance, 
providing a comprehensive 
study of the nature and 
practice of corporate 
governance in Saudi 
Arabia after the 
regulations were issued by 
the Capital Market 
Authority at the end of 
2006. 
The concept of corporate governance in Saudi 
business environment among different 
stakeholders, with concern for and evaluation of 
current regulations and discussion of how to 
improve and develop the current regulations. 
 
1. How is corporate 
governance understood in 
the Saudi Arabian 
environment? 
2. What is the level of 
compliance with 
corporate governance 
provisions of Saudi 
Arabia among Saudi 
Arabian listed 
companies? 
3. What are the main 
obstacles to corporate 
governance in the Saudi 
business as applied 
through the new 
regulations in the capital 
market? 
4. What are the main 
elements that corporate 
Main method: semi-
structured interviews 
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Research aims Objectives Research questions Research methods 
governance regulations 
need to improve and 
develop?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
12 | P a g e  
Introduction 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. The current chapter presents an introduction to the 
research. It provides a preamble of the research study, with concern for the research problem, 
objectives, questions, the importance of the study, and methodology that will be used.  
Chapter Two contains a general review of corporate governance, which focuses on general 
definitions of corporate governance, an investigation of the corporate governance model with 
concern for Islamic corporate governance and the Shari'ya model. Also, this chapter discusses 
in more detail some of the corporate governance principles and codes such as OECD.  
Chapter Three discusses the importance of the theoretical framework that describes and 
explains corporate governance. This chapter provides a brief description of the five theories 
behind the corporate governance mechanisms: agency theory, stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, transaction cost economics theory, and resource dependence theory. This 
chapter also provides a table comparing all of these theories to make understanding these 
theories easy.  
Chapter Four highlights the literature review concerning the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. It will discuss the theory behind each 
variable, and review the prior empirical literature, divided into two sections. The first section 
offers the previous studies on developed countries, and the second section highlights the 
previous studies on emerging economies. It will then develop hypotheses on the basis of the 
review for each variable.  
Chapter Five provides a background of the study setting, Saudi Arabia, by focusing on 
general information about Saudi Arabia’s political, legal, and economic systems. Also, this 
chapter sheds light on monitoring bodies and the regulations and laws that set and regulate 
companies in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, this chapter provides a description of the Saudi 
stock market, including its historical background and the development of the new Saudi 
capital market (Tadawul), with a focus on the corporate governance regulations in the 
Kingdom.  
Chapter Six details and justifies the research methodology and data collection used in this 
study. This chapter also explains the two approaches used in the study—quantitative and 
qualitative—and is concerned with the study’s triangulation methodology. In addition, it 
Chapter One 
13 | P a g e  
Introduction 
provides details about the data collection methods and the samples included in this study. 
Finally, this chapter provides a brief conclusion that summarises the research methodology.  
Chapter Seven discusses the results of the study's quantitative data (secondary data from 
annual reports). It first provides results of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions after 
solving some problems related to the assumptions of the OLS. After that, this chapter 
provides the results of the two stage least square (2SLS) regressions that deal with 
endogeneity and causality and seeks to study the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
between each other. It also seeks to examine the impact of firm performance Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) on corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, the chapter 
includes a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) regression. The GMM is applied 
to examine the potential endogeneity problem and detect unobserved heterogeneity and the 
dynamic relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and past performance. 
Chapter Eight reports the findings of the interview data. The main objective of this chapter is 
to explore in greater detail the corporate-governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia. It focuses 
on the relationship between corporate-governance mechanisms and firm performance.  
Chapter Nine provides a general discussion that links and compares the findings of the 
secondary data analysis and the semi-structured interviews. The main objective of this 
chapter is to integrate the quantitative and qualitative analysis together and explain the 
findings of this study. Also, this chapter sheds light on how the qualitative data supports the 
findings from the quantitative data analysis (secondary data) and also explores some points 
not covered in the quantitative data.  
Chapter Ten presents the conclusions of this thesis. It offers some recommendations for 
regulation, explains the limitations of the present study, and suggests some avenues for future 
research. Also, this chapter sheds lights on the study’s contributions to the knowledge of 
corporate governance and firm performance.    
1.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the background to the research topic and the significance of the study. It 
provides the research problem, aims, and questions the study will develop. The chapter also 
highlights the methodology used in this thesis. Finally, it lays out the structure of the ten 
chapters in this thesis. 
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2 GENERAL REVIEW OF CORPORTE 
GOVERNANCE 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the general features of corporate governance. It also provides general 
definitions of corporate governance with further explanations of different definitions. This 
chapter provides some reasons that give corporate governance more attention at the present. 
In addition, this chapter investigates the corporate governance model and provides a brief 
description of Islamic corporate governance. Moreover, this chapter discusses in greater 
detail corporate governance codes and reports with concern on the UK codes and the OECD 
principles of corporate governance. In the end, briefly summarises this chapter. 
2.2 THE DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The idea of corporate governance is ancient (Tricker, 2012). The history of the phrase 
corporate governance began at the end of 1980s (Tricker, 2012). Corporate governance 
contains two words: corporate and governance. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
Online (“Corporate,” 2012; “Government,” 2012)1 the word corporate means pertaining to or 
affecting the body, and the word governance means the action or a manner of governing. The 
phrase corporate governance is a new phenomenon in the financial surge or rise of the 
financial sectors of the last fifteen years (Mallin, 2007).  
The phrase corporate governance has received more attention and become more important in 
the business world, particularly since the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. Corporate 
governance issues arise in corporations whenever there is a potential conflict of interest 
between internal and external stakeholders, for example between managers and shareholders 
(this is often referred to as the agency problem). Such conflicts are often associated with 
“asymmetric information,” where the internal stakeholders have superior knowledge 
compared to that of the external stakeholders. In such a situation, transaction costs may lead 
to incomplete contracts or gaps (Hart, 1995) that make other mechanisms for resolving or 
avoiding conflicts necessary. Such mechanisms are collectively referred to as corporate 
governance. However, how can one arrive at a definition of corporate governance? A number 
of definitions for corporate governance are in use around the world. 
Thus, there is no specific definition for describing corporate governance. There are generally 
many different definitions of corporate governance, all with different views about what it 
                                                 
1
 http://www.oed.com 
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means. The essential ideas of corporate governance have to do with a system of control in the 
company; the relationship between the board of directors, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders; and managing the company in accordance with the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders (Hussain and Mallin, 2002). 
There are two approaches to describing corporate governance. These approaches depend on 
two theories: the first approach depends on the agency theory. This approach is a simple 
pattern that describes corporate governance as a relationship between a company and its 
shareholders (Solomon, 2007). The second approach, which depends on the stakeholder 
theory, is a more widely used pattern that describes corporate governance as a web of 
relationships between a company and its stakeholders, such as employees, customers, 
suppliers, shareholders, and managers (Solomon, 2007).  
In a 1992 report, Sir Adrian Cadbury provided a simple and general definition of corporate 
governance. Cadbury (1992, p.7) stated that, “corporate governance is the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.” Cadbury (1992) focused on the board of directors 
and on how the members of the board can manage the company in the best way. Cadbury’s 
(1992) definition focused on the internal processes of the company and on the responsibility 
of the board of directors, which include setting the plan, devising a strategy, and supervising 
the management of the business. Also, this report included in the role of shareholders the 
appointing of directors and auditors to obtain and build a good structure of corporate 
governance. 
In addition, Parkinson (1993) examined corporate governance under the interests of 
shareholders and how the managers work in the interests of shareholders. Parkinson (1993, 
p.159) defined corporate governance as “the process of supervision and control intended to 
ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance with the interest of shareholders.” 
This definition includes only shareholders. However, Parkinson’s (1993) definition implicitly 
involves managers’ setting up of methods and processes to control the company in 
accordance with shareholders’ interests. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) defined corporate governance as “the ways in which the 
suppliers of finance to a corporation assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.” This definition focuses on the suppliers of finance, with respect to their 
confidence concerning their money and how the company can manage this money in the best 
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way, in order to give the suppliers a good return on their money. Actually, the suppliers of 
money (creditors) are among those stakeholders who have some interests in the corporation, 
who invest money by supplying the company with funds, and expect to have good legal 
protection to receive good interest from the company. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) (2004, p.11) 
defined corporate governance as involving:  
'' a set of relationships between a company’s management; its board; its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined ''.   
This definition is broad because it looks at three entities: the board of directors, the 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. The OECD’s (2004) definition reflects the idea that 
when the company establishes a good relationship between these parts, such an action leads 
to improved performance, efficiency, and growth; also, investors become more confident in 
investing money. 
Tricker (1984, p.6-7) gave a broad definition of corporate governance, stating that ''the 
governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the company per se, but 
with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive 
actions of the management, and with satisfying legitimate expectation of accountability and 
regulations by interests beyond the corporate boundaries''. This definition of corporate 
governance does not focus exclusively on shareholders, but looks at other company 
stakeholders and accountability, and how all stakeholders can receive equal treatment as well 
as their interests in the company. 
Keasey and Wright (1993) defined corporate governance as a sum of the structure, process, 
cultures, and system that engender the successful operation of the organization. This 
definition describes corporate governance as a collective of structure, process, cultures, and 
systems working together to produce success and boost productivity. This definition reflects 
the idea that a company’s success depends on applying the standards and guidelines of 
corporate governance.  
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Solomon (2010, p.6) defined corporate governance as “the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity.” This definition incorporates checks and balances into the rules and 
principles of the company (internal) and its environments (external); it is a wider definition of 
corporate governance because its main ideas are to describe corporate governance. These 
ideas are: 
1. Corporate governance is a system to manage and direct the company. 
2. Corporate governance must look at the internal structure and the external environment. 
Zheka (2005, p.452) said that ''corporate governance delimits the distribution of the rights and 
duties amongst the different participants in the firm, and sets rules and procedures for making 
decisions. Corporate governance also provides structures through which aims and objectives 
are set, and through which monitoring is carried out''. This definition looks at corporate 
governance as a distribution system for dividing rules and rights amongst stakeholders in 
order to make good decisions. However, good corporate governance must take into account 
all of the different participants who have a rightful decision in the company. 
From all of these definitions, we can derive many various perspectives that describe corporate 
governance. Some of these definitions depend on agency theory to determine the relationship 
between shareholders and its company. However, some of the broader definitions of 
corporate governance consider stakeholders and external environments. Corporate 
governance contains rules, guidelines, systems, and standards to manage, balance, and control 
companies according to the interests of all stakeholders, to increase the performance and 
efficiency of the company. Also, corporate governance must consider the external 
environments, as well as establish good principles and guidelines that are commensurate with 
the environment, such as an Islamic environment. Lastly, a corporate governance system 
gives and provides more confidence to all stakeholders who deal with the company, not just 
shareholders. 
2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance has grown rapidly in the last decade and has become an essential 
feature of companies (Hussain and Mallin, 2002). Recently, in the wake of corporate scandals 
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afflicting such organisations as Enron, Tyco, Adelphi and others, corporate governance has 
begun receiving more attention (Harris and Raviv, 2008). Mallin (2007) outlined some 
reasons corporate governance has been given more importance: 
1- Corporate governance is an appropriate system of control that helps to maintain the 
company’s assets. 
2- It prevents individuals from having too power and influence. 
3- It is focused on the relationships among a company’s management, board of directors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
4- It ensures the management and direction of the company will be in the best interests 
of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
5- It gives investors more confidence by encouraging both transparency and 
accountability. 
Good corporate governance is essential to attracting both foreign and new investment, 
particularly in developing countries (Mallin, 2007). Good corporate governance may result in 
efficiency gains, more output or value added (Love, 2011). Also, a corporate governance 
system is very important in protecting minority shareholders and creditors from risk (La Porta 
et al., 2000). However, the main objective of corporate governance is to ensure fairness to all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders, and this is to be attained through greater transparency and 
accountability (Hasan, 2009). 
Claessens (2006) outlined five reasons corporate governance is important for economic 
development in many countries: 
1- Privatisation: The importance of corporate governance is increased because the firm 
has gone to the public market to seek more capital. 
2- Liberalisation: Trade liberalisation and the opening up of financial markets leads to 
more capital from various countries; this makes good corporate governance more 
important. 
3- The results of increasing firm size, the growing role of financial intermediaries, and 
the growth of institutional investors in many countries have increased the need for a 
good corporate governance system. 
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4- The deregulation and reform of many firms and companies, along with new 
institutional arrangements, have led to the need for a better corporate governance 
system. 
5- More international financial integration results in good corporate governance. 
In addition, Claessens (2006) mentioned that the application of corporate governance can 
have a positive effect on growth and development via several related channels, as follows: 
1. Increased access to external financing by firms that may encourage more foreign and 
local investors to invest in their listed companies, leading to enhanced growth and 
more employment. 
2. Lower capital costs and associated higher firm values attracting investment that leads 
to growth and development. 
3. Better operational performance through better allocation of resources and better 
management, enhancing growth and development. 
4. The existence of good practices in corporate governance, reducing financial crises 
and enhancing growth and development; this is an opposite relationship between 
financial crises and growth. 
5. The concept of good corporate governance practices creates a better relationship with 
all stakeholders, which helps to improve social and labour relationships and areas 
such as environment protection.  
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
There are two main models of corporate governance, the first being the shareholder model, or 
the market-based system, or what some scholars refer to as the outsider model, and as the 
second being the stakeholder model, also known as the European model, which is an insider-
dominated system. These models are the most widespread models being used in the most 
countries. However, there is a new model that describes corporate governance in the Islamic 
view: the Islamic model looks at all stakeholder groups from the point of view of Shari'ya 
law.  
Firstly, the shareholder model of corporate governance, also known as the market-based 
system, the Anglo-Saxon model, or the principal agent model, is used mainly in the United 
States and the United Kingdom and is an outsider-dominated system (Prowse, 1994; Hasan, 
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2009; Solomon, 2007). The aim of the shareholder model is to maximise shareholder wealth 
(Maher and Andersson, 2000). Maher and Andersson (2000) also mentioned that the problem 
of corporate governance under this model arises from the principal-agent relationship because 
the interests of the principals may differ from those of the agents. Another problem that is 
associated with the principal-agent problem is incomplete contracts, which lead to transaction 
costs (Hart, 1995). 
Secondly, the stakeholder model of corporate governance, also known as the European 
model, is an insider-dominated system (Solomon, 2007; Hasan, 2009). The stakeholder 
model is used by a majority of European countries including Germany, France, and Greece 
(Hasan, 2009). The stakeholder model is relationship-based because of the close relationship 
between companies and their dominant shareholders (Solomon, 2007). The main objective of 
this model is to consider social responsibility for all stakeholder interests rather than only the 
shareholders’ interests (Maher and Andersson, 2000). However, Solomon (2007) highlighted 
some problems with this model. The results of the close relationship between owners and 
managers seem to reduce the agency problem and also seem to be a positive characteristic 
because they are the same people (Solomon, 2007). However, Solomon also mentioned that 
the low level of separation between ownership and control can lead to abuses of power 
(2007). In addition, she indicated that there is little transparency and accountability, so 
minority shareholders may not be able to obtain enough information about the company’s 
operations (2007). 
Solomon (2007) explained the main differences between the shareholder model (outsider-
dominated) and the stakeholder model (insider-dominated) with the following table: 
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Table ‎2-1 Comparison between stakeholder and shareholder models 
Insider (stakeholder model) Outsider (shareholder model) 
Firms owned predominantly by insider 
shareholders who also wield control over 
management 
Large firms controlled by managers but 
owned predominantly by outside 
shareholders 
System characterized by little separation of 
ownership and control such that agency 
problems are rare 
System characterized by separation of 
ownership and control, which engenders 
significant agency problems 
Hostile takeover activity is rare Frequent hostile takeovers acting as a 
disciplining mechanism on company 
management 
Concentration of ownership in a small group 
of shareholders (founding family members, 
other companies through pyramidal 
structures, state ownership) 
Dispersed ownership 
Excessive control by a small group of 
‘insider’ shareholders 
Moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders 
Wealth transfer from minority shareholders 
to majority shareholders 
No transfer of wealth from minority 
shareholders to majority shareholders 
Weak investor protection in company low Strong investor protection in company low 
Potential for abuse of power by majority 
shareholders 
Potential for shareholder democracy 
Majority shareholders tend to have more 
‘voice’ in their investee companies 
Shareholding characterized more by ‘exit’ 
than by ‘voice’ 
Source: Solomon (2007) 
In addition, Cernat (2004) summarised the different labour-related and capital-related aspects 
of the two models of corporate governance in the table below. 
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Table ‎2-2 Aspects of labour-related and capital-related of two models of corporate governance 
Aspects Anglo-Saxon  Continental  
Labour-related    
Co-operation between social 
partners 
Conflictual or minimal contract Extensive at national level 
Labour organizations Fragmented and weak Strong, centralized unions 
Labour market flexibility Poor internal flexibility; high 
external flexibility 
High internal flexibility; lower 
external flexibility 
Employee influence Limited Extensive through works 
councils and co-determination 
Capital-related   
Ownership structure Widely dispersed ownership; 
dividends prioritized 
Banks and other corporations 
and major shareholders; 
dividends less prioritized 
Role of banks Banks play a minimal role in 
corporate ownership 
Important both in corporate 
finance and control 
Family-controlled firms General separation of equity 
holding and management  
Family ownership important 
only for small- and medium-
sized firms 
Management boards One-tier boards Two-tier boards 
Market for corporate control Hostile takeovers are the 
'correction mechanisms' for 
management failure 
Takeovers are restricted  
Role of stock exchange  Strong role in corporate finance Reduced role 
Source: Adapted from Rhodes and van Apeldoorn (1997) (Cited in Cernat, 2004) 
Thirdly, the Islamic model of corporate governance is a new model that delineates corporate 
governance from the Islamic point of view. There is little literature that explains and 
describes corporate governance in the Islamic view. The Islamic corporate governance model 
is very similar to the stakeholder model of corporate governance, tying Shari'ya law 
objectives to the stakeholder model of corporate governance (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009). 
According to Hasan (2009, p. 286), “the Islamic corporate governance based on the 
stakeholder-oriented model is preoccupied by the two fundamental concepts of Shari'ya 
principles of property rights and contracted frameworks”. Corporate governance in the 
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Islamic view considers all stakeholder groups based on Shari'ya, which is related to the 
ethical values of Islam such as fairness and truthfulness (Kasri, 2009). 
Bhatti and Bhatti (2009) stated that the model of Islamic corporate governance: 
1- is based on the principle of property rights and contracted frameworks; 
2- is governed by Islamic law, or Shari'ya; and 
3- includes all stakeholders. 
In accordance with these principles, Islamic corporate governance is a comprehensive model 
of corporate governance because it considers the shareholders and all stakeholder groups 
according to ethical standards set by Islam. Hasan (2009) provided a table that explained the 
difference between three models of corporate governance: the Anglo-Saxon model 
(shareholders), the European model (stakeholders), and the Shari'ya model (Islamic corporate 
governance): 
Table ‎2-3 The difference between Anglo-Saxon, European and Shari'ya models 
Aspects Anglo-Saxon 
(shareholder model) 
European 
(stakeholder model) 
Shari'ya Model 
Episteme Rationalism and 
Rationality 
Rationalism and 
Rationality 
Tawhid 
Objective:    
Rights and Interests To protect the 
interests and rights of 
the shareholders 
To protect the 
interests and rights of 
the community in 
relation to the 
corporation 
To protect the 
interests and rights of 
all stakeholders but 
subject to the rules of 
Shari'ya 
Corporate goal Shareholders 
controlling managers 
for the purpose of 
shareholders’ profit 
Society controlling 
corporation for the 
purpose of social 
welfare 
Acknowledging 
being profit motive 
oriented while being 
in balance with the 
Shari'ya objectives 
and principles  
Nature of Management Controlling Concept of 
Chapter Two 
25 | P a g e  
General Review of Corporate Governance 
Management dominated  shareholder 
dominated 
vicegerency and 
Shura  
Management Board One-tier board  Two-tier board Two-tier board. 
Shari'ya board as the 
ultimate governance 
Capital-related and 
Ownership 
Structure  
Widely dispersed 
ownership; dividends 
prioritized 
Bank and other 
corporations are 
major shareholders; 
dividends less 
prioritized 
Shareholders and 
depositors or 
investment account 
holders  
Source: Hasan (2009) 
Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) compared the Islamic corporate governance principles with the OECD 
principles of corporate governance shown in this table: 
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Table ‎2-4 Comparison between Islamic corporate governance and OECD principles 
 OECD Principles and Annotation Islamic Principles 
1- Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
  Promotion of transparent and efficient markets with 
rule of law and division of responsibilities 
 Promotion of business within ethical framework of 
Shari'ya 
 Belief in profit and loss 
 Primacy of justice and social welfare with social and 
spiritual obligations 
 Prohibition of interest 
2- The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
  Basic shareholder rights 
 Participation in decision-making at the general 
meetings 
 Structure and arrangement markets for corporate 
control 
 Ownership rights by all shareholders, including 
institutional shareholders 
 Consultative process between shareholders and 
institutional shareholders 
 Property as a trust from God 
 Sole authority is God 
 Society as stakeholders 
 Accountability not only to stakeholders but also to God, 
the ultimate owner 
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3- The equitable treatment of shareholders 
  Protection of minority and foreign shareholders 
 
 Values of justice and fairness Equitable distribution of 
wealth to all stakeholders and disadvantaged members 
in the form of Zakat and Sadqa 
 Social and individual welfare with both spiritual and 
moral obligations 
 Sensation of equality 
4- The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
  Creating wealth, jobs, and sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises 
 Islamic accountability to Falah and social welfare 
orientation 
 Haram/Halal dichotomy in transaction 
 Social and individual welfare both spiritually and 
materially 
 Consideration of whole community 
5- Disclosure and transparency 
  Matters regarding corporations 
 Financial situations 
 Shari'ya accountability and  compliance 
 Socio-economic objectives related to firms’ control and 
Chapter Two 
28 | P a g e  
General Review of Corporate Governance 
 Performance, ownership, and governance accountability to all stakeholders 
 Justice, equality, truthfulness, and transparency 
 Wider accountability with written as well as oral 
disclosure 
6- The responsibilities of the board 
  Strategic guidance 
 Monitoring of management 
 Accountability to company and stakeholders 
 Accountability not only to the company, board, or 
stakeholders but also to Allah, the ultimate authority, 
who leads to welfare and success 
 Holistic and integrative guidance 
 Negotiation and co-operation 
 Consultation and consensus-seeking for each decision 
with stakeholders 
Source: Abu-Tapanjeh(2009) 
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In conclusion, the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia combines the Anglo-Saxon 
and European systems with a slight interjection of Islamic style. For example, a number of 
listed companies are owned by founding family members and their governance reflects the 
insider model of the European system (Solomon, 2007). The Saudi corporate governance 
system differs from the European system, because it solely maintains a one-tier board (e.g., 
the Anglo-Saxon system with a Shari’ya board consultant to discuss Islamic jurisprudence 
issues). In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a Muslim country. Therefore, it seeks to 
protect the interests and rights of all stakeholders— not just shareholders, but also those who 
are also subject to the rules of Shari’ya (Hasan, 2009).  
2.5 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
A large number of massive corporate collapse crises resulting from a weak system of 
corporate governance codes has drawn increased attention to the need to improve, develop 
and reform such regulations (Solomon, 2007). In addition, a number of reasons, including 
financial scandals, justify the existence of these codes. Scandals involving Enron and 
WorldCom led to reforms in corporate governance regulations (Mallin, 2007). Another 
reason for reform is to protect the rights of outsider investors, including both shareholders 
and creditors (La Porta et al., 2000). Additionally, the lack of transparency and inadequate 
disclosure increase the need to strengthen corporate governance regulations (Liew, 2006). 
According to Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), the two main purposes of good corporate 
governance codes are to compensate for deficiencies in legal protections for investors and to 
enhance not only the efficiency of governance but also the legitimacy of national companies 
in the global financial market. 
The 1990s saw growing interest in reforming, revising and creating regulations to address 
new areas in corporate governance (La Porta et al., 2000), and this interest continued into the 
2000s. Each country has a different legal system, cultural background, business forms and 
ownership structure, which leads to the creation and reform of different versions of corporate 
governance (Mallin, 2007). The development of corporate governance regulations, codes and 
guidelines has often been driven by financial scandal, corporate collapses and other financial 
crises (Mallin, 2007). These regulations have positive impacts upon company activities, 
capital costs, growth, firm performance and the development of capital markets (Martynova, 
2006). 
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Corporate governance regulations, guidelines and codes have been issued by various bodies, 
including investment communities, academics, stock exchange bodies and investment 
representative groups (Mallin, 2007). For example, in Saudi Arabia, the board of the Capital 
Market Authority issued corporate governance regulations in 2006, while in Bahrain, the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Central Bank of Bahrain and National Corporate 
Governance Committee jointly developed a corporate governance code (Corporate 
Governance Code, Kingdom of Bahrain, 2010). The United Kingdom (UK) has used many 
codes for corporate governance, including the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports. Each 
code addressed a specific issue in the corporate governance mechanisms. In 2008, the 
Financial Reporting Council in the UK issued the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
bringing together the recommendations of the earlier reports to increase confidence in 
financial reporting (Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2008). Most of these codes 
are based on a comply-or-explain philosophy, under which compliance with their principles 
is not mandatory but disclosure of compliance or non-compliance is (MacNeil and Li, 2006). 
For example, the UK’s Combined Code (2003) required that companies follow the full 
disclosure requirements and state whether they have complied with the code’s provisions or 
explain why not (Mallin, 2007). 
The following table shows when countries and organisation first issued a corporate 
governance code. 
Table ‎2-5 The first issued of corporate governance codes among countries 
Year Country 
1992 UK 
1994 Canada and South Africa 
1995 France, Australia and Pan-Europe 
1996 Spain 
1997 United States of America, The Netherlands and Japan 
1998 Belgium, Germany, India, Italy and Thailand 
1999 The Commonwealth, Hong Kong, Greece, ICGN, Ireland, Mexico, OECD, Portugal 
and South Korea 
2000 International comparison of corporate governance: Guidelines and codes of best 
practices in developing and emerging markets, Denmark, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Romania and the Philippines 
2001 Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Malta, Peru, Singapore and Sweden 
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2002  Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, 
Switzerland and Taiwan 
2003 Finland, Latin America, Lithuania, New Zealand, Nigeria, Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkey and Ukraine 
2004 Argentina, Bangladesh, Iceland, Mauritius, Norway and Slovenia 
2005 Jamaica and Latvia 
2006 Bosnia–Herzegovina, Egypt, Estonia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 
Antilles, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Nations 
2007 Bulgaria, Colombia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Mongolia and the United Arab 
of Emirates 
2008 Albania, Morocco, Qatar, Serbia and Tunisia 
2009 Algeria, Croatia, Georgia and Montenegro 
2010 Armenia, Bahrain, Baltic States, Ghana, Malawi and Yemen 
2011 Azerbaijan and Guernsey 
2012 Republic of Maldives  
2013 Barbados 
Source: Adopted from European Corporate Governance Institute (2013)
2
 
This study examines two codes of corporate governance, the UK codes and the OECD’s 
principles of corporate governance. The UK’s codes are addressed first, because in 1992, this 
country became the first to establish such codes. Additionally, a number of countries, 
including Taiwan, based their corporate governance codes on the UK’s (Solomon et al., 
2003). The publication of the Cadbury Report, the earliest UK report on corporate 
governance, prompted many countries to try to improve corporate governance practices (Al-
harkan 2005). Next, this research addresses the OECD’s principles of corporate governance, 
because they influenced the Saudi Arabian corporate governance codes, most of which are 
based on or are similar to those of the OECD (Alshehri, 2012).  
2.5.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK is one of the most developed countries in the world and has a well-developed market 
with various investor bases, including institutional and individual investors and financial 
institutions (Mallin, 2007). Jones and Pollitt (2001) outlined the main stages of the process by 
which committees charged with establishing corporate governance have operated: 
                                                 
2
 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php 
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1. Initial interest: In this stage, when an influence group (such as the Confederation of 
British Industries) believes that a problem exists, this belief supplies evidence of 
significant, initial interest in dealing with apparent governance problems. 
2. Formation of the committee: The committee chair and members are appointed. They 
should have enough experience to solve these problems. 
3. Terms of reference: The committee receives the official reference terms and redefines 
or elaborates upon them as it deems necessary. 
4. Deliberation: The how and wherefores of the principal workings of the committee 
take place, including writing the draft report and collecting and considering comments 
on the draft report. 
5. Compilation of the final report: The final report is put together, and the influences on 
it noted in the conclusion of the draft report. 
6. Content of the final report: Details are added to the final report, and the main 
conclusion of the committee’s report written. 
7. Presentation of the final report: The committee releases the final report to the public. 
8. Debate: This stage is related to the previous one. The most influential shapers of the 
debate are identified. 
9. Implementation: In the final stage, an agency or organization takes responsibility for 
implemented the recommendations in the report. 
The development of corporate governance in the UK can be represented by the Combined 
Codes, published in 2006 by the Financial Reporting Council (Mallin, 2007). Mallin (2007) 
explains the development of corporate governance in the UK, as illustrated in Figure 2-1 
below. 
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Figure ‎2-1 Development of corporate governance in the UK 
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According to Mallin (2007), the original Combined Code on Corporate Governance issued in 
1998 consisted of three main reports: the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports. Figure 2-
1 shows the various influences on the Combined Code. Within the first influence, four main 
reports describe specific areas of corporate governance: the Turnbull (internal control), 
Myners (institutional investment), Higgs (the role of non-executive directors’ effectiveness) 
and Smith reports (audit committee). The second influence stems from institutional investors, 
such as the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) and Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC). The third influence is the UK legal 
system of corporate governance, including company law. The fourth influence comes from 
external factors, such as the European Union (EU) review of company law and the United 
States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
2.5.1.1 The Cadbury Report (1992) 
The Cadbury Report is the first published attempt to formalize the best practices of corporate 
governance (Solomon, 2007). Following a sustained period of economic growth, especially 
1987–88, with significant increases in gross domestic product (GDP) growth and asset prices, 
1990 and 1991 saw high inflation and negative growth (Jones & Pollitt, 2001). These 
economic conditions led to spectacular corporate collapses, including of those of Coloroll and 
Robert Maxwell and the $8-billion failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) (Jones & Pollitt, 2001). Public concern about failures of corporate governance 
revealed by these collapses has since made corporate governance a more important topic of 
discussion among policymakers (Solomon, 2007). 
In May 1991, the Financial Reporting Council, London Stock Exchange and accountancy 
profession established the Cadbury Committee to address the financial aspects of corporate 
governance (Cadbury Report, 1992). The Cadbury report (1992) states two main reasons for 
the committee’s establishment: 
1. Low level of confidence in financial reporting and audit reports’ ability to provide 
safeguards: The absence of a clear framework for accounting standards was seen as 
leading to weak control and low confidence. 
2. The failure of major companies in the UK due to a weak corporate control system: 
These failures made it necessary to attend to clarifying responsibilities and raising 
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standards, and the report was seen as a means of encouraging best corporate-
governance practices. 
After the first draft of the report was released for public comment on May 27, 1992, the 
committee received more than 200 written responses to its proposals. The majority supported 
the committee’s approach, and some led to modifications in the final draft of the report. 
The Cadbury Report covered three general areas: the structure of boards of directors and its 
responsibility to adopt a code of best practices; the roles of the chairperson, non-executive 
directors, board and company secretary; and board remuneration and best practices for some 
committees. The report also offered several recommendations for auditors’ role. The last 
section dealt with the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, including institutional 
shareholders. Jones and Pollitt (2004, p. 168) described the report as “a model of how to 
conduct a corporate governance investigation” and identified a number of desirable features: 
1. Sir Adrian Cadbury was a good, visionary chairperson who energetically promoted 
his suggestions and recommendations. 
2. The Cadbury Committee reflected the main stakeholders. 
3. The issuing of a draft report was followed by consultation. 
4. The final report included recommendations that were accepted widely. 
2.5.1.2 The Greenbury Report (1995) 
A second corporate governance committee was created to address the issue of directors’ 
remuneration (Solomon, 2007). The Confederation of British Industries formed the Study 
Group on Directors’ Remuneration (CBI) in January 1995 in response to public and 
shareholder concerns about the pay and other remuneration for company directors in the UK 
(Greenbury, 1995). The Greenbury Report included details about directors’ remuneration, 
discussed disclosure and approval provisions and focused on PLC directors. The Greenbury 
Report (1995, para. 1:15) states that “the key to encouraging enhanced performance by 
directors lies in remuneration packages which link rewards to performance by both the 
company and individuals and align the interests of directors and shareholders in promoting 
the company’s progress”. According to Solomon (2007), the primary aim of the Greenbury 
Report was to provide a means to balance directors’ salaries with their performance. 
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2.5.1.3 The Hampel Report (1998) 
The Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance was established in November 1995 by the 
chairperson of the Financial Reporting Council, Sir Sydney Lipworth (Hampel, 1998). The 
committee issued a new report based on a review of the recommendations of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury committees and the implementation of the financial aspects of both corporate 
governance and directors’ remunerations (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007). The Hampel 
Committee report, published in 1998 (Mallin, 2007), discussed five major topics: the 
principles of corporate governance, the role of directors, directors’ remuneration, the role of 
shareholders, accountability and audits. A general introduction and a summary of conclusions 
and recommendations placed these topics in context. The report’s content was highly similar 
to that of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. 
The Hampel Report, though, did comment on matters with which the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports did not deal and took a different view in some areas. For example, the Hampel Report 
did not address the company secretary’s role in corporate governance, which the Cadbury 
Report discussed fully. While large, listed companies fully implemented both the Cadbury 
and Greenbury reports, smaller companies did so for most provisions but found it hard to 
comply with some. The Hampel Committee thoughtfully addressed this problem and 
distinguished between the governance standards expected of larger and of smaller companies. 
The Hampel Report’s most important contribution was its emphasis on avoiding a 
prescriptive approach to corporate governance and stipulating that companies and 
shareholders need to avoid taking a “box-ticking” approach to corporate governance. Instead, 
the Cadbury Report stressed the importance of focusing on the spirit of corporate governance 
reform (Solomon, 2007). The box-ticking approach does not account for the variety of 
circumstances and experiences among companies and even within the same company. This 
approach assumes that the roles of the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) should 
never be combined and that there is an ideal, minimum number of non-executive directors 
and maximum term for executive directors (Hampel, 1998). 
2.5.1.4 The Turnbull Report (1999) 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales established the Turnbull 
Committee to provide guidance for listed companies implementing the code’s internal control 
requirements (Turnbull, 1999). The initial impetus to create the committee came from the 
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lack of an adequate internal control system during high-profile corporate failures in the late 
1980s. In addition, the Cadbury Report had not addressed in detail the effectiveness of 
internal control (Jones & Pollitt, 2001). These codes’ objectives were to establish best 
business practices whereby internal control could be embedded in the business process by 
which a company pursues its objectives, to enable each company to apply these codes in a 
manner appropriate for its particular circumstances and to remain relevant in the continually 
changing business world (Turnbull, 1999). 
The creation of the Turnbull Committee reflected the importance of specific codes that 
address internal control systems, while the report itself highlighted the need for internal 
controls, such as safeguarding shareholders’ investments and company assets, ensuring the 
reliability of internal and external reporting and complying with law and regulations. The 
Turnbull Report confirmed that a board of directors is responsible for reviewing and 
assessing the effectiveness of a company’s system of internal control.  
2.5.1.5 The Higgs Report (2003) 
The Higgs Report addressed the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. Solomon 
(2007) explained the main reason for the establishment of this committee: The Enron scandal 
spurred the UK to re-evaluate corporate governance issues, such as the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors. 
2.5.1.6 The Combined Code 
Published in 1998, the Combined Code combined the recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel reports. Its two main sections covered companies and institutional 
investors (Mallin, 2007). In July 2003, after also reviewing the Higgs Report, the Financial 
Reporting Council issued a new draft of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
Solomon (2007) identified the primary reforms of the new code: At least half of a board of 
directors should be independent non-executives, a CEO should not be the chairperson of the 
same company, and the chairperson should be independent. The most recent revision, made 
in 2003, discussed non-executive directors. In 2006, an update to the Combined Code 
included these main changes (Mallin 2007): allowing chairpersons to serve on the 
remuneration committee, where they are considered independent; providing a vote-withheld 
option on proxy appointment forms to enable shareholders to indicate that they wish to 
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withhold their vote; and recommending that companies publish online the details of proxies 
lodged at general meetings at which votes are taken based on a show of hands. 
2.5.1.7 The UK Corporate Governance Code 
The first version of the corporate governance code in the UK was produced in 1992 by the 
Cadbury Committee (the UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code dictates good practices by outlining five main principles that include 
leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, and relations with shareholders. 
Companies that are listed in the UK are required to report on how they have applied these 
principles and either to confirm that they have complied with the Code's provisions or, where 
they have not, provide an explanation (i.e., comply or explain) (Financial Reporting Council, 
2013). The new Code applies to accounting periods that began on or after 29 June 2010. 
Further, as a result of the new Listing Regime that was introduced in April 2010, the new 
Code also applies to all companies with a Premium Listing of equity shares, regardless of 
whether they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere (the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010). The Code that was revised in September 2012 follows a consultation exercise that 
sought views on whether to amend the UK Corporate Governance Code and the associated 
Guidance on Audit Committee (Financial Reporting Council, 2013). 
2.5.2 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The international, Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has 29 member countries (Solomon, 2007). The OECD has created advanced 
guidelines and an agenda for corporate governance that consider how it can affect 
competition. In addition, these guidelines give a vital role to investment institutions; through 
the principles, such companies can utilize practices that increase and sustain the value of their 
investments. The OECD principles also give guidance to boards trying to determine how to 
improve the performance of their companies. The main purpose of the OECD is to assist 
OECD and non-OECD governments in evaluating and improving the legal, institutional and 
regulatory framework of corporate governance and to give guidance and suggestions to stock 
markets, investors, corporations and other parties that have a role in developing good 
corporate governance (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004). These principles 
focus on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-financial, and are extremely 
important tools to improve corporate governance in non-traded companies. 
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2.5.2.1 History of OECD’s Approach to Corporate Governance 
At a council meeting in April 1998, the OECD ministry established its principles of corporate 
governance (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004). Several institutional 
elements—national governments, relevant international organisations and certain private 
sector players—contributed to the creation of these principles. At a 2002 ministerial-level 
OECD council meeting, the OECD Steering Group on corporate governance, World Bank, 
Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a 
survey among OECD countries to assess and improve the principles of corporate governance 
(OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004).  
2.5.2.2 Definition 
The OECD principles provide guidance and recommendations for stock market investors, 
corporations and other important parties involved in shaping corporate governance. The 
OECD believes that corporate governance is an important factor in increasing economic 
efficiency and growth and investor confidence. The OECD defines corporate governance as  
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and 
its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. (OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance, 2004, p. 11) 
The OECD states that corporate governance depends on the legal, regulatory and institutional 
environment (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004). Influenced by other factors 
including business ethics, the framework is designed to solve problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control. The OECD states factors that can affect corporate 
governance (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004): 
1- Controlling shareholders 
2- Institutional investors 
3- Creditors 
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4- Employees and other stakeholders 
The main areas addressed by the OECD principles are as follows (OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004). 
1- Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
The corporate governance framework should enhance and support transparent and efficient 
markets. The OECD suggests that, to build a strong, effective corporate governance 
framework, the focus should be on increasing improvements to economic performance. 
Additionally, this framework should be transparent, enforceable and compatible with the rule 
of law. Under strong corporate governance, the division of responsibilities is clear. An 
effective corporate governance framework also includes supervisors and regulators who have 
the authority to do their duties in a professional, objective manner. 
2- Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
An important principle held by the OECD is that the corporate governance framework should 
protect shareholders’ rights to:  
 Secure methods of ownership registration 
 Buy, sell or transfer shares 
 Receive relevant and timely information about the company 
 Vote in general shareholder meetings 
 Elect board members 
 Share in the profits with liability limited by the number of shares investors own  
In addition, the OECD has discussed points related to shareholders meetings and voting 
procedures. Shareholders should know the location, date and agenda of a meeting far enough 
in advance to decide if they will attend. When shareholders can be present at meetings, they 
should ask board members questions about financial reporting and the annual external audit 
report. Shareholders can also elect and nominate board members, which the OECD supports 
as a basic right. To elect a suitable member, shareholders should be provided full disclosure 
about each candidate’s experience and background during the nomination process. As well, 
the board’s remuneration policy should be disclosed because, according to the OECD, it is 
important to know the specific link between remuneration and company performance. As 
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well, organization rules and regulations governing acquisitions and mergers should be clearly 
articulated and disclosed to keep investors informed about their rights. 
3- Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
This principle is important in building any framework for corporate governance because it 
ensures the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. This principle mandates the following points: 
 All shareholders at the same stage should be treated equally. 
 Investor trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. This situation 
occurs when investors have a close relationship with a member of the board of 
directors or a manager. 
4- Stakeholders’ Role in Corporate Governance: 
A corporate governance framework should address the rights of stakeholders as established 
by law or general agreement. Stakeholders play an important role in corporate governance 
because they contribute valuable resources for building competitive, profitable companies. In 
addition, the law protects stakeholders’ benefits. When their interests or rights are violated, 
they should obtain effective redress. 
Employees are stakeholders. The OECD recommends developing mechanisms to improve 
employee performance, which invests in the corporation by increasing employees’ skills and 
knowledge. These stakeholders are a pillar of the corporate governance framework and 
should have timely access to relevant information. Creditors are another important 
stakeholder whose rights are also protected by the corporate-governance framework. 
5- Disclosure and Transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that all important, accurate information 
about the corporation, including financial reports, financial performance and ownership 
structure, is disclosed in a timely. A strong disclosure policy is an important basis for 
increasing transparency, attracting money and capital and building confidence in the capital 
market. Low transparency, on the other hand, can decrease market value and crate a lack of 
confidence. The OECD recommends that disclosure include the following: 
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 The company’s financial position and operating results 
 Company objectives and policies 
 Ownership structure and the rights of ownership 
 Remuneration policy for board members 
 Any foreseeable risk factors 
6-  Responsibilities of the Board 
 The corporate governance framework gives strategic guidance to corporations. 
 The board of directors should act in the interests of the company, shareholders 
and employees. 
 The board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
 The board should apply high ethical standards. 
 The board should perform the following functions: 
 Review and guide corporate strategy 
 Assess governance practices’ effectiveness and make changes 
 Clearly disclose and communicate information  
 Ensure the integrity of financial reports 
 Manage and prevent conflicts of interests among management, board members 
and shareholders 
Solomon (2007) stated that the OECD principles are one of the most significant influences on 
corporate governance reform globally and form the basis for many international codes, acting 
as an umbrella for many corporate-governance regulations around the world (Steger and 
Amann, 2008, as cited in Alshehri, 2012). The OECD principles seek to set minimal, 
acceptable standards and codes for the best practices of corporate governance, protecting the 
market and shareholders (Alshehri, 2012). 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a general review of corporate governance concepts. Many aspects of 
corporate governance were discussed, such as definitions and models. Also, the corporate 
governance codes were investigated in greater detail especially in the UK and the OECD 
principles. However, the recommendations of corporate governance codes are based on ideas 
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about how companies ought to be governed, which are derived from, or influenced by, 
various theories. Also, theories have been developed to try to explain the actual governance 
practices that are observed. The next chapter will a theoretical framework of corporate 
governance. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are different theories that describe and explain the mechanisms of corporate 
governance. This chapter will concern itself with five different theories of corporate 
governance: agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, transaction cost 
economics, and resource dependence theory. All of these theories have a specific view and 
objectives that reflect corporate governance mechanisms. Before starting a review of the 
empirical literature on corporate governance (see Chapter 4), we need to understand the 
theoretical framework that explains the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. At the end of this chapter, we will provide a comparison 
of all of these theories in table format. 
3.2 AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory is one of the theories most widely employed by researchers and scholars in 
business disciplines like accounting, marketing, finance, and economics (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Most of the research concerned with corporate governance applies agency theory in their 
studies (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2003; Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Al-Saidi, 2010; Bianco and Casavola, 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Brudney, 1985). Agency theory concerns and describes the relationship 
between shareholders and mangers. Ross (1973, p. 134) stated, ''an agency relationship has 
arisen between two (or more) parties when, one designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, 
or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in particular domain of decision 
problem''.  
According to Cadbury (2002), the agency problem has existed as long as there has been 
separation of ownership and control. Agency was first analysed in the 18th century by Adam 
Smith (1776), who explored the problem from the perspective of how to separate corporate 
ownership and control. Adam Smith (1776, as cited in Cadbury, 2002, p. 4) held that “the 
directors of such companies however being the managers rather of other people’s money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance which the partners in private copartnery frequently watch over their own … 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company”. 
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Berle and Means (1932), who provided an explanation of the relationship between company 
managers and investors in the United States, observed that large corporations were generally 
run by managers who had relatively small ownership interests in the firms they managed. The 
modern formulation of agency theory is provided by Jensen and Meckling in their paper titled 
‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ that was 
published in 1976. Agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as 
''a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some of the 
decision making authority to the agent''.  
Agency theory attempts to address two main problems that can arise in a company that stem 
directly from the agency relationship. First, given that a conflict of interest in goals and 
strategies can occur between agents and principals, and since it can be difficult for the 
principals to verify exactly what the agent is doing (this is sometimes referred to as the 
‘moral hazard’ problem), how can the agent be provided with incentives to act in the interest 
of the principal? How, alternatively, can structures be established that prevent the agent from 
acting against the interest of the principal? (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second problem is 
encountered when the agent and the principals have different beliefs (this is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘adverse selection’ problem); for example, when there is a conflict about 
what constitutes acceptable risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). La Porta et al. (2000) mentioned another 
problem related to conflicts of interest that arise among different shareholders rather than 
between managers and shareholders. This problem arises when controlling shareholders can 
apply and act on policies that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. In 
another study, La Porta et al. (1999) documented that controlling shareholders have strong 
incentives to monitor managers and to maximise profits. 
Eisenhardt (1989) has provided a table that summarises agency theory overview: 
Table ‎3-1 Overview of Agency Theory 
Key idea Principal–agent relationship should reflect economically efficient 
organisation of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human 
assumptions 
Self-interest 
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Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organisational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Economic efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information 
assumption 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting 
problems 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals 
and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
 
Agency theory assumes that economic actors will behave so as to maximise their own 
utilities. Hence owners of a business will seek to maximise the value of the business 
(shareholder value). However, the interests of managers may not be the same as those of the 
owners, and hence the agent may not always work to serve the interests of the owners, or the 
agent may work only partly in the best interests of the owners, from which conflicts of 
interest may arise between the agent and the principals. For example, the agents may not use 
their power fully to manage corporations in the way that would be most likely to maximise 
shareholder value or may take on risks as they pursue interests that are attractive to them but 
that the owners or investors would prefer to avoid. Another problem is information 
asymmetry, whereby the investors and the agent have access to different sources of 
information, which can result in miscommunication and error (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007). 
According to Byrd et al. (1998), the conflicts between agents and principals can be related to 
effort, horizon, differential risk preference, and asset use as defined in the table below: 
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Table ‎3-2 Types of Agency Problems 
Agency Problems Definitions 
Effort Managers may have incentives to exert less effort than stockholders expect 
them to. 
Horizon Managers tend to have shorter horizons for achieving investment results than 
stockholders have. 
Differential risk 
preference 
Managers typically have so much of their wealth tied to the on-going viability 
of the firm that they tend to be more risk-averse than stockholders. 
Asset use Managers can have incentives to misuse corporate assets or to consume 
excessive perks because they do not bear the full costs of such actions. 
Source: Byrd et al. (1998). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the principal can limit and reduce the divergence 
of interests with the agent by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs that are designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) agreed that establishing any type of agency relationship will 
incur three costs (as cited in Ishak, 2004): 
1. Monitoring expenditures, which are incurred by the principal to give appropriate 
incentives to ensure that agents will act in the interests of the principal. 
2. Bonding expenditures, which are incurred by the agent to guarantee the principal(s) 
that their interests are being pursued. 
3. Residual costs, which are incurred when bonding and monitoring are unable to solve 
all agency conflicts. 
Indeed, agency costs are higher in firms that are not 100 per cent owned by their managers, 
and these costs increase as the equity share of the owner-manager declines (Ang et al., 2000). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) stated that ''agency costs will be generated by the 
divergence between his interests (they mean managers) and those of outside shareholders, 
since he will then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out 
in maximizing his own utility''.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) focused on how to reduce agency costs by maintaining 
separation between ownership (principals) and control (agents). On the other hand, they held 
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that “it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the 
agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint” (p. 308). Agency costs 
arise when the interests of the managers are not aligned with those of the owners, which may 
lead to the formation of preferences for on-the-job perks, shirking, and working toward self-
interested and entrenched aims that tend to reduce the owners’ (shareholders’) wealth (Ang et 
al., 2000).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioned a further problem of agency: the conflict between 
debt holders and shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) documented that the agency 
problem in this situation refers to the difficulties debt holders have in assuring that their funds 
are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects. Denis (2001, p. 205) explained this 
conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders as follows: “Management may 
choose to return cash to equity investors via dividends or repurchases, management is 
obligated to return specified amount of cash to debtholders at specified times or risk the loss 
of some or all of its control rights”.  
Existing empirical studies provide some evidence that financial and investment decisions as 
well as firm values and board of directors and ownership structures are affected by the 
presence of agency conflict (Florackis, 2008). For example, Bathala and Rao (1995, p. 59) 
claimed that “agency theory ascribes a significant role to the board of directors in the 
organizational and governance structure of the typical large corporation”. Cadbury (2002) 
suggests that the agency problem is an important problem to be considered in corporate 
governance, given that it has its influence on the structure and composition of boards, on the 
disclosure requirements, and on the balance of power between shareholders and directors.  
Furthermore, John and Senbet (1998) classified the agency perspective on corporate 
governance into two categories. They mentioned that the first perspective is managerialism, 
which refers to self-serving behaviours by managers. John and Senbet documented large 
corporations, particularly in the US, which were owned by a large number of shareholders 
and whose managers tended to lack major stock ownership positions, which led managers to 
push for the greatest interests even if doing so was illegal. The second perspective is debt 
agency, which refers to situations where the debt contract authorizes managers to work on 
behalf of owners (equity holders) to make sub-optimal investments and financial decisions by 
departing from the principle of value maximisation (John & Senbet, 1998).  
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Agency theory involves two patterns of development: the positivist theory of agency and 
principal–agent theory (Jensen, 1983). The two patterns are based on a common unit of 
analysis, in which the contract between the principals and the agent shares people, the 
organisation, and information; however, the two patterns differ in style, dependent variables, 
and mathematical rigour (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The first approach to agency theory is called the positivist agency theory. This theory 
subscribes to a broad idea of governance, in which the principals and the agent, when they are 
in conflict, set a goal and describe the governance mechanisms by which they will solve the 
agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). Positivist agency theory has focused particularly on 
cases of the principal–agent relationship between owners and managers of large public 
corporations (Berle & Means, 1932, as cited in Eisenhardt, 1989). The main role of theory in 
this approach is to provide testable hypotheses about practice in corporations. Within the 
assumptions set out above, it is assumed that agency contracts and structures are optimal in 
the sense that they represent the most economically efficient arrangements possible, given the 
constraints within which agents and principals are operating. Agency theory has a role in 
explaining why observed contracts and structures take the form observed in practice. 
Most of the literature on agency theory focuses on the agent-principal relationships between 
managers and shareholders, where the principal–principal (dispersed - controlled) ownerships 
have little direct control over management (Ishak, 2004). The principal–principal conflict is 
one of the major agency problems in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). Ownership 
concentration is common in most emerging markets (Wang and Shailer, 2009). According to 
agency theory, the presence of concentrated ownership provides an incentive to monitor and 
evaluate the performance of management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). La Porta et al. (1998) 
argued that concentrated ownership protected other shareholders’ interests when the legal 
system provided only weak protection for minority shareholders. The principal– principal 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are rooted in 
concentrated ownership, family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak 
legal protection of minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). Young et al. (2008) explained 
the differences between traditional principal–agent conflicts and principal–principal conflicts.  
Grossman and Hart (1980) mentioned another problem related to agency cost: the free rider 
problem. This is most commonly seen when individual shareholders who own a small 
number of shares and do not have the power to protect their interests appear to take a free ride 
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and let others monitor the behaviour of the managers (Ishak, 2004). According to Al-Saidi 
(2010), the free ride problem arises when just one shareholder incurs all the costs and 
expenditures associated with reform but receives benefits and advantages in proportion to his 
or her ownership. This, in turn, gives managers the ability to pursue opportunistic behaviour 
and serve their own interests at shareholders’ expense. 
In Saudi Arabia, the agency costs of the listed companies may results from conflicts of 
interest between managers and owners (Alghamdi, 2012). Saudi Arabia is an emerging 
economy and is incurring another type of agency cost that arises from the conflicts of interest 
between minority ownership and concentrated ownership (Alghamdi, 2012). 
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Table ‎3-3 Principal-agent conflicts versus principal-principal conflicts 
 Principal–agent conflicts as depicted in Anglo- 
American variety of agency theory 
Principal–principal conflicts that commonly occur in emerging economies 
Goal 
incongruence 
Between fragmented, dispersed shareholders and 
professional managers. 
Between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Manifestations Strategies that benefit entrenched managers at the 
expense of shareholders in general (e.g. shirking, pet 
projects, excessive compensation, and empire building). 
Strategies that benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of minority 
shareholders (e.g. minority shareholder expropriation, nepotism, and 
cronyism). 
Institutional 
protection of 
minority 
shareholders 
Formal constraints (e.g. judicial reviews and courts) set 
an upper boundary on potential expropriation by 
majority shareholders. Informal norms generally adhere 
to shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Formal institutional protection is often lacking, corrupt, or un-enforced. 
Informal norms typically favour the interests of controlling shareholders 
over minority shareholders. 
Market for 
corporate control 
Active as a governance mechanism ‘of last resort’. Inactive even in principle. Concentrated ownership thwarts notions of 
takeover. 
Ownership 
pattern 
Dispersed – holding 5–20% equity is considered 
‘concentrated ownership’. A shareholder with 5% equity 
stake is regarded as a ‘blockholder’. 
Concentrated – often more than 50% of equity is held by controlling 
shareholder. Often structured as a ‘pyramid’ where cash flow rights are 
greater than ownership rights 
Boards of 
directors 
Legitimate legal and social institutions with fiduciary 
duty to safeguard shareholders’ interests. Research 
focuses on factors that affect day-to-day operations such 
as insiders vs. outsiders, background of directors, 
In emerging economies, boards often have yet to establish institutional 
legitimacy and thus are ineffective. Research indicates they are often the 
‘rubber stamp’ of controlling shareholders. 
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committees. 
Top management 
team  
Professional managers who have often made their way 
up through the ranks or are hired from outside after 
extensive search and scrutiny of qualifications. 
Monitored internally by boards of directors and 
externally by the managerial labour market. 
Typically family members or associates. Monitored mainly through family 
consensus or self-regulation that adheres to ‘gentlemen’s agreements’. 
Source: Young et al. (2008) 
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3.3 STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
Stewardship theory is an alternative way to explain and describe the relationship between 
agents and principals (Dicke and Ott, 2002). It is contrary to agency theory in that, while 
agency theory is based on an economic model, stewardship theory is based in psychology and 
sociology literature (Albrecht et al., 2004). This theory concerns upper managers in 
corporations. The stewardship model is based on viewing one manager as a ‘steward’ rather 
than an agent with self-interested rationale (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). According to Davis 
et al. (1997, p. 24), in stewardship theory, ‘the model of the man is based on a steward whose 
behaviour is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility 
than individualistic, self-serving behaviors.” Stewardship theory envisions the creation of a 
board that readily facilitates and empowers rather than monitors and controls employees 
(Davis et al., 1997).  
Different behaviours are implicit in the positions of agency theory and stewardship theory. 
Agency theory promotes self-serving behaviour; in contrast, stewardship theory involves pro-
organisational behaviour (Davis et al., 1997). This means that the steward will work toward 
the interests of the organisation. Also, the steward seeks to attain higher value through co-
operation rather than defection. In addition, when the interest of the steward and principal are 
not aligned, the steward will seek to make himself of higher value to the firm, because the 
steward will receive greater utility in co-operative behaviour (Davis et al., 1997).  
The steward realizes the trade-off between personal needs and organisational objectives; 
when the steward works toward organisational objectives, personal needs will follow (Davis 
et al., 1997). Also, the benefits obtained from organisational behaviour are higher than the 
benefits from individualistic and self-serving behaviour because the pro-organisational 
behaviour raises the benefits for all stakeholder groups by increasing and improving firm 
performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997).  
Stewardship theory assumes a strong relationship between the organisation’s success and the 
satisfaction of principals (Davis et al., 1997). To satisfy the principals, the steward works to 
protect and maximise the principals’ wealth via firm performance, which indicates the 
organisation’s success (Alghamdi, 2012). Stewardship theory is thus based on strictly pro-
organisational behaviour (Davis and Donaldson, 1994; Davis et al., 1997); this means that 
stewardship theory seeks to satisfy most groups (stakeholder groups). Most of the stakeholder 
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groups have interests, and the pro-organisational steward is motivated to maximise the firm’s 
performance, thereby satisfying the interests of all stakeholder groups (Davis et al., 1997). 
Stewardship theory focuses on the structure of the board of directors (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). For example, CEOs, who are both the steward and chair of the board, possess more 
power, facilities, authority, and the empowering structure to determine strategy without fear 
from an outside chair of the board (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The CEO-chair will enhance 
efficiency and productivity of the firm, and this leads to attaining performance returns on 
behalf the shareholders that are superior to those achieved in situations in which there is a 
separation of the roles of the chair and CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). 
Stewardship theory makes three assumptions with regard to the behaviour of managers 
(Ntim, 2009). It assumes that, when top managers spend their entire working lives in the 
company they govern, they better understand the business and have better knowledge than the 
outside directors (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, as cited in Ntim, 2009). The second 
assumption is that executive inside managers possess superior formal and informal 
information about the company they manage, through which they cause better decision 
making (Donaldson and Davis, 1994, as cited in Ntim, 2009). Finally, competitive internal 
and external market discipline and the fear of damaging their future managerial capital ensure 
that agency costs are minimised (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983, as cited in Ntim, 
2009).  
Table ‎3-4  Comparison between Agency theory and Stewardship theory 
 Agency theory Stewardship theory 
Behaviour Individual Collective 
Motivation Extrinsic value Intrinsic value 
Governance Monitoring Trust 
Time frame Short term Long term 
Power High  Low 
Source: Alghamdi (2012). 
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3.4   STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory is one of the essential theories that explain and describe corporate 
governance mechanisms, which are used widely as a corrective to perceived defects of 
business and business ethics. Stakeholder theory can also be used as an alternative model of 
corporate governance (Sternberg, 1997). The first use of the term ‘stakeholder theory’ was by 
Ansoff (1965) when he was defining the objectives of a firm (Alshehri, 2012). In agency 
theory, shareholders are the main concern. However, in the stakeholder theory, shareholders 
are but one of a number of important groups, such as customers, suppliers, and employees, 
which are affected by a firm’s success or failure (Heath and Norman, 2004). According to 
Mallin (2007, p. 16), “Stakeholder theory takes account of a wide group of constituents rather 
than focusing on shareholders”. By ‘constituents’, Mallin refers to the many different groups 
that have a relationship with the company; not just shareholders, but also, for example, 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and government. 
The term ‘stakeholder’ has become increasingly important in the management strategy and 
corporate governance field. It includes many kinds of people and groups that work together 
and have an impact on the firm (Sternberg, 1997). Stakeholders include a wide range of 
groups and individuals with interests that influence the company. For example, creditors are a 
group of stakeholders that includes banks or financial institutions. Creditors need to be 
confident about the safety of the money they have invested and also need to seek assurance 
from annual reports that the company is able to repay the money. The company’s objective is 
to get more money from creditors and to give creditors more confidence about their money; 
the creditors’ objective is to get debt repaid with interest (Mallin, 2007).  
Stakeholder theory was first developed by R. Edward Freeman (1984), who developed the 
basic features of the concept of stakeholder theory in his book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach (Solomon, 2007; Jones, 1995). Freeman (1984, p. 46, as cited in 
Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 856) stated: ''A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by achievement of the organization’s 
objectives''. This is a wide definition of the term that includes not only stakeholders internal 
to a company but also any group that occupies the environment that surrounds a company. 
Each group gets benefits from the company and gives the company some benefits through a 
reciprocal relationship. For example, owners have some stocks or bonds in the company, and 
they expect to get a good financial return from the company, while employees get salaries 
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and benefits such as job security and give the company their labour, services, and loyalty in 
return (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) classified stakeholder theory into three stages: descriptive, 
normative, and instrumental. Donaldson and Preston (1995) suggest that this theory may be 
used to explain and describe some corporate characteristics and behaviour. Stakeholder 
theory can be described as the nature of the company (Brenner and Cochran, 1991, as cited in 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and as what managers actually do with respect to stakeholder 
relationships (Jones, 1995).  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) normative theory can be used to interpret the corporate 
functions that include the moral and philosophical principles for firm management. Jawahar 
and McLaughlin (2001) highlighted that the normative stream of stakeholder theory concerns 
how managers should deal with corporate stakeholders. The normative stream focuses on all 
stakeholders’ interests, not just those of shareholders (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). 
Instrumental theory is used to explain the connection between stakeholder management and 
the achievement of a firm’s objectives and performance, such as growth and profitability 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). This offshoot of stakeholder theory is used to achieve the 
corporation’s performance goals (Jones, 1995). 
The key distinguishing features of the agency theory (shareholder perspective) and the 
stakeholder theory of corporate governance are summarised in table 3-5 below: 
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Table ‎3-5 Comparison between Agency theory and Stakeholder theory 
 Agency theory Stakeholder theory 
Purpose Maximise shareholder wealth Multiply the objectives of 
parties with different interests 
Governance 
structure 
Principal–agent model (managers are 
agents of shareholders) 
Team production model 
Governance process Controlling Coordination, cooperation, and 
conflict resolution 
Performance metrics Shareholder value sufficient to maintain 
investor commitment 
Fair distribution of value 
created to maintain commitment 
of multiple stakeholders 
Residual risk holder Shareholders All stakeholders 
 Source: adapted from Kochan and Rubinstein (2000, as cited in Ayuso and Argandona, 
2007). 
3.5 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS THEORY 
The transaction cost economics theory was founded by the work of Williamson (1975, 1984, 
as cited in Mallin, 2007), which builds on the earlier work of Coase (1937, as cited in Robins, 
1987). The main reason for establishing this theory is increasing transaction costs and 
growing firm sizes (Dietrich, 1994). In addition, this theory seeks to explain the framework 
of a company in terms of the optimal selection between market and hierarchal provisions 
(Clark, 2004, as cited in Alghamdi, 2012). According to Robins (1987, p.69), transaction 
costs are “those costs associated with an economic exchange that vary independent of the 
competitive market price of the goods or services exchanged”. These costs include those 
incurred for searching, information seeking, and monitoring (Robins, 1987). 
Transaction cost economics theory and agency theory are complementary, but today, given 
increases in firm size and complexity, transaction cost economics theory has become more 
useful (Solomon, 2007). Transaction cost economics theory is very closely related to agency 
theory: the latter considers the firm to be a nexus of contracts, but transaction cost economics 
theory views the firm as a particular form of governed organisation for transactions between 
one party and another (Mallin, 2007; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). 
According to Mallin (2007, p.15), the nexus of contracts approach of agency theory assumes 
a “connected group or series of contracts amongst the various players, arising because it is 
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seemingly impossible to have a contract that perfectly aligns the interests of principal and 
agent in a corporate control situation.” Mallin implied that agency theory is concerned with 
making a distinction between ownership and control. However, transaction cost economics 
theory is concerned with when the firm grows in size through technological advances or 
evolving monopolies. This requires an increase in capital, which in turn leads to additional 
shareholders (Mallin, 2007). 
Mallin (2007, p.15) stated that “there are certain economic benefits to the firm itself to 
undertake transactions internally rather than externally”. This means that a larger and more 
complex firm requires more transactions; and, to become more efficient, the firm needs to 
develop structures that minimise transaction costs. For example, it should provide its own 
internal capital market, not an external market. Then, these transactions will be completed 
more cheaply within the firm than would using an external market (Mallin, 2007; 
Williamson, 1998). This provides a link between structure and firm performance: choosing an 
efficient structure (including a governance structure) should lead to enhanced firm 
performance. 
Solomon (2007) suggested that a firm’s management should ‘internalize transactions as much 
as possible’. Solomon explained that the main reason for internalization is removing risk and 
uncertainty about the future prices of products. This reduction of risks, such as information 
asymmetry, becomes an advantage to the firm, and hence should lead to enhanced 
performance.  
3.6 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
There is another theory used in corporate governance research that has also become one of 
the most important theories in organisational and strategic management (Hillman et al., 
2009). According to Johnson (1995, p.1) stated that ''resource dependence theory is a theory 
of organization(s) that seeks to explain organizational and inter-organizational behaviour in 
terms of those critical resources which an organization must have in order to survive and 
function''. Resources dependence theory was founded with the publication of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978)’s The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective 
(as cited in Hillman et al., 2009). The central idea of this theory is that firms attempt to exert 
control over their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001).  
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The main objective of this theory is to maximise organisational autonomy; organisational 
leaders use a variety of strategies to manage external constraints and dependencies (Johnson, 
1995). According to Davis and Cobb (2009), resource dependence theory has three primary 
ideas: social context matters, organisations have strategies to enhance their autonomy and 
pursue interests, and organisations have the power to understand their internal and external 
actions. 
Resource dependence theory describes the mechanisms of corporate governance mechanisms 
and how they can affect firm performance (Hillman et al., 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1987, 
p. 163, as cited in Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) noted ''when an organization appoints an 
individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will 
concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it''. 
According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), boards can provide four primary benefits: advice 
and counsel; legitimacy; channels for communicating information between external 
organisations and the firm; and preferential access to commitments or support from important 
elements outside the firm. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the relevance of various theories that explain the field of corporate 
governance. The theoretical framework chapter enables the reader to build a full picture of 
the theories that relate to and affect corporate governance studies. These theories interpret 
with more explanation the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, 
which makes the results more logical and rational. Agency theory is the theory most often 
used to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. It is a 
fundamental theory used to develop and improve corporate governance principles, codes, and 
standards (Habbash, 2010). But other theories (such as stewardship theory or resource 
dependence theory) explain some results of the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and firm performance. 
In Saudi Arabia, the listed companies are characterised by governing ownership, different 
types of blockholder ownership (e.g., corporation, banking, and insurance companies), family 
ownership, and some small foreign ownership (Albarrak, 2011; Alghamdi, 2012). 
Concentrated ownership leads to a closer alignment of interests and goals, which could affect 
firm performance (Tam and Tan, 2007). This could mitigate the agency problem and reduce 
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agency cost (Alghamdi, 2012). Stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, stakeholder 
theory, and transaction cost economic theory are all alternative theories to support some of 
this study’s findings. The table below 3-6 summarises the main points of the aspects of each 
theory. The next chapter will review a literature that concern on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance from various theories. 
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Table ‎3-6 Comparison between Agency, Stewardship, Stakeholder, Transaction cost economics, and Resource dependence theories 
Aspect Agency theory Stewardship theory Stakeholder theory Transaction cost 
economics theory 
Resource dependence 
theory 
Founded by  Based on the ideas of 
Adam Smith (1776) 
and Berle and Means 
(1932), whose work 
provided an 
explanation of the 
separation between 
ownership and 
control. Modern 
formulation by 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). 
 
The work of 
Donaldson and Davis 
(1989–1991) 
R. Edward Freeman 
(1984) 
Based on the ideas of 
Ronald Coase (1937). 
Formulated as a distinct 
theory by Oliver 
Williamson. 
Resource dependence 
theory was founded by the 
publication of Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) The 
external control of 
organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective 
(cited in Hillman et al., 
2009). 
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Definition Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) defined an 
agency contract as a 
contract under which 
one or more person 
(the principals) 
engage another 
person (the agent) to 
perform some service 
on their behalf that 
involves delegating 
some decision 
making. 
Davis et al. (1997) 
defined stewardship 
theory as an 
organisation in which 
the model of the 
manager is based on 
a steward whose 
behaviour is ordered 
such that pro-
organisational, 
collective behaviours 
have higher utility 
than individualistic 
and self-serving 
behaviours.  
Freeman (1984) defined 
a stakeholder in an 
organisation as any 
group or individual who 
can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of 
the organisation’s 
objectives. 
Mallin (2007) defined 
stakeholder theory as 
taking account of a wide 
group of constituents 
rather than focusing on 
shareholders. 
Robin (1987) defined 
transaction cost as the 
costs associated with an 
economic exchange that 
are independent of the 
competitive market 
price of the goods or 
services exchanged. 
The central idea of this 
theory is that firms attempt 
to exert control over their 
environment by co-opting 
the resources needed to 
survive (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Jawahar 
and McLaughlin, 2001).  
 
The main 
problem 
- Agency 
problems occur 
Stewardship theory 
seeks to increase 
- To which 
shareholders 
According to Coase 
(1937), the main 
According to Johnson 
(1995, p. 1) ''Resource 
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when 
cooperative 
parties have 
different goals 
(conflict of 
interests). 
- Risk sharing 
cooperative 
behaviour and 
explores how 
organisational 
objectives can be met 
along with personal 
needs. 
  
managers should be 
accountable and 
how accountability 
is achieved. 
- How managers can 
satisfy the different 
interests of all 
stakeholders.  
problem of this theory is 
that, as a firm becomes 
larger and more 
complex, there may be 
decreasing returns to the 
entrepreneur function; 
that is, the cost of 
organising additional 
transactions within the 
firm may rise. 
dependence argument 
suggests that a given 
organization will respond to 
and become dependent on 
those organizations or 
entities in its environment 
that control resources 
which are both critical to its 
operations and over which 
it has limited control''. 
The main 
objective 
Maximising value for 
the principals (for 
companies, the 
principals are the 
shareholders) 
The objectives of the 
organisation – this 
may involve 
increasing firm 
performance or some 
other objective. 
 
The main objective of 
this theory is to produce 
benefits to all 
stakeholder groups 
(corporate social 
responsibilities). 
Minimising transaction 
costs, which leads to 
enhancing firm 
performance. 
Maximising organisational 
autonomy. 
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Unit of 
analysis 
Individual contract 
between agent and 
principal 
Contract between 
steward and principal 
Corporate social 
responsibilities 
Transaction cost Dependence resource 
Strategic 
intent 
Shareholders’ view Organisational view Stakeholders’ 
(environment’s) view 
Shareholders’ view Organisation’s view 
Behaviour Individualistic and 
self-serving 
behaviours 
Pro-organisational 
behaviour 
Social behaviour Individualistic 
behaviour moderated 
somewhat by 
organisational behaviour 
Organisational behaviour 
Focus Monitor and control Facilitate and 
empower 
Corporate social 
responsibilities 
Internalise transaction 
cost 
Resources 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the literature that focuses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The internal corporate governance mechanisms play an 
important role affect the firm performance. The literature review chapter highlights previous 
studies about the board of directors’ structure and ownership structure. This chapter provides 
an overview of the existing literature on the board of directors’ structure, with concerns on 
board size, family board members, royal family board member, outside non-executive 
directors and board committees. Also, this chapter investigates the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance through the use of several mechanisms; insider 
(managerial) ownership, family or individual ownership, institutional government ownership, 
foreign investors, financial and non-financial firm ownership. In addition, this chapter sets 
the research hypotheses after each variables dependes on the literature. 
4.2 BOARDS OF DIRECTORS STRUCTURE 
The board of directors is a very important element in the internal corporate governance 
mechanism. The board of directors of a company performs the critical functions of 
monitoring and advising top management (Coles et al., 2008). The separation of ownership 
and control in most corporations creates potential conflicts between managers and 
shareholders; these conflicts can be mitigated by the board of directors (McWilliams and Sen, 
1997). Mallin (2007) highlighted that organizations with effective boards are able to lead and 
control their companies so that they are successful. Solomon (2007, p. 77) stated that ''A 
company's board is its heart and as a heart it needs to be healthy, fit and carefully nurtured for 
the company to effectively''.  
4.2.1 ROLES, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992) indicated that the main responsibilities of a board of directors 
include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing leadership, supervising managers, 
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. Cadbury (2002) also outlined the main 
functions of a board: 
1- To define the company’s purpose. 
2- To agree on strategies, plans, and policies toward achieving that purpose. 
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3- To appoint a chief executive. 
4- To monitor and assess the performance of the executive team. 
The UK combined code (2006, p.3) stated the following:  
“The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a 
framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and 
managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the 
necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its 
objectives and review management performance. The board should set the 
company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders 
and others are understood and met.” 
Epstein and Roy (2006) (cited in Mallin, 2007) stated that a high-performance board must 
achieve three core objectives: 
1- Provide strategic guidance to ensure the company’s growth. 
2- Ensure accountability for the company and help to bring about prosperity. 
3- Ensure that a highly qualified executive team is managing the company. 
4.2.2 UNITARY AND DUAL BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
There are two different approaches with regard to boards of directors: the unitary board (one 
tier) and the dual board (two tiers). Unitary boards are found in countries that have been 
influenced by the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance and in common law countries 
(e,g., UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) (Solomon, 2007; Mallin, 2007; Falgi, 
2009). A unitary board is characterized by one single board encompassing both executive and 
non-executive directors (Mallin, 2007). A unitary board is also responsible for all aspects of a 
company’s activities, and the directors are elected by the shareholders (Mallin, 2007).  
Dual boards or two-tier boards have two separate boards, a supervisory board and a 
management board (Solomon, 2007). The two-tier model is used throughout Europe; it was 
developed in Germany (Cadbury, 2002). It deals with civil-law countries, such as Germany, 
France, Austria, and Netherlands (Solomon, 2007; Falgi, 2009). In this approach, there is a 
clear separation between the functions of supervision and management (Mallin, 2007). The 
supervisory board deals with strategic decisions (Solomon, 2007). In addition, the 
supervisory board oversees the direction of the business (Cadbury, 2002; Mallin, 2007). The 
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chairman of the company sits on the supervisory board as a non-executive (Solomon, 2007). 
The management board includes only executives and is headed by the chief executive, who 
deals with operational issues (Solomon, 2007). The management board is responsible for the 
running of the company (Cadbury, 2002). Table below summarises the key differences 
between supervisory and management boards in the dual-boards approach. 
Table ‎4-1 The differences between supervisory and management boards in the dual-board approach 
Supervisory board Management Board 
Members (shareholder representatives) are 
elected by the shareholders in a general meeting, 
or members (employee representatives) 
nominated by the employees 
 
 
Members appointed by the supervisory board  
Controls the direction of the business 
 
Manages the business  
Oversees the provision of information and that an 
appropriate system has been put in place by the 
management board 
Provides various financial information and 
reports and the installation of an appropriate 
system, e.g., a risk management system 
Source: Mallin (2007) 
4.2.3 BOARD SIZE 
Board size is a very important variable in determining firm performance. The main question 
in this part is: What is the ideal size for the board of directors? To maximize firm 
performance, Raheja (2005) documented that boards of directors should feature three types of 
members: the chief executive officer (CEO), the inside directors who are senior managers of 
the firm, and the outside directors. Two theoretical frameworks describe the relationship 
between board size and firm performance: agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
For these two theories, the relationship between board size and firm performance has 
produced mixed results (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Yermack, 1996). According to Pearce and Zahra (1992), three important reasons exist 
regarding why empirical research on the determinants of boards of directors is essential: first, 
due to the importance of board composition variables in the undertaking of director roles and 
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in subsequent contribution to company performance, their predictors need to be understood. 
Second, because significant variations exist in the size and type of directors on boards, even 
when companies function in the same industry, the causes and possible justification of these 
variations need to be delineated. Third, predictors of board composition variables are 
believed to reflect the critical demands of success in an industry and firm's strategy. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) preferred boards of eight members or nine members, with at least 
two independent directors. According to Jensen (1993), the optimal size of a board of 
directors is seven members or eight members, and when a board is larger than this number, it 
is less likely to function effectively and becomes harder for the CEO to control. Furthermore, 
Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994) suggested that the size of a board of directors should be no 
larger than eight members, given that small boards engender greater focus, participation, and 
genuine interaction and debate. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) supported the agency theory perspective, arguing that small boards 
allow directors to get to know one another and are conducive to more effective discussion 
among all directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 13) stated, that '' The idea is that when 
boards get to be too big, agency problem (such as director free-riding) increase within the 
board and the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management process''. In 
addition, Beiner et al. (2004, p. 328) supported the view of Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), 
stating that “when boards become too big, agency problem (e.g., director free-riding) increase 
and the board becomes more symbolic and neglects its monitoring and control duties”. 
Moreover, Jensen (1993) said that a small board of directors can help to improve firm 
performance, and he suggested that a board size of seven members or eight members is easier 
for the CEO to control and makes communicating with other members easier as well. 
Yawson (2006) supported the agency theory; he argued that larger boards suffer higher 
agency problems and are far less effective than are smaller boards. In addition, larger boards 
have increased problems with communication and coordination, which lead to the decreased 
ability to control management (Cheng, 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998).  
Contrary to the agency theory view is resource dependence theory. According to Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003), resource dependence theory prefers the larger board because it enables the 
firm to more easily form capital environment linkages and resources (Abdullah, 2007). Zahra 
and Pearce (1989) said that a larger board is assumed to have more directors with various 
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educational and industrial backgrounds and skills, which improves the quality of action and 
increases firm performance. In addition, according to Goodstein et al. (1994), Pearce and 
Zahra (1992), and Pfeffer (1987) (as cited in Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), a larger board of 
directors helps companies to secure critical resources and reduced environmental 
uncertainties. Furthermore, Coles et al. (2008) documented that large boards are correlated 
with providing more advice to companies, which leads to a greater ability to solve problems. 
Large boards lead to more difficulties as companies attempt to arrange appropriate board 
meetings, and they also are less efficient and slower at decision-making (Cheng, 2008). 
According to Kiel and Nicholson (2003), resource dependence theory argues that a large 
board size provides firms with greater opportunities to form links and hence increases access 
to resources.  
Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 309) stated that ''larger boards are not as susceptible to managerial 
domination as their smaller counterpart. They are also more likely to be heterogeneous in 
member background, values, and skills. Thus, they are likely to resist managerial domination 
and present shareholders interest. Therefore, those boards will be more actively involved in 
monitoring and evaluating CEO and company performance, normally through specialized 
committees''. Bathula (2008) said that a larger board provides some benefits to firms, such as 
the effective oversight of management, making necessary resources available, and allowing 
for the representation of different stakeholders in the firm, which lead to enhanced firm 
performance.  
Empirical studies that examined the relationship between board size and firm performance 
produced mixed results. In the developed market, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) 
conducted one of the earliest studies concerning the relationship between board size and firm 
performance. They studied the relationship between board size and firm performance among 
United States (U.S.) firms from 1978 to 1985, using firm growth as a dependent variable. 
They found that a large team had more skills and experience, which led to increased firm 
growth, thus supporting the resource dependence theory. However, Yermack (1996), using 
the same sample that Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) used, studied the relationship 
between board size and Tobin’s Q of 452 large U.S. industrial firms between 1984 and 1991 
and found a negative relationship between board size and performance.  
In addition, Cheng (2008) studied the relationship between firm performance and board size 
in the US for the sample of 1,252 firms covered by the Investor Responsibility Research 
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Centre (IRRC) for the period of 1996–2004. The results indicated that board size is 
negatively associated with firm performance, and  Cheng's study indicated that larger boards 
have lower variability of corporate performance. Lee and Filbeck (2006) studied the 
relationship between board size and firm performance among small firms in the US, of which 
total assets were less than $18 million (1,013 firms). They found a negative relationship 
between board size and firm profitability, which Yermack (1996) also found when using a 
sample of large U.S. firms. 
In addition, the new study of the relationship between board size and firm performance in the 
U.S. by Gill and Obradovich (2012). They examined this relationship among a sample of 333 
firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years from 2009-2011. 
They found that the larger board size negatively impacts the value of Americans firms, this 
study also, indicated that the board size positively related with firm size.  
Conyon and Peck (1998) studied the relationship between board size and financial 
performance among five European countries (United Kingdom, France, Netherland, Denmark 
and Italy). They collected data from DataStream International and used two measures of 
corporate performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) during 1992–1995 with regard to observable 
measures of board size. They found a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. In another developed country, Canada, Bozec (2005) studied the relationship 
between board size and firm performance for the long period of 1976 to 2000 and found a 
negative relationship between board size and return on sales.  
Guest (2009) supported the findings of Conyon and Peck (1998). He examined the impact of 
board size on firm performance using a large sample of 2,746 United Kingdom (UK)-listed 
firms for the period of 1981–2002. He found that board size has a strong negative impact on 
profitability (ROA), Tobin’s Q and share return. The researcher used three econometric 
techniques to examine this relationship. He used the OLS technique and found a significant 
negative relationship. Meanwhile, the fixed effects technique found a negative significance at 
a level of 1%. Finally, the researcher used GMM for dealing with the endogeneity problems 
and found a significant negative relationship. Both of these two studies (Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Guest, 2009) supported the argument that problems of poor communication and 
decision-making undermine the effectiveness of large boards. 
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In Switzerland, Loderer and Peyer (2002) found that a large board size was associated with 
lower firm value (Tobin’s Q) in the Swiss stock exchange from 1980–1995. They found that 
the average number of board members decreased from 10.5 in 1980 to 8.5 in 1995. They also 
suggested that a large board size identifies firms that are not run as effectively as other firms 
are, and they finally reached the conclusion that “larger boards are comparatively ineffective” 
(p. 190). On the other hand, Beiner et al. (2004) did not find a significant relationship 
between board size and firm valuation in Switzerland in 2001. However, in another study by 
Beiner (2006), using the same data in Switzerland in 2002, the author found that board size is 
positively related to Tobin’s Q but that neither the presence of controlling shareholders nor 
large (outside) block shareholders have a significant impact on valuation. 
Among various developed countries, De Andres et al. (2005) studied the relationship between 
board size and performance among the larger non-financial companies from 10 countries: 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
They found a negative relationship between board size and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). In 
addition, they mentioned that this negative effect persists after controlling for an alternative 
definition of firm size, board composition and internal function, country effect, industry 
effect, and measure of performance (except for ROA). In addition, Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
studied 785 healthy firms and 97 bankrupt firms in Finland. That study found a negative 
relationship between board size and ROA.  
In Japan, Sakawa and Watanabel (2007) studied the relationship between board size and firm 
performance, and they found a negative relationship between board size and firms’ 
performance. Toledo (2010) found that larger boards have a negative impact on firm value in 
Spain. His results indicated that the breakpoint for a board’s size is seven members; when a 
board becomes larger than this point, firm value is negatively affected.  
A number of previous studies focused on the relationship between board size and firm 
performance in the emerging market and found mixed results. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) 
studied the relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q in two samples: The first sample 
comprised 271 firms listed on the Singapore stock exchange, and the second sample consisted 
of 279 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange from 1999 to 2000. They found an 
inverse relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q in both countries. Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) examined the relationship between board size and firm performance according to two 
measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA) in Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2000. The researchers 
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found that when they used Tobin’s Q, a large board was less effective at monitoring 
performance; also, they found a positive relationship between board size and performance 
based on ROA. In addition, they suggested that large boards with experience and expertise 
are needed to enhance firm performance. 
Sanda et al. (2005) found a positive relationship between board size and firm performance in 
a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms from the period of 1996 to 1999. In addition, Sulong and 
Nor (2010) found a positive relationship between board size and Tobin's Q among 403 firms 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a four-year period from 2002 to 2005. They argued that 
firms with smaller boards seem to be associated with less efficient use of assets and lower 
firm valuation. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) found that a larger board size enhances firm 
performance in an environment of economic and political uncertainty in Zimbabwean listed 
companies. All of these studies support Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2006) notion that large boards 
with experience and expertise are needed to enhance firm performance.  
A recent study, by Yasser and Al Mamun (2012) studied the relationship between board 
structures and firm performance for five years data of listed companies in Pakistan. They 
used various firm performance measures such as ROA and Tobin's Q. The results indicated 
that the board size positive related with firm performance. This results supported the results 
of the previous studies in the Emerging markets (Sanda et al., 2005; Sulong and Nor, 2010; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). 
Moreover, a few bodies of literature examine the relationship between board size and firm 
performance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Aljifri and Moustafa 
(2007) studied that relationship between board size and firm performance among a sample of 
51 firms for the 2004 period for the firms listed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They 
used Tobin's Q to measure firm performance, and they found an insignificant relationship 
between board size and firm performance in the UAE. They indicated that this results in an 
insignificant relationship beyond the absence of a real application of the appropriate 
corporate governance regulations in the UAE. Also, Al-Saidi (2010) studied the relationship 
between board size and firm performance in the Kuwait and found a insignificant relationship 
between board size and firm performance. 
In conclusion, the majority of the studies in the developed market found a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance, which the agency theory view 
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supports. Yermack (1996), Cheng (2008), Lee and Filbeck (2006), Conyon and Peck (1998) 
and Sakawa and Watanabel (2007) believe that a smaller board has a positive effect on firm 
performance: Smaller boards are more effective, are easier to control and allow for easier 
communication, which ultimately lead to better performance. 
On the other hand, a number of studies in the emerging market support a larger board. The 
studies of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Sanda et al. (2005), Sulong and Nor (2010), and 
Mangena and Tauringana (2008) are from emerging markets and support resource 
dependence theory. This means that these emerging markets need more directors who have 
various educational and industrial backgrounds and skills along with greater opportunities to 
form more links and thus have better access to resources (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). 
For Saudi listed companies, the corporate governance regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia specify that the board size shall not be less than three and no more than eleven. 
Empirical studies in most of the emerging markets, the group to which Saudi Arabia belongs, 
suggest the following hypothesis for the relationship between board size and a firm’s 
performance: 
H 1: A positive relationship exists between board size and firm performance. 
4.2.4 NON-EXECUTIVE MEMBERS 
Non-executive directors are vital to guaranteeing the integrity and accountability of firms, 
and bring valuable external experience that can contribute to those firms’ strategic success 
(Clarke, 1998). Chen and Jaggi (2000) noted the important role of non-executive directors in 
ensuring the accuracy of information that managers provided. Pye (2001) defined the role of 
non-executives as preventing the undue exercise of power by the executive, safeguarding 
shareholders' interests in the board’s decision making, and contributing to strategic decision 
making to ensure competitive performance. Mallin (2007) explained the two dimensions of a 
non-executive director’s role. The first dimension is to help ensure that an individual or group 
cannot unduly influence the board’s decision; the second is to direct the overall leadership 
and development of the company. Roberts et al. (2005) stated that the role of the non-
executive director is indeed vital to enhancing the effectiveness of the board.  He or she 
serves as a source of confidence for distant investors. The non-executive director also 
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supports executives in their leadership, monitors and controls executive conduct, removes 
non-performing CEOs, and provides additional expertise and knowledge to the firm 
(Weisbach, 1988; Tricker, 1984; Stewart, 1991; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Dahya et al., 1996; 
Higgs, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) 
suggest bringing in outside experts as members of the board of directors to solve business 
problems when insiders are not familiar with such issues. 
The presence of independent non-executive directors on a company board helps to reduce the 
notorious conflict of interest between shareholders and management (Solomon, 2007). 
According to Vafeas and Theodorou (1998, p. 386), “Director independence is compromised 
for non-executive directors having a fiduciary relationship with the firm, such as management 
consultants, executives in financial institutions, and the firm’s legal counsel (collectively 
called ‘grey’ directors), and for interlocking directors.” 
A number of codes and regulations regulate the work of non-executive members. For 
example, Higgs (2003, p.36) stated, “The majority of non-executive directors should be 
independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could 
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment, leaving it to boards to 
identify which of its non-executive directors are considered to meet this test.”  In addition, 
the UK combined code (2006, p. 3) states, “Non-executive directors should scrutinize the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the 
reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
information and that financial controls and system of risk management are robust and 
defensible.  They are responsible for determining appropriate levels of remuneration of 
executive directors and have a prime role in appointment, and where necessary removing, 
executive directors, and in succession planning.”   
A number of theories describe the relationship between non-executive members and firm 
performance. The first of these is agency theory, as described by Mizruchi (1988) (as cited in 
Dalton et al., 1998, p.270), “Agency theory is a control-based theory in that managers, by 
virtue of their firm-specific knowledge and managerial expertise, are believed to gain an 
advantage over firm owners who are largely removed from the operational aspects of the 
firm.” Agency theory has had an important effect on governance reform in boards of 
directors. According to this theory, an effective board should be comprised of outside 
directors who provide superior performance benefits to the firm as a result of their 
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independence from the managers (Dalton et al., 1998).  Agency theory also discusses the 
dangers of too close a relationship between executive and non-executive directors and the 
collusion that this might imply. The theory suggests splitting the roles of chairperson and 
chief executive, with the chairperson being an independent non-executive (Roberts et al., 
2005). 
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, suggests that insider-dominated boards (executives) 
are favoured for their depth of knowledge, good access to operating information, technical 
expertise and commitment to the firm (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). This theory argues that 
executive members, such as the CEO and other executives, are responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the company, and have the specialised expertise and wealth knowledge to 
manage the business (Weir and Laing, 2001). Stewardship theory predicts that shareholders 
can expect to maximise their returns when the organization structure facilitates effective 
control by management (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Weir and Laing (2000) documented 
that non-executive members may have difficulty understanding the complexities of the 
company, which means they have less knowledge about business activities, particularly since 
outside directors are usually part-time and may sit on a number of other boards.  
The resource dependence theory suggests that putting more resource-rich outsider directors 
on the board brings in needed resources, which leads to better performance (Peng, 2004). In 
addition, the board of directors takes on a broader, more inclusive role, with non-executive 
directors involved in giving advice and enhancing strategy discussions (Roberts et al., 2005), 
and providing services to the firm such as consulting, supplying loans, and interlocking 
directors (Clifford and Evans, 1997).  
Empirical studies on the relationship between board composition and firm performance have 
produced mixed results depending on the nature of the theoretical framework explaining the 
relationship between firm performance and non-executive members. A number of studies 
examine the relationship between non-executive members and firm performance in developed 
markets. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) examined this relationship in terms of the 
issues raised by corporate governance, studying 266 major U.S. corporations between 1970 
and 1980. The researchers used relative financial performance (RFP), which is calculated by 
dividing a firm’s return on equity by the average return on equity for all the firms in its 
primary industry, and found a positive relationship between change in number of non-
executive directors and improvement in firm performance. They suggested that reforming 
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corporate governance mechanisms to include the correct proportion of independent outside 
directors on the board of directors would potentially improve performance. 
Beasley (1996) studied the proportion of outsiders on the boards of directors of 150 firms 
from 1980-1991. Seventy-five of the 150 firms represented fraud firms. The researcher used 
two sources to identify the fraud firms: Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs) and the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJ Index).  Through logistic cross-sectional 
regression, he found that the boards of directors of fraud firms had significantly fewer outside 
members and more management directors than no-fraud firms. He also found that fraud firms 
had a smaller proportion of independent directors than no-fraud firms did. Overall, a larger 
proportion of outside members on a board of directors reduced the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud. 
Schellenger et al. (1989) examined the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance among 526 firms in the U.S. Using various measures of firm performance, they 
found a positive relationship between outsider directors and ROA, but no relationship with 
ROE. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) studied the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance among 142 U.S. firms (NYSE). They applied piece-wise linear 
equations using board composition. They found essentially no effect of board composition on 
Tobin's Q; they also treated the endogeneity problem and still found no relationship between 
outsider directors and firm performance.  
Brown and Caylor (2004) studied the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in 2,327 firms based on 51 corporate governance provisions provided by the 
Institutional Investor Service (ISS) in 2003. The researchers used three categories to measure 
firm performance: operating performance (return on equity, profit margin, and sales growth), 
valuation (Tobin’s Q), and shareholder payout (dividend yield and share repurchases). The 
researchers also used Gov-Score to measure boards of directors with regard to 51 factors of 
corporate governance. These factors cover eight governance structures: audit, board of 
directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, 
ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. The study found a strong 
positive significant relationship between independent outside directors and firm performance 
based on return on equity, net profit margin, dividend yield, and share repurchases, and found 
a negative significant relationship with Tobin’s Q and sales growth. 
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Mura (2007) investigated the relationship between firm performance and board composition 
among the UK firms for the period 1991-2001. The study used the GMM model to control 
the endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Mura’s study found a positive relationship 
between non-executive board members and firm performance. In addition, Dahya and 
McConnell (2003) indicated that increasing the number of outside directors on the board is 
likely to influence board decisions positively and enhance firm performance in the UK firms.  
In another study in the United Kingdom, Abdullah (2007) studied the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance among FTSE 350 non-financial 
companies in the UK. The study used various firm performance measures for the period 1999 
to 2004. For the period of 1999 to 2001, there is a positive relationship between Tobin's Q 
and board independence. However, for the period 2002 to 2004, Abdullah found a negative 
relationship between board independence and Tobin's Q. The study also applied 2SLS to 
control the endogeneity, and got the same OLS results.  
On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examined the effect of outside directors on 
firm performance by studying 400 large US corporations and using Tobin’s Q to measure 
firm performance. The researchers used two econometric estimators to examine this relation 
(OLS/2SLS) and found that outsiders had a negative effect on firm performance. In addition, 
Bhagat and Black (2000) investigated the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance in the US. They found a negative relationship between firm performance and 
board independence for both OLS and 3SLS. Beiner et al. (2004) also identified a negative 
relationship between firm performance and external directors in Swiss-listed firms.  
In the emerging markets, a number of studies have examined the relationship between non-
executive members and firm performance. Luan and Tang (2007) studied the relationship 
between outside directors and firm performance in Taiwan. They used ROE to measure firm 
performance in Taiwan’s electronics industry and ordinary least squares to test their 
hypotheses. The researchers found that the appointment of independent outside directors to a 
board was positively and significantly related to firm performance. Choi et al. (2007) also 
found a positive effect of independence directors on firm performance in Korea.  
On the other hand, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the relationship between non-
executive directors and firm performance in 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange from 1996–2000. The study used ROA and Tobin’s Q to measure firm 
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performance. The researchers did not find a significant relationship between non-executive 
directors and firm performance. Yasser and Al Mamun (2012) studied the relationship 
between board structures and firm performance for five years data of listed companies in 
Pakistan. They used various firm performance measures such as ROA and Tobin's Q. The 
results indicated that there is no significant relationship between non-executive members with 
firm performance. However, Amran and Ahmad (2010) studied the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance among 730 companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia from 2003 to 2007. They found a negative relationship between firm 
performance and board independence. In addition, Kumar and Singh (2012) found a negative 
relationship between outside directors and firm performance in India.  
Moreover, there is a small body of literature examining the relationship between non-
executive members and firm performance in the MENA region. For example, Abu-Tapanjeh 
(2006) studied the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance based on 39 industrial companies listed in the Amman Stock Exchange in 
Jordan for the period of 1992–2004. The study found that non-executive board members 
improved firm performance, which means that outsider directors have good communication 
with the environment and provide useful information to help manage the firms well. El 
Mehdi (2007) found similar results showing that the presence of outside directors is 
positively related to firm performance in Tunisian listed companies. El Mehdi suggested that 
this positive effect on firm performance occurs because non-executive members are 
motivated to take their responsibilities seriously in order to enhance their reputations. In 
addition, the fraction of non-executives on the board is not high, which give them more 
concentrated decision. Al-Saidi (2010) also identified a positive relationship between non-
executive members and firm performance in Kuwait.  
Despite the fact that previous studies have presented mixed results regarding the relationship 
between non-executive members and firm performance in both developed and emerging 
countries, the majority of researchers have argued that the presence of non-executive 
members contributes to the  reduction in the conflict of interests between shareholders and 
managers. The regulations of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia suggest that the majority 
of the board members should be non-executive in order to make positive contributions to the 
development and performance of the business because they may have a broader view of 
different experiences and fields of knowledge that may affect firm performance (Cadbury, 
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1992). The literature therefore suggests the following hypothesis for the relationship between 
non-executive members and firm performance: 
H 2 : A positive relationship exists between non-executive members and firm performance. 
4.2.5 FAMILY BOARD MEMBERS 
Family control, or the presences of family board members, is a very widespread practice in 
most countries of the world, particularly in developing countries (Yeh et al., 2001). The 
agency theory proposes that family owner-management enhances communication and 
cooperation within a firm and guards against opportunism, which leads to increased firm 
performance and reduced agency costs (Schulze et al., 2003). The agency theory suggested 
that the existence of family board members on the board of directors leads to reduce and 
eliminate the agency problem between management and shareholders when the company is 
controlled by the same family (Al-Saidi, 2010).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that family-controlled firms enjoy more advantages in 
monitoring and disciplining related to decision agents, which leads to reduced monitoring 
costs. In addition, McConaugby et al. (2001) found that firms controlled by family members 
are generally run more efficiently than other firms, carry less debt than other firms, and gain 
greater value as measured by the market equity/book equity ratio. On the other hand, the 
resource dependence theory suggested that directors with family connections or other social 
relationships with the CEO/management may also be more motivated to provide resources 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
There is a number of publicly-traded companies around the world that are controlled by 
founders or their families (Piesse et al., 2012). In the developed market, the literature reveals 
mixed results of the relationship between family board members and firm performance. For 
example, in Canada, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) examined the financial performance of 
124 management successions within Canadian family-controlled firms between 1962 and 
1996. This study found that poor corporate performance led to the selection of non-family 
insiders or outsiders to improve firm performance. This means that there is a negative 
relationship between family management and firm performance, assuming that the young age 
of family-based managers reflects a lack of management experience. 
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In contrast to Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), Ben-Amar and Andre (2006), investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance among a sample of 327 
Canadian firms for the period 1998–2002. This study investigated the role of family 
ownership and family management (CEO is a family member); they found that having a 
family member as the CEO has a positive impact on firm performance.  
In Italy, Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) studied the relationship between family managers and 
firm performance in Italy. The researchers compared between two types of firms: The first 
type was made up of firms that continued to be managed within a family by heirs to the 
founders. The second type referred to firms that have outside managers or managers unrelated 
to the founding family. The authors found a negative relationship between firm performance 
and inherited family management. In addition, they found that founder-run companies 
outperform the sectoral average profitability before succession.  
On the other hand, Mishra et al. (2001) examined the relationship between family control and 
firm performance among 120 Norwegian companies in 1996. They found a positive 
relationship between founding family control and Tobin’s Q. They suggested that there is a 
strong relationship between family control and performance in smaller boards. In addition, 
they found that the presence of outside independent directors did not improve performance in 
family-controlled firms. Another study by Maury (2006) agreed with Mishra et al. (2001).  
Maury (2006) examined the relationship between family-controlled firms and firm 
performance among 1672 non-financial firms in Western Europe. The researchers used 
Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance. He found that active family ownership 
(i.e., the family holds at least one of the top two officer positions) improved profitability. 
Furthermore, Barontini and Caprio (2006) investigated the relationship between family board 
members (as CEO and non-executive from the same family) among data from 675 publicly 
traded corporations in 11 countries in the Europe. They found the family CEO and family 
non-executive members had a significant positive effect on firm performance.   
In the emerging market, Filatotchev et al. (2005) used a multi-industry dataset of 228 firms 
listed on the Taiwan stock exchange in 1999. This study analysed the effects of ownership 
structure and board characteristics on firm performance. The researchers used the ratio of 
market to book value (MTBV), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on assets (ROA), 
sales revenue and earnings per share. They did not find that family control was associated 
with performance measures when they used two econometrics test techniques (2SLS and 
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OLS). However, in another study in Taiwan, Tsai et al. (2006) studied the tenure of CEOs 
from a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan (63 firms were family controlled, 241 were 
not family controlled) and found that family CEOs have sufficient motivation that improves 
firm performance.  
In Malaysia, Amran and Ahmad (2010) examined the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on family and non-family controlled companies’ performance from a sample of 
730 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2003 to 2007. They found that family-
controlled companies do have a higher firm performance as compared to non-family 
controlled companies. 
Furthermore, Abu-Tapanjeh (2006) investigated the relationship between family board 
members and firm performance among 39 industrial companies in the Amman stock 
exchange of Jordan for the period 1992–2004. The study found that the family board 
members had an insignificant effect on firm performance; also, the researcher indicated that 
the family board members are not affecting the mechanisms of corporate governance that 
influence the firm as far as firm performance is concerned.   
In Kuwait, Al-Saidi (2010) found a positive relationship between family directors and firm 
performance. Al-Saidi indicated that family board members in Kuwait are more concerned 
with their family name and reputation, and the new generation of family board members are 
more educated and qualified to manage and control the firm.  
There are a number of listed companies in the Saudi market that have a substantial number of 
family members that act on the board of directors as either executive or non-executive 
members. Family board members reduce monitoring costs, eliminate the agency problem 
between management and shareholders, and the existence of family board members also 
causes the company to be run more efficiently with less debt (Fama  Jensen, 1983; Al-Saidi, 
2010; McConaugby et al., 2001). Hence, the literature suggests the following hypothesis for 
the relationship between family board members and firm performance: 
H 3: A positive relationship exists between family board members and firm performance. 
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4.2.6 ROYAL FAMILY BOARD MEMBERS 
The royal family board member is a new variable among the board members in the Arabian 
Gulf countries in general and especially in Saudi Arabia. Royal family board members are 
very widespread in some listed companies in Saudi Arabia (Alghamdi, 2012). Fama and 
Jensen (1983) claimed that family-controlled firms enjoy more advantages in monitoring and 
discipline related to decision agents, which leads to reduced monitoring costs. Agency theory 
proposes that family owner-management enhances communication and cooperation within a 
firm and guards against opportunism, which leads to increased firm performance and reduced 
agency costs (Schulze et al., 2003). 
The majority of royal family board members act as non-executive members (Alghamdi, 
2010). Therefore, stewardship theory suggests that non-executive members may be difficult 
for them to understand the complexities of the company, which means that they have less 
knowledge about business activities, particularly as outside directors are usually part-time 
and may sit on a number of other boards (Weir & Laing, 2000). On the other hand, resource 
dependence theory predicts that royal family board members may have more resource-rich 
outside non-executive directors are on the board to help bring in needed resources, which 
leads to better performance (Peng, 2004). 
Many members of the royal family are appointed as board directors and serve on boards as 
managerial members, which enables them to monitor the management closely, leading to 
decreased mismanagement and wrongdoing (Alghamdi, 2010). Alghamdi (2012) suggested 
that the existence of royal family board members might increase firm performance because 
they own large shares in the company and expose the firm to a competitive environment, 
which leads to improved firm performance. 
For Saudi listed companies, there are a number of royal family board members that act as 
non-executive members. These types of board members lead to a decrease in mismanagement 
and wrongdoing, which may enhance a firm’s performance (Alghamdi, 2012). In addition, 
the majority of royal family board members have ample capital and linkages that may 
increase a firm’s performance (Peng, 2004; Abdullah, 2007). Hence, the literature suggests 
the following hypothesis for the relationship between royal family board members and firm 
performance: 
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H 4: A positive relationship exists between royal family board members and firm 
performance. 
4.2.7 BOARD SUB-COMMITTEES 
It has been suggested that the board of directors should establish three different types of sub-
committees to which they will delegate some activities.  These committees should report 
regularly to the main board about what they have done and the areas they cover (Mallin, 
2007).  The Cadbury report (1992) recommended the board of directors have three sub-
committees: audit, remuneration, and nomination committees. 
The Smith report (2003) provided the main objective of an audit committee, which is to 
ensure the interests of the shareholders are protected.  The Smith report (2003) outlined the 
main role and responsibilities of audit committees: 
1. To monitor the integrity of the financial statements.  For example, the audit committee 
should consider whether the accounting policies adopted in preparing the financial 
statements are appropriate. 
2. To review the internal control system (if the organisation does not have a separate 
committee, such as a risk committee).  The internal control system includes financial, 
operational, and compliance controls and risk management. 
3. To monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit                             
function.  Internal auditors are employed by the company to monitor the internal 
control system. 
4. To make recommendations to the board about appointment of the external auditor. 
5. To monitor and review the external auditor’s independence. 
6. To develop and implement policy on the engagement of external auditors to supply 
non-audit services. 
The combined code of corporate governance (2006, p. 15) states that “the board should 
establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
members, who should all be independent non-executive directors.  The board should satisfy 
itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial 
experience.”  Mallin (2007) explained why the audit committee should have independent 
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non-executive directors: to help oversee it and give assurance that the audit committee is 
functioning properly.   
Conyon and Peck (1998) highlighted the importance of establishing remuneration 
committees.  If this committee is absent, it provides senior executives with the opportunity to 
award themselves pay raises that are not congruent with shareholders’ interests.  The 
Greenbury report (1995, p. 14) stated that “to avoid potential conflict of interest, boards of 
directors should set up remuneration committees of non-executive directors to determine on 
their behalf, and on behalf of the shareholders, within agreed terms of reference, the 
company’s policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages for each of 
the executive directors, including pension rights and any compensation payments.” 
Mallin (2007) outlined the remuneration committee’s roles (in the form recommended by the 
combined code): 
1. To prevent executive directors from setting their own remuneration levels. 
2. To provide a formal, transparent procedure for the setting of executive remuneration 
levels including the determination of appropriate targets for any performance-related 
pay schemes. 
In addition, corporate governance codes encourage boards of directors to establish 
nomination committees to improve the board’s effectiveness through managing its 
composition such as selecting qualified and independent members (Ruigrok et al., 2006).  
The roles of the nomination committee are to establish the benchmark that determines what 
skills are required of replacement or additional directors and to review the performance of the 
board on a regular basis (Carson, 2002).  The UK combined code (2006) highlighted some 
important points about nomination committees, such as: 
1. A majority of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-
executive directors. 
2. The chairman or an independent non-executive director should chair the committee. 
3. The nomination committee should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge, and 
experience on the board. 
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Klein (1998) suggested that audit and compensation (remuneration) committees be staffed by 
independent non-executive directors to reduce agency cost.  He argued that an audit 
committee helps alleviate the agency problem by facilitating the timely release of unbiased 
accounting information by managers to shareholders and creditors, which leads to reducing 
the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and to reducing agency costs.  
Also, he argued that remuneration committees help alleviate the agency problem by 
constructing and implementing incentive and bonus schemes designed to better align 
managers’ and owners’ goals. Vafeas (1999)’s agency theory suggests that the nomination 
committee should be staffed by independent members to enhance effective decision control 
and increase performance. 
Wild (1994) noted that the role of the audit committee is to oversee the financial reporting 
process and contribute to the integrity of financial reporting. He studied the effect of audit 
committee formation upon the quality of accounting reports by 260 US companies between 
1966 and 1980.  The researcher used market reaction (measured in terms of earnings response 
coefficient – the ratio of abnormal returns to unexpected earnings) before and after the 
companies established their audit committees.  He found that earnings response coefficient 
increased when companies established audit committees. Also, he reported that “the 
formation of an audit committee is one strategy to enhance managerial accountability to 
shareholders” p. 370. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) studied 275 Fortune 500 firms between 
1995 and 2000. They studied the relationship between the audit committee and the quality of 
management earnings forecasts, as well as the extent to which market reaction to earnings 
forecasts was moderated by the quality of corporate governance. They found a positive 
relationship between market reaction to earnings forecasts and corporate governance 
variables, including measures of the independence, expertise, size and activity of the audit 
committee.   
According to Newman and Mozes (1999), the compensation committee plays an important 
role in CEO compensation and other executive directors’ compensation decisions.  They 
studied the relationship between compensation committees and CEO compensation among 
161 firms in the US. They obtained compensation data for the years 1991 and 1992 and found 
that the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is more favourable 
toward CEOs (the CEO receives a greater share of overall firm performance) when the firms 
have insiders on the compensation committee. On the other hand, Sun and Cahan (2009) 
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studied the effect of compensation committees on the association between CEO 
compensation and firm performance among 812 US firms. They found that the association 
between CEO compensation and accounting earnings is higher when firms have a high 
proportion of directors on the compensation committee who are CEOs of other firms (outside 
directors). Also, they found that CEO compensation and accounting earnings are significantly 
higher for firms with a higher proportion of directors; i.e., three or more additional 
directorships sitting on the compensation committee. 
Laing and Weir (1999) studied the relationship between board committees (remuneration and 
audit) and firm performance among 115 firms randomly selected from the UK quoted 
companies which appeared in The Times 1000 for the years 1992 and 1995. The researchers 
used return on assets to measure firm performance. They found that companies without board 
committees in 1992 that introduced a committee between 1992 and 1995 had a significantly 
higher return on assets than companies without board committees in both 1992 and 1995 
(although the researchers do not note this, it is possible that very badly performing companies 
without board committees in 1992 faced difficulties in introducing such committees by 
1995).  In addition, a study by Brown and Caylor (2004) studied the relationship between 
independence of nominating committee and firm performance among 2,327 firms. The 
researchers used six measures to measure firm performance (return on equity, net profit 
margin, sales growth, Tobin’s Q, and dividend yield and share repurchases). They found that 
independence in nominating committees is positively related to return on equity, net profit 
margin, dividend yield, and share repurchases.   
Vafeas (1999) studied the relationship between board committees and firm value among 307 
firms listed on the Forbes 1992 compensation survey that are listed in the SilverPlatter 
database for at least three years between 1990 and 1994. Financial firms and utilities are 
excluded. The researcher used two econometrics techniques (OLS and 2SLS). He found a 
negative (but not statistically significant) relationship between the number of board 
committees and firm value, that is, lower firm value is associated with more committees.  
However, he points out that the number of board meetings (his main variable) tends to 
increase after falls in firm value, and it may be that the direction of causation runs from firm 
value to number of committees rather than vice versa. Lam and Lee (2012) found that the 
nomination (remuneration) committee is positively (negatively) related to firm performance 
among a sample of 346 firms in Hong Kong for the period 2001-2003. 
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Some researchers did not find any relationship between board committees and firm 
performance.  For example, Klein (1998) examined the relationship between committee 
structure and firm performance for firms listed on the S&P 500 as of March 31, 1992 and 
March 31, 1993.  The sample consists of 485 of the original S&P firms for 1992 and 486 for 
1993.  The researcher used OLS regression analysis to examine this relationship and she did 
not find any significant statistical relationship. Also, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) studied 
the relationship between board committees and firm performance among 250 firms in the UK 
listed in the Silverplatter database for 1994. The researchers compared the market value of 
the firm to the book value of the total assets (MB) as a measure of firm performance. They 
also did not find these committees have significant determinants of firm value. Bozec (2005) 
examined the relationship between board committees and firm performance among 25 state-
owned enterprises in Canada during the period 1976–2000 and he found no relation between 
board committees and firm performance. 
Overall, researchers have examined board committees in different ways: (1) the existence of 
particular committees and the overall number of committees, (2) factors about specific 
committees, such as the size, composition of membership (independence and expertise of 
members), and number of meetings, and (3) the initial establishment of particular 
committees.  In some cases, researchers have incorporated various different variables for 
board committees in their statistical model, while in other cases they have incorporated 
information about board committees in overall corporate government scores or indices. 
The Saudi regulations of corporate governance (2006) suggest that a suitable number of 
committees should be set up in accordance with the company’s requirements, in order to 
enhance performance of the board of directors and positively affect firm performance. Also, 
the regulations of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia (2006) suggest that these committees 
should have a sufficient number of non-executive members with specific knowledge that is 
related to the function of the sub-committees. The literature therefore suggests the following 
hypothesis for the relationship between board sub-committees and firm performance: 
H 5: A positive relationship exists between board sub-committees and firm performance. 
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4.3 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
Ownership structure is one of the most important dimensions of corporate governance 
mechanisms. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Berle and Means, calls 
attention to ownership in corporations in the United States (La Porta et al., 1999). La Porta et 
al. (1999) investigated the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies 
and identified five types of ownership: family or individual, state, a widely held financial 
institution, a widely held corporation (non-financial firm), and miscellaneous, such as 
cooperative, a voting trust, or a group with no single controlling investor. Alshehri (2012) 
noted that the problem of ownership structure can be linked to the agency problem in two 
ways. When ownership is divided among a large number of shareholders, the controlling 
interests may be not matched by those shareholders. When ownership is concentrated among 
a few people, groups, or families, it leads to influence management, which affects minority 
shareholders. The country should have a good legal system to protect the minority 
shareholders. La Porta (1999, p. 473) stated that: 
''In these countries, controlling shareholders have less fear of being expropriated themselves 
in the event that they ever lose control through a takeover or a market accumulation of shares 
by a raider, and so might be willing to cut their ownership of voting rights by selling shares to 
raise funds or to diversify. In contrast, in countries with poor protection of minority 
shareholders, losing control involuntarily and thus becoming a minority shareholder may be 
such a costly proposition in terms of surrendering the private benefits of control that the 
controlling shareholders would do everything to keep control. They would hold more voting 
rights themselves and would have less interest is selling shares in the market''. 
Ownership concentration is one of the most widespread common ownership structures in 
emerging markets (Wang & Shailer, 2009). According to agency theory, the presence of 
concentrated ownership provides an incentive to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). La Porta et al. (1998) argued that concentrated 
ownership protects other shareholders’ interests when the legal system provides only weak 
protection for minority shareholders.  
Xu and Wang (1999) examined whether ownership concentration had any effect on firm 
performance of publicly-listed companies in China in 1998. This study calculated three 
measures of performance: ROA, ROE, and MBR. In addition, this study measured ownership 
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concentration by the proportion of shares hold by the top ten shareholders. It found a positive 
and significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) examined the effect of ownership concentration on 
shareholder value (market-to-book value), profitability (asset returns), and sale growth of 435 
of the largest European companies between 1990 and 1995. The researchers found a positive 
effect of ownership concentration on market-to-book value and asset returns, but the positive 
effect lasted only up to a certain level; after that, it showed a negative effect. There was no 
relationship between sales growth and ownership concentration.  
Leech and Leahy (1991) investigated ownership concentration and how it can affect firm 
value. The researchers examined this relationship among 470 UK-listed companies between 
1983 and 1985. They found that ownership concentration has a negative effect on firm 
performance. They suggested that ownership concentration depends on firm size, 
diversifiable risk, and product diversification.  
In contrast, Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) discussed the effect of ownership concentration in 
the largest companies in 12 European countries on firm performance between 1990 and 1993. 
Their study found that ownership concentration does not have any significant effect on return 
on equity. They also found that ownership concentration decreases with firm size.  
There are some studies that discussed the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance in developing Arab countries. Al-Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) 
investigated 50 of the largest Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange and the impact of ownership concentration on ROA and market-to-book value of 
equity as measures of performance from 1996 to 2002. This study found a nonlinear and 
significant effect of ownership concentration on market-to-book value but a negative and 
insignificant effect on ROA.  
Moreover, Omran et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance among a sample of 304 firms from various Arab countries (Egypt, 
Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia). The researchers used ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q to calculate 
firm performance. The researchers used the 2SLS regression technique and found a positive 
significant at a level of 1% between Tobin’s Q and ownership concentration and no 
significant effect of ownership concentration on ROA and ROE. However, when excluding 
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financial institutions from the full sample, they found the same result for ROA and ROE, and 
a positive significant effect on Tobin’s Q at a level of 5%. 
Ownership concentration can be understood as referring to the existence of a small number of 
entities or individuals who, between them, own a substantial proportion of the company’s 
equity. The ownership concentration can be also referring to different types of owners such as 
managers, families, governments, banks, and corporations. La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that 
in countries with poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for 
legal protection, because only large shareholders can hope to receive a return on their 
investment (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). La Porta et al. (1998) investigated why ownership 
tends to be more concentrated in countries that have poor investor protection and explained 
this was primarily due to two reasons: first, large shareholders or dominant shareholders who 
monitor the managers might need to own more capital and shares to exercise their control 
rights and thus to avoid being expropriated by the managers; and second, small investors in 
the countries that are poorly protected might be willing to buy shares in companies at low 
prices that then make it unattractive for corporations to issue new shares to the public. The 
concentrated ownership in Saudi Arabia is classified into managers, families, individuals, 
foreign, financial and non-financial corporations, and governments. In turn, we consider each 
type of ownership in the following sections. 
4.3.1 MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that if the share ownership of a manager decreases, the 
agency cost will be generated by divergence between his interest and the interests of outside 
shareholders. Also, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that when an owner-manager’s 
percentage of common stock falls, this fraction’s claim on the outcome falls and tends to 
encourage him to appropriate another resource in the form of perquisites, which forces 
minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behaviours. Agency theory 
suggested that the agency cost may be reduced if managers increase their common stock 
ownership of the firm to better align their interests with those of outsider shareholders 
(Crutchley & Hansen, 1989). 
According to Dinga et al. (2009), two main hypotheses describe the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance: the convergence of interest hypothesis and the 
entrenchment hypothesis. The convergence of interest hypothesis proposes that the equity 
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ownership of managers leads to aligning the interests of shareholders and managers, and 
when the proportion of equity owned by managers increases, the interests of two parties 
(managers and outside directors) align (Dinga et al., 2009; Ntim, 2009). According to Ntim 
(2009, p. 117), “directors who own large blocks of shares have additional incentive to 
actively monitor managerial actions that can help reduce agency cost and increase firm 
financial performance”. 
However, another hypothesis, the entrenchment hypothesis, views the situation differently. 
According to Morck et al. (1988), the high level of managerial ownership may lead to 
entrenchment, which creates difficulties for outside shareholders to monitor the firm (as cited 
in Short & Keasey, 1999). Stulz (1988) suggested that this is a positive relationship between 
firm value and managerial ownership for lower fractions of voting rights, and it is negatively 
related when the fractions are large (as cited in Dinga et al., 2009). 
A large body of work examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance using several measures of firm performance. The first scholars in this area found 
a non-linear relationship between these two variables (managerial ownership and firm 
performance). Morck et al. (1988) studied the relationship between managerial ownership 
and market valuations of firms in a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms in the US. 
The researchers used Tobin’s Q and profit rate to measure firm performance and applied 
piecewise linear regression to examine this relationship. The researchers found a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance at a 0–5% ownership range 
and a negative relationship between 5–25%—plus a positive effect in firm performance 
beyond the 25% level. The main result of the study was a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Additionally, McConnell and Servaes (1990) supported the result found by Morck et al. 
(1988) by using the same data. They investigated the relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
managerial ownership among 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986 in the US. The 
researchers found a non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial ownership; 
they found a significant curvilinear relation. Another study by McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
investigated the relationship between Tobin’s Q and equity ownership in 1976, 1986 and 
1988 in the US for high-growth firms and low-growth firms. They found that the fraction of 
shares held by managers is more closely tied to corporate value for low-growth than for high-
growth firms. 
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In addition, Short and Keasey (1999) studied this relationship in the UK. They investigated 
the relationship between the percentage of equity shares held by management and firm 
performance among UK firms in the London Stock Exchange for the period 1988–1992. 
They used two variables to measure firm performance (the return on shareholders’ equity and 
a valuation ratio). The researchers used OLS regression to examine this relationship, finding 
a non-linear relationship between performance and managerial ownership. Another study by 
Davies et al. (2005) examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value 
in the UK for 1996 and 1997 by using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. They found a 
non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial ownership.  
Subsequent scholars to examine this relationship found a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. For example, Earle (1998) investigated the 
impact of managerial ownership on the productivity performance of Russian industrial 
enterprises in 1994. The researcher used an OLS regression estimate to examine this 
relationship and found a positive relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership. In addition, Claessens and Dajankov (1999) studied the effects of managerial 
equity holding on firm performance among 706 Czech firms over the period 1993–1997. The 
researchers used profit margins and labor productivity to measure firm performance. The 
main result of this study was that equity holding by insiders exerts a positive effect on firm 
performance. 
Chen et al. (2003), investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s 
Q among 123 Japanese firms from 1987–1995. The researchers used an OLS econometrics 
technique to examine this relationship. They used a regression model to distinguish between 
two hypotheses (convergence of interests and entrenchment). The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression model showed a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial 
ownership. 
Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) also contributed to the discussion, addressing in their 
research the question of whether inside ownership affects firm performance. The researchers 
examined this relationship between inside ownership and firm performance using various 
measures of performance (stock price performance, a market-to-book ratio and returns on 
assets) among 648 firms in Germany for the years 2003 and 1998. The researchers used two 
econometrics techniques (OLS and 2SLS) to examine this relationship. Their study found a 
positive and significant relationship. 
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Lastly, another study in Greek by Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) studied the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm performance among a sample of 175 Greek listed firms in 
2000 by using the same econometrics techniques (OLS and 2SLS) used by Kaserer and 
Moldenhauer (2008). They used Tobin’s Q and an accounting profit rate to measure firm 
performance. Their study also found a positive and significant relationship between these two 
variables. 
In contrast, some scholars examined the same relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance and found a negative relationship. For example, Sanda et al. (2005) 
investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in a 
sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms from 1996 to 1999. The researchers used a price-earnings 
ratio, returns on assets, returns on equity and Tobin’s Q to measure performance as a 
dependent variable. They concluded that a negative relationship exists between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. 
Also, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) examined the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance in a sample of 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange in 1996–2000. They found a negative relationship between firm performance and 
managerial ownership. In addition, they stated that “managerial ownership seemed to be 
detrimental to accounting performance” (p. 1057). However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
found that the mean managerial ownership in their sample was 34.53%, much greater than 
was the case in most studies using US data. 
Finally, some scholars found no relationship between these two variables whatsoever. For 
example, Curcio (1994) investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance using a panel dataset of 389 UK manufacturing companies. The researcher used 
two measures of firm performance, Tobin’s Q and total factor productivity growth. He found 
that managerial ownership was not related with Tobin’s Q and was a positive effect on 
productivity growth but not highly significant. 
Also, another study in the UK, developed by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), studied the 
impact of managerial ownership on firm performance in a sample of 250 publicly traded 
firms in the UK. The researchers measured performance by using the market value of the firm 
compared to the book value of the total assets (MB). They supported the result found by 
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Curcio (1994). They concluded that percentage of stock ownership by management was 
unrelated to firm performance. 
Faccio and Lasfer (1999) investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm value among 1,650 non-financial companies in the London Stock Exchange from June 
1996 to June 1997. Their study used the management entrenchment hypothesis to test this 
relationship by splitting these companies into high-growth and low-growth groups, using 
Tobin’s Q, PE, ROE and ROA to measure firm performance. The main result of this study 
showed that the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership was weak 
or non-existent. In a developing country, El Mehdi (2007) analysed the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance by using 24 firms listed on the Tunisian stock 
exchange for 2000–2005. He found that CEO shareholding was associated with firm 
performance (measured using a variation of Tobin’s Q), but that the shareholding of other 
directors (who were mainly managers, as El Mehdi found that non-executive directors were 
uncommon in Tunisia during the period of his study) was not associated with firm 
performance. 
Overall, the majority of studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
managerial share ownership and firm performance, where performance is measured using a 
wide range of metrics.  This is supported to some extent by the only study to date of 
ownership structure and firm performance in a MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
country (El Mehdi, 2007).  Other research findings imply that the relationship may not be 
linear over the full range of possible managerial shareholdings. Hence, the literature suggests 
the folloing hypothesis for the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance: 
H6: A positive relationship exists between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
4.3.2 FAMILY OR INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP 
Agency theory argues that ownership concentration with a large shareholder (family or 
individual) will lead to more effective monitoring (Klein et al., 2005). Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976, as cited in Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006) agency theory argues that ownership 
concentration leads to reduced monitoring costs because large owners (family or individual) 
possess the incentive and expertise to monitor the managers. According to Anderson and 
Reeb (2003, p. 1305), “the family’s wealth is so closely linked to firm welfare, families may 
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have strong incentives to monitor managers and minimize the free-rider problem inherent 
with small, atomistic shareholders”. 
La Porta et al. (1999) studied the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 wealthy 
economies around the world, providing examples of individual or family ownership. They 
mentioned that the fourth most valuable company in the US is Microsoft, which has three 
large individual shareholders: cofounders Bill Gates (23.7% of the votes as well as shares), 
Paul Allen (9%), and Steven Ballmer (5%). 
McConaugby et al. (2001) also investigated the relationship between family ownership and 
performance. They found that family ownership exercised a positive impact on firm 
performance. In addition, Villalonga and Amit (2006) studied how family ownership affected 
firm value in Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 2000 in the US. They found that family 
ownership created value for firms only when the founder served as the CEO of the family 
firms or as the chairperson with a hired CEO. In addition, they suggested that “the classic 
owner-manager conflict in non-family firms is more costly than the conflict between family 
and non-family shareholders in founder-CEO firms” (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, p. 385). 
Pukthuanthong et al. (2013) investigated the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance among Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
between 1999 and 2007. They found that family ownership helps resolve agency conflicts 
between ownership and management and, in turn, enhances firm value.  
Barontini and Caprio (2006) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance in 675 publicly traded corporations in 11 countries in Europe. The 
researchers used market valuation (Tobin’s Q) and operating performance (ROA) to measure 
firm performance. Their results indicated that family ownership had a positive effect on firm 
performance. Martinez et al. (2007) studied the impact of family ownership on firm 
performance for a sample of 175 firms that regularly operate in Bolsa de Comercio de 
Santiago, the main Chilean stock exchange. The researchers used three different measures of 
firm performance: ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q for a ten-year period (1995–2004). They found 
that family-controlled firms were better performers than non-family-controlled companies. 
In France, Corstjens et al. (2004) compared the economic performance of French publicly 
quoted family-owned and non-family-owned firms for the period from 1993 to 2002. The 
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researchers used Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance and found that French 
family-owned firms offered a significantly higher return on assets than did non-family firms, 
and they did not find any significant difference in Tobin’s Q between French family and non-
family firms. 
Cueto (2008) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
from 2000 to 2006 across various countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). 
The researcher found that the investors preferred a dominant family group shareholder rather 
than institutional investors or a government agency because family members owned more 
internal information and could lead the firm more easily with their experience (Shyu, 2011). 
In China, Xu and Wang (1997) investigated the relationship between individual ownership 
and firm performance of publicly listed stock companies in China. They found that individual 
ownership has an insignificant relationship with firm profitability. They mentioned that the 
reason for this insignificant relationship is that publicly traded corporations in China suffer 
from the traditional free-rider problem, and individual shareholders have no incentive and no 
capability to monitor and influence the behaviour of management.  
In Taiwan, Chu (2011) examined the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance by considering the influence of family management, family control, and family 
size among 786 public family firms in Taiwan from 2002 to 2007. The researcher used ROA 
to measure firm performance. He found a positive relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance. Shyu (2011) investigated the influence of family ownership in Taiwan on 
firm performance using 465 Taiwanese listed companies. He used ROA and Tobin’s Q to 
measure performance. The researcher found some interesting results: increasing family 
ownership led to enhanced firm performance, family members possessed both internal 
information and the ability to foresee the prospects of a given firm more easily, the 
profitability of a firm (ROA) increased with an increase in family holding (reaching its peak 
when family ownership was approximately 30%), and the relationship between firm 
profitability and family appeared to take on an inverse U-shaped curve. 
Abdullah et al. (2011) investigated the impact of group and family ownership on the financial 
performance of a sample of firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange from 2003 to 2008. 
They applied different models of econometrics (OLS and 2SLS) to examine this relationship 
and found that the Tobin's Q of family-owned firms was larger than that of non-family owned 
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firms. Moreover, the ROA suggested that family ownership did not result in increased 
efficiency in the utilization of assets or cost of reduction.    
Zeitun and Tian (2007) examined the impact of ownership structure on firm performance on a 
sample of 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 2002. This study calculated four 
ratios to measure firm performance (ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, and market-to-book value). They 
stated that individual ownership has no incentive and no capability to monitor and influence 
the behaviour of management, which leads to bad performance. In addition, in Jordan, Al-
Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) examined the ownership structure on firm performance in 50 
of the largest Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman stock exchange from 1996 
to 2002. They found a negative relationship between individual ownership and firm 
performance. Hence, the literature suggests the folloing hypothesis for the relationship 
between family or individual ownership and firm performance: 
H7: A positive relationship exists between family or individual ownership and firm 
performance. 
4.3.3 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large blockholder ownership may work as a device to 
monitor and centralize management and improve firm performance. Craswell et al. (1997) 
agree that it creates a great incentive to monitor management; whether institutions or 
individuals, large blockholders can achieve cost effectiveness due to their expertise. Resource 
dependence theory suggests that blockholder ownership (such as government ownership) 
provides firms the advantages of counsel, legitimacy, communication channels with external 
organizations, and preferential access to important elements outside the firm (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). 
Government investment in firms can achieve social and economic goals beyond profitability 
(Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007).  Sun et al. (2002) summarise three major roles it plays: 
 The signalling effect. Government ownership can send signals to investors. For example, 
selling a small portion of a company to the public can be positive signal that the 
government is committed and credible. 
 The monitoring role. Government can contribute to firm performance through active 
monitoring. However, the feasibility of this is a practical problem. 
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 The policy role. The government may give firms important business connections. 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) documented that large shareholders, such as governments, 
corporations and families, help solve an information problem in capital markets by 
monitoring management expected to produce significantly higher growth rates. However, if 
large shareholders improve firm performance, why do not all firms have them? Zeckhauser 
and Pound suggested that when the capital market is fully efficient, large shareholders would 
be most likely to take positions in firms that would otherwise exhibit poor performance.  
Thomsen and Pedersen (1998) said the traditional argument for government ownership is that 
monopoly power and large economics of scale overcome market failures or income 
distribution problems. However, Wiwattanakantang (2001) corrected the old view of 
government ownership, and replaces it with the idea of a monopoly or regulated duopoly that 
may give rise to superior performance. Government ownership has the power to monitor 
management, protect minority shareholders and supply firms with funds to support the capital 
market and infrastructure, especially in developing markets (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Boardman and Vining (1989) found a significant negative relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance in North America. Cueto (2008) found a similar one during 
the period of 2000-2006 across various Latin American countries. Government ownership, 
the researchers said, provides the firm with poor monitors and does not pursue investment 
projects with positive net present value. 
Xu and Wang (1999) examined the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in 
publicly-listed companies in China, using pooled firm-level data for 1993 through 1995.  
Their study found a positive relationship between institutional government ownership and 
firm performance by using market-to-book value ratio, return on equity (ROE), and return on 
assets (ROA) to calculate firm performance. This study suggested that institutional 
government ownership can and does monitor and control management. Sun et al. (2002) 
reinforce this result, finding a similar relationship among all companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1997. 
However, other studies in China show conflicting results. Wei and Varela (2003) investigated 
the relationship between government equity ownership and firm performance for Chinese 
privatized firms in 1994 (164 firms), 1995 (175 firms), and 1996 (252 firms). The researchers 
used Tobin’s Q, monthly stock returns (MSR), and the ordinary least square test (OLS). 
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Tobin’s Q’s relationship with government ownership is convex (non-linear). It decreases as 
government ownership increased from the lowest level, but then increases after the ownership 
reached an inflection point. The relationships with MSR were insignificant. Also, Bai et al. 
(2004) examined the relationship between firm performance and institutional government 
ownership in China from 1999 to 2001, and found it negative. 
Sulong and Nor (2010) examined it using panel data analysis of 403 firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia over a four-year period from 2002 to 2005. The researchers used a generalized least 
square (GLS) estimation technique to find a significant positive relation between institutional 
government ownership and Tobin’s Q. 
In Arab countries, reports of the relationship are similarly mixed. Omran et al. (2008) 
investigated 304 firms from different sectors in Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia, from 2000 
to 2002.  They found that institutional government ownership has a positive effect on ROA, 
ROE (accounting measures), and Tobin’s Q (market measure). Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) 
examined 51 firms for the year of 2004 in the UAE and find a similar positive relationship. 
However, Zeitun and Tian (2007) studied 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 
2002, working with ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, and market-to-book value. Their study found a 
significant negative significant relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance. Furthermore, they suggested that reducing government ownership can increase 
firm performance, but will also cause some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the short term.  
They recommended governments pursue privatization reform and social security to minimize 
impact of such liquidations. 
The Saudi Arabian government owns significant shares in some of the listed companies in the 
capital market. Government ownership can contribute to a firm’s performance through active 
monitoring (Sun et al., 2002). In addition, government ownership also protects minority 
shareholders and supplies firms with funds to support the capital market and infrastructure 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Hence, the literature, especially in emerging markets, suggests 
the following hypothesis for the relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance: 
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H8: A positive relationship exists between government ownership and firm performance. 
4.3.4 FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
Foreign investor ownership can reduce expropriation problems because the foreign investor is 
under greater government scrutiny, which discourages foreign investors from disregarding 
minority shareholder investors (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Fraedrich & Bateman, 1996). 
Foreign investors have more of the necessary experience and skills of governance to reduce 
monitoring and agency cost problems as well as provide corporations with sufficient 
resources (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Djankov, 1999; Frydman et al., 1997). In addition to the 
principal-agent conflict, the principal-principal conflict in the emerging market is also a 
problem (Young et al., 2008). The principal-principal conflict may produce between foreign 
ownership and domestic ownership. This conflict appears within weak governance systems 
with little legal protection from large owners (foreign or domestic) that control the firms and 
deprive other owners of the right to appropriate returns on their investments (Claessens et al. 
2000; Lemmon and Lins 2003, as cited in Douma et al., 2006).  
According to resource dependence theory, foreign investor ownership is endowed with good 
monitoring capabilities and provides firms with tangible and intangible resources, which are 
costly or sometimes difficult to obtain (Douma et al., 2006). Firms with foreign shareholders 
are endowed with superior technical and managerial expertise, and organisational and 
financial resources (Sulong and Nor, 2010). Djankov and Hoekman (2000) suggest that 
foreign ownership should be associated with provision of knowledge and skills that may be 
provided the firms.  
In Greece, Dimelis and Louri (2002) analysed the relationship between foreign ownership 
and performance by using a sample of 4,056 manufacturing firms operating in Greece in 
1997. The researchers used labour productivity to measure firm performance. This study 
found that a higher degree of foreign ownership led to more efficient production. In addition, 
Barbosa and Louri (2005) found multinational firms operating in Greece are significantly 
more profitable than Greek-owned firms  
In Norway and Sweden, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) investigated the relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance and found a positive relationship between the two. 
They suggested that board members from Anglo-American countries enhance the 
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international orientation of the firms and serve as a catalyst for further globalization of the 
corporation, which leads to enhanced firm performance.  
In Germany, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) investigated the relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance (ROA) among 361 German corporations that operated 
during the period of 1991–1996. The researchers used panel regression to examine this 
relationship, and the main result suggested a negative relationship between foreign ownership 
and ROA. 
Gedajlovic et al. (2005) used data from the fiscal years of 1996–1998 for 247 of Japan’s 
largest manufacturers. They evaluated the extent to which a firm’s investment behaviour and 
financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. They found no relationship 
between the percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders and ROA. Also, they found 
stock ownership by foreign shareholders to be associated with higher dividend payouts.  
Bai et al. (2004) also found a positive significant relationship between foreign investors and 
market valuation (Tobin’s Q) in China for the period of 1999–2001. Wei et al.’s study (2005) 
supported these results. They investigated the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value across a sample of 5,284 firms years of China's partially privatized, formerly state-
owned enterprises (SOE) from 1991–2001. They found that foreign ownership of China's 
privatized firms is positively and significantly related to firm value. Wei et al. (2005) believe 
this finding indicates that foreign investors can monitor and positively influence management 
of the firm, force management to act more consistently with firm value maximization, allow 
access to international capital markets, and access advanced technology and international 
managerial talents. 
Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) found that the existence of the foreign ownership in Indian 
firms is positively related to a high degree of resources and technology skills, which enhance 
firm performance. Douma et al. (2006) validated this study. They investigated the impact of 
foreign investor ownership on firm performance in 1,005 Indian firms for the period of 1999-
2000. This study used return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. It 
found that the coefficient of foreign ownership is positively and significantly related to ROA 
and Tobin’s Q.  
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Imam and Malik (2007) investigated the relationship between firm performance and foreign 
ownership in Bangladesh. They found a positive relationship between the two. They note that 
foreign holdings are increasing in firms with good governance, and through these good 
governance practices, firms will improve by performing better for all of their stakeholders. 
Moreover, a more recent study by Sulong and Nor (2010) also investigated how foreign 
ownership affects firm performance. They used a panel data analysis of 403 firms listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia for a four-year period from 2003–2005. Their study found that foreign 
ownership is statistically significant and is associated with enhanced firm value (Tobin’s Q). 
Al-Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) examined the ownership structure and firm performance 
of 50 of the largest Jordanian industrial companies listed in the Amman stock exchange for 
the period of 1996-2002. They found a negative, but insignificant, relationship between the 
two. Also, Omran et al. (2008) failed to find any significant relationship between foreign 
investors and firm performance in Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia) for the 
period of 2000-2002 by using ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q to calculate firm performance.  
Most of the studies that concerned the relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performance focus on the emerging market. There are a number of reasons for foreign 
ownership to be concentrated in this area. The R&D capital of foreign-owned firms is greater 
than that of domestic firms. Also, foreign-owned firms can benefit from the managerial 
experience and distribution networks of their foreign owners (Yudaeva et al., 2000). The 
existence of foreign investors in the emerging market enhances the appreciation of its 
technical infrastructure in these countries (El Mehdi, 2007). Hence, the literature, especially 
in emerging markets, suggests the following hypothesis for the relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance: 
H9: A positive relationship exists between foreign ownership and firm performance. 
4.3.5 FINANCIAL FIRMS OWENERSHIP  
Bank and financial institutions play a pivotal role in business, because they are the largest 
source of external funds for firms (Ang et al., 2000). External shareholders can enforce a high 
level of productivity (Nickell et al., 1997). Ang et al. (2000) explained how bank ownership 
reduces agency cost. By incurring monitoring costs to safeguard their loans, banks make 
firms use assets and reduce perquisite consumption. This leads to improved firm 
performance.  Moreover, Ang et al. (2000) highlighted that banks and financial institutions 
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have the skills and knowledge to enforce good monitoring. Also, financial firm ownership, 
especially when concentrated, can help firms in crisis by offering low-interest loans 
themselves or connecting firms with other loan sources (Heugens et al., 2009). Regarding the 
resource dependence theory, the financial firms ownership seeks to maximize organizational 
autonomy. Organizational leaders use many strategies to manage their external constraints 
and dependencies with good financial resources (Johnson, 1995). 
Regarding the developed market, there is a wealth of literature indicating the vital role of 
financial institutions in firm performance. Prowse (1992) examined the ownership structure 
of keiretsu and independent firms in Japan from 1979 to 1984.  The researcher used OLS 
regression estimates to examine this relationship.  The result of this study suggested that 
financial institutions help stabilize profits in independent Japanese firms, but not in keiretsu.  
Nickell et al. (1997) investigated the impact of financial institutions on the productivity of 
580 UK manufacturing companies from 1982 to 1994 and found a positive effect. In Spain, 
banks play a key role in firm ownership. When Spanish banks are part owners of a firm, they 
can internalise financial relationships (Nanka-Bruce, 2006). 
Gorton and Schmid (2000) investigated the influence of bank equity ownership in Germany, 
comparing two different periods (1974 and 1985) to examine the effect of bank equity 
ownership on the firms’ return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The 1974 
sample contained 88 companies and indicated a positive effect. The 1985 sample contained 
57 firms, and indicated that banks’ equity ownership no longer had the same power as in 
1974. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) studied the same relationships among 361 German 
corporations. They defined large shareholders as those with at least five percent of the firm’s 
voting capital. Their study found that if firms were owned by families, financial institutions, 
or a mix, they were significantly more profitable than other groups.   
On the other hand, a number of studies have found a negative relationship between financial 
institution and firm performance. Morck et al. (2000) found such a negative relationship 
between equity ownership by banks and Tobin’s Q in Japanese firms. They explained the 
cause as increased interest costs for firms. Baert and Vennet (2009) studied 2,851 European-
listed firms using Tobin’s Q for the period from 1997 to 2006.  Their results agreed with the 
results found by Morck et al. (2000). 
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Lin et al. (2009) found that bank ownership hurt firm performance in an emerging market: 
companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China 
from 1994 to 2004. They used ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q to calculate firm performance, and 
attributed the negative effect to inefficient borrowing and investment systems.  
Finally, Abdel Shahid (2003) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance among the 90 most actively listed companies on the Cairo & Alexandria 
stock exchange at the end of 2000. He found it insignificant. The study indicated that 
ownership concentration affected stock performance less than economic and market 
conditions such as the South East Asian crisis, and the lack of disclosure of listed companies 
led to insignificant results. Hence, the literature, especially in emerging markets, suggests the 
following hypothesis for the relationship between financial firms ownership and firm 
performance: 
H10: A positive relationship exists between financial firms ownership and firm 
performance. 
4.3.6 NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS OWNERSHIP (CORPORATIONS) 
La Porta et al. (1998) argued that large blockholders in countries with weak legal protection 
for minority shareholders solved the agency’s problem and received a good return on 
investment. Gorton and Schmid (2000) argued that outside block shareholders played a vital 
role as monitors of management because the size of these external shareholders gave them 
more incentive to oversee management and reduce the free-rider problems of small 
shareholders, which led to a reduction in the cost of monitoring. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) analysed the relationship between corporations’ ownership 
who held equity in their firms and firm performance for one hundred fourteen NYSE or 
AMEX-listed companies for the period 1979–1984. This study used accounting rate-of-return 
and Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. Their results found that a corporation’s 
ownership did not have any effect on firm performance. These results are consistent with the 
results found by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), which reported no significant relationship 
between large ownership and accounting profit rates. 
Also, Mehran (1995) investigated the relationship between corporations that own at least five 
percent of common stock of the company and firm performance among 153 randomly 
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selected manufacturing firms in 1979–1980 in the US. The researcher used Tobin’s Q and 
ROA to calculate firm performance. He found no significant relationship between firm 
performance and corporation ownership.   
Moreover, Gorton and Schmid (2000) investigated the relationship of nonbank blockholders 
and accounting performance (ROA and ROE). They researched two different periods in 
Germany: 1974, with eighty-eight companies, and 1985, with fifty-seven companies. The 
researchers stated that “nonbank blockholders may be so powerful that they monitor 
management and banks, preventing banks from falling prey to their conflicts-of-interest” (p. 
15). The main result of this study showed that in 1974 nonbank blockholders did not have 
any effect on firm performance, while in 1985, they did affect firm performance. 
Other scholars found a positive or negative relationship between equity ownership by 
corporate blockholders and firm performance. For example, Nickell et al. (1997) investigated 
the role of non-financial ownership on productivity growth rate using data from around 580 
UK manufacturing companies for the period 1982–1994. They found a negative effect of 
non-financial ownership equity on productivity growth.   
However, Prowse (1992) discussed the relationship of many types of external ownership 
structures and their effects on firm performance in Japan for the period 1979–1984.  The 
researcher used profit instability and found the coefficient is positive in non-financial 
ownership-equity regression. In addition, Morck et al. (2000) reported that a positive 
relationship exists between equity ownership by corporate blockholders and firm value in 
Japan. They studied this relationship between two variables: ownership by corporate 
blockholders and Tobin’s Q. Morck et al. (2000) stated that this is a positive relationship, 
consistent with the hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), which stated that the large 
blockholders are a way to solve the free-rider problems. 
Zeitun and Tian (2007) examined the impact of ownership structure on firm performance on a 
sample of fifty-nine publicly listed firms in Jordan from the period 1989–2002. This study 
calculated four ratios to measure firm performance: ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, and market-to-
book value. Their study found that non-financial ownership (companies) did not seem to have 
any significant impact on firm performance.  
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In Jordan, Al-Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) examined the ownership structure on firm 
performance in 50 of the largest Jordanian industrial companies listed in the Amman stock 
exchange for the period 1996–2002. They found a positive relationship between non-financial 
ownership and firm performance, but no significant relationship, while the correlation 
between non-financial ownership and market-to-book value was found to be positively 
significant.  
In Egypt, Abdel Shahid (2003) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance among 90 of the most-actively listed companies on the Cairo & Alexandria 
stock exchange for the period at the end of 2000. The study found a highly positive 
significant relationship between various firm performances (ROE and ROA) and non-
financial ownership. Hence, the literature, especially in emerging markets, suggests the 
following hypothesis for the relationship between non-financial firms ownership and firm 
performance: 
H11: A positive relationship exists between non-financial ownership and firm performance. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter highlights the previous literatures that discuss the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. The literature suggests that the relationship 
between the structure of the board of directors and firm performance is mixed. In addition, 
the previous studies discussed how the board of directors, among several structures, reduces 
the agency problem by using a small board size, and through the use of outside non-executive 
directors, with more concern on family board members. Based on the prior literature, a series 
of hypotheses linking corporate governance mechanisms based on the board of directors with 
firm performance has been developed. 
Another part of this chapter discusses previous studies concerning the ownership structure. 
The literature focused on two types of ownership (inside and outside) and their effect on firm 
performance. Moreover, this chapter presents several studies that used varied measures of 
firm performance, such as ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q. Based on the prior literature, a series 
of hypotheses linking ownership structure with firm performance has been developed. The 
next chapter will provide detailed investigations of the Saudi Arabian environment. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the environment in which this research is situated, this chapter presents 
some general background information about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one of the largest 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa and one of the more active of the emerging 
markets. It is divided into eight sections. Section 5.2 presents a brief introduction on Saudi 
Arabia. Section 5.3 provides a brief description of the Saudi political system, while section 
5.4 sheds light on important aspects of its legal system. Section 5.5 reveals the economic 
system of Saudi Arabia with a focus on the country’s development plans. Section 5.6 offers a 
brief description of the monitoring bodies and the following section sheds light on the 
regulations and law that set and regulate companies in Saudi Arabia. Section 5.8 provides a 
description of the Saudi stock market including its historical background and the 
development of the new Saudi capital market (Tadawul). Section 5.9 focuses on the corporate 
governance regulations in the Kingdom, after which section 5.10 provides a brief summary of 
the chapter.  
5.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND  
On 23 September 1932, King Abdulaziz Al-Saud (1880-1953) founded the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (Falgi, 2009). The Kingdom is located on the Arabian Peninsula in the southwest 
corner of Asia. It is the largest country in the Middle East and the fourteenth largest country 
in the world (Albarrak, 2011) and is about one-fourth the size of the United States, with a 
total area over 2,150,000 km
2
 (830,000 square miles) and is covered almost 80% of the 
Arabian Peninsula (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 a). Desert covers more than 
half of the total area (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 a). The country had a total 
population 25 million in 2009 (Albarrak, 2011).  
Chapter Five 
111 | P a g e  
The Environment of Saudi Arabia 
Figure ‎5-1 Map of Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning (2012 e) (as cited in Alshehri, 2012) 
The capital city is Riyadh, located in the centre of the Kingdom and contains the headquarters 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 b). Saudi 
Arabia has the two holiest cities in the Muslim world, Makkah and Madinah. Makkah is the 
city of birth of the Prophet Mohammed, and the place where Muslims travel in pilgrimage 
and is, also, the direction of Muslims' prayers. Madinah is the city of the Prophet Mohammed 
where he emigrated and lived. Because of these two holy cities, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
has a special position in the Islamic world (Falgi, 2009). 
The religion is Islam which influences all aspects of life in the Kingdom, including business, 
company law, accounting practices and professions (Alkhtani, 2010). Arabic is the official 
language and is used in drafting documents and contracts (Basheikh, 2002). There are two 
festival days in Saudi Arabia and in the Islamic world in general, Eid Alfiter (after Ramadan) 
and Eid Aladha (during the Pilgrimage). 
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Table ‎5-1 Key Indicators 
Total population 2012 29,195,895 
Population growth rate 2012 2.90 % 
Population density (person/sq km) 2012 14.6 
Saudi population 2012 19,838,448 
Saudi population growth rate 2012 2.21 % 
GDP growth at constant prices 2012 6.81 % 
Per capita GDP at current prices in 2012 (SAR) 93,417 
Private sector's contribution to GDP at constant prices for 2012 58.20 % 
Proportion of private sector growth for 2012 at constant prices 7.50 % 
Proportion of non-oil exports to imports 2012 34.40 % 
Growth of exports of goods and services for 2012 8.14 % 
Growth of imports of goods and services for 2012 5.23 % 
Exports contribution to GDP for 2012 at current prices 55.90 % 
The cost-of-living index 2012 122 
Change in the cost-of- living index (inflation) for 2012 2.90 % 
Unemployment rate 2012 5.50 % 
Saudi's unemployment rate 2012 12.10 % 
Employment as percentage of population 2012 35.60 % 
Revised economic participation rate 2012 39.20 
Infants mortality rate (per thousand live births) 2012 16.2 
Gross enrolment rate in primary education 2011  106 % 
Net enrolment rate in primary education 2011 96.60 % 
Source: Central Department for Statistics and Information (2012) 
5.3 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The political system of Saudi Arabia is monarchical. According to the Basic Law of 
Governance: 
Governance shall be limited to the sons of the Founder King 'Abd al-Aziz ibn 
'Abd ar-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa'ud, and the sons of his sons. Allegiance shall 
be pledged to the most suitable amongst them to reign on the basis of the Book 
of God Most High and the Sunnah of His Messenger (PBUH) (1992, Article 5-
b). 
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The monarchical system is centralized (Alghamdi, 2012) with the King as the authority for 
legislation (Albarrak, 2011). The King derives authority from the Holy Quran and the Sunnah 
of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) (Basic Law of Governance, 1992). In addition, the three 
fundamental powers, legislative, executive and judicial are vested in the King (Falgi, 2009). 
Furthermore, according to Article 8 of the Basic Law of Governance "Governance in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be based on justice, shura (consultation), and the equity in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah" (Basic Law of Governance, 1992, Article 8). 
5.4 THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The official religion of Saudi Arabia is Islam, and all aspects of individual life in the 
Kingdom are heavily influenced by Islamic law and regulations (Alkhtani, 2010; Albarrak, 
2011). The Basic Law of Governance states that  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its 
religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the book of God and Sunnah 
(Traditions) of His Messenger, may God's blessing and peace be upon him 
(PBUH). Its language shall be Arabic and its capital shall be the city of Riyadh 
(1992, Article 1). 
According to Basheikh (2002), Islam is the basis of the legal system in Saudi Arabia. He 
highlights four Islamic sources: 
1- The Quran is the first and primary source of the legal system in Saudi Arabia. It 
contains all the fundamental instructions and directives from Allah. 
2- The Sunnah is the second primary source of the legal system in the Kingdom. Sunnah 
contains the sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and the 
interpretations of the Holy Quran. 
3- Ijma’ is a secondary source which is defined as consensus by agreement among 
religious scholars. 
4- Qiyas is also a secondary and is defined as the analogy and the application of the 
Quran and Sunnah to solve new issues and problems. 
Islamic principles have a strong effect on the business environment with a focus on high 
ethical standards, strong protection of human rights and a strong belief in Allah (God). For 
this reason, Saudi Arabia adopts accounting and auditing standards and regulations that are 
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influenced by Islamic law and principles (Al-harkan, 2005). Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian 
Corporate Governance Regulations are also consistent with Islamic Law (Alghamdi, 2012). 
For example, the main objective of corporate governance is to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, because Islamic law requires fairness and equitability between all 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
5.5 THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a developing country. According to Basheikh (2002) the 
establishment of the oil industry in 1960 led to high economic growth rates. Saudi Arabia 
holds the biggest oil reserves in the world, approximately 23% of global reserves in 2011 
(OPEC, 2013). The economy in Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on oil revenues which are 
the main source of the national income (90-95% of the total national income and 35-40% of 
GDP) (Falgi, 2009). In addition, it is the principal source of income for the government. The 
oil industry in Saudi Arabia is of two types: the exports of crude oil and also, oil refining and 
the export of petroleum-based products (Alkhtani, 2010). The oil wealth gives the country 
strong financial leverage resulting in a leading political role in the region (Albarrak, 2011), as 
well as membership of the politically important G20 group of countries.  
Prior to the discovery of oil the Kingdom had a low level of subsistence and was one of the 
poorest countries in the world (Falgi, 2009; Alshehri, 2012). After 1970, when oil revenues 
increased dramatically, the Saudi government built a framework of five-year socio-economic 
development plans (Basheikh, 2002; Falgi, 2009; Alshehri, 2012). The focus of these plans 
was developing the levels of education and healthcare and improving the infrastructure of the 
country (Falgi, 2009).  
In order to improve economic growth, the government created the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA) in 2000 with the remit to boost investment in Saudi Arabia, 
which aims to improve the investment and eliminate the obstacles local and foreign investors 
(Alshehri, 2012). This step was followed on 3 June 2002, when the Supreme Economic 
Council approved a strategy of privatization, which includes telecommunications, postal 
services, airlines, electricity sector, railways, seaports, the water sector, sport clubs and 
educational services (Ministry of Economic and Planning, 2012 d; Alshehri, 2012). At the 
same time, the Council agreed to the establishment of a joint-stock holding company 
(Tadawul), jointly owned by the government and private sector, to enhance and improve the 
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Saudi Capital Market (Tadawul, 2012). The objectives of privatization are to increase the 
contribution of the private sector, reduce the economic dependence on oil and enhance the 
level of private investment (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 c). According to Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (2012), Saudi Arabia is the perfect investment 
opportunity in the top 10 most competitive economies in the world, because: 
1- In terms of fiscal freedom, Saudi Arabia is ranked 5th in the world 
2- It has the 10th most rewarding tax system. 
3- Saudi Arabia is ranked 20th out of the 25 largest economies 
4- It is the largest free market in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
5- Saudi Arabia has the ability to reform its business climate rapidly. 
6- Saudi Arabia is ranked first for ease of property registration property in the MENA. 
7- It is the largest recipient of the Foreign Direct Investment in the Arab World.   
8- Saudi Arabia represents 25 % of the total Arab GDP. 
In terms of the external environment, Saudi Arabia became the 149
th 
member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2005 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
2006 b). Also, it is ranked as the 12
th 
largest exporter and 22
nd 
largest importer of goods 
globally (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2012 a). In the service sector, Saudi Arabia is 
ranked as the 21
st 
largest services importer and 33
rd 
largest services exporter globally 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2012 a). 
Table ‎5-2 Five-Year Development Plans 
Plan Period Revenues (SAR bn) Expenditure (SAR 
bn) Oil Others Total 
1
st 
Development Plan 1970-74 163.8 12.5 176.2 75.5 
2
nd 
Development Plan 1975- 79 663.1 79.6 712.7 684.4 
3
rd 
Development Plan 1980- 84 1100.4 239.8 1340.2 1212.7 
4
th 
Development Plan 1985- 89 322.6 190.5 513.1 779.3 
5
th 
Development Plan 1990- 94 576.6 180.2 756.7 1020.5 
6
th 
Development Plan 1995- 99 586.1 234.0 820.1 967.2 
7
th 
Development Plan 2000-04 795.4 196.8 992.2 981.0 
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8
th 
Development Plan 2005-09 3089.0 402.6 3491.6 2322.5 
9
th 
Development Plan 2010- 14 On- going 
Adopted: Ministry of Economy and Planning (2012 f); Alshehri (2012) 
5.6 THE SUPERVISION AND MONITORING BODIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
5.6.1 THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
The King is charged with running the country in accordance with the dictates of Islam and 
supervising the implementation of Shari‘ah (Islamic law) in the Kingdom (Basic Law of 
Governance, 1992). The King is the head of the Council of Ministers (effectively the 
equivalent of the cabinet), which is responsible for internal and external affairs, and also, for 
organizing governmental bodies (Basic Law of Governance, 1992). The main purpose of the 
Council of Ministers is to help and assist the King in his duties (Alkhtani, 2010). 
5.6.2 THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL (MAJLIS ASH-SHURA) 
The Consultative Council (Majlis Ash-Shura) was established by Royal Decree No. A/91 in 
March 1992 (Majlis Ash-Shura, 2011). According to the Shura Council Law the “Shura 
Council shall hold fast to the bond of Allah and adhere to the source of Islamic legislation. 
All members of the Council shall strive to serve the public interest, and preserve the unity of 
the community, the entity of the State, and the nation’s interests” (1992, article 2). The Shura 
Council consists of a Chairman and 150 members. They are chosen by the King from among 
scholars, experts, and specialists (Shura Council Law, 1992). Members should be of the 
Saudi nation by descent and upbringing; well known for uprightness and competence; and not 
less than 30 years of age (Shura Council Law, 1992).  
According to Shura Council Law (1992), the following are some of its responsibilities: 
 Express opinions about the state’s general policies and those that are referred by the 
Prime Ministers. 
 Discuss and give opinions about the general economic plans and social development. 
 Revise laws, regulations, and international treaties and agreements, and provide 
opinions and suggestions on these to the Council of Ministers. 
 Discuss annual reports of government agencies and provide suggestions related to 
these reports. 
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5.6.3 THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) has an important role in the Saudi Arabian 
economy (Falgi, 2009). The main roles of the MOCI are to develop and expand domestic and 
foreign trade, and to manage companies and business in the country (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, 2006). In addition, the MOCI approves the establishment of joint stock 
companies (Falgi, 2009). Moreover, it has an indirect supervisory role over many monitoring 
bodies in Saudi Arabia, such as the Saudi Capital Market Authority, the Saudi Stock 
Exchange, and the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (Alghamdi, 2012). 
In the country’s seventh five-year development plan, the ministry has a number of objectives 
including (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2012 b) : 
1- Developing internal and external non-oil trade. 
2- Increasing the effectiveness of the role of the private sector and encourage it to 
improve economic efficiency. 
3- Developing the employment of nationals in the private sector. 
4- Improving the performance of the trade sector in order to meet the demand for goods 
and services in the local markets. 
5- Supporting the development of non-oil exports. 
6- Developing the business services sector. 
The MOCI provides certain services as follows (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2006 
c): 
1- Registering commercial activities. 
2- Approving the establishment of joint stock companies. 
3- Registering and protecting trade names and trademarks. 
4- Resolving any issues and differences between businesses.  
In addition, there are two important ministries which assist the MOCI; the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry of Economy and Planning. All three ministries work together to 
enhance, develop and improve the economic environment. The Ministry of Finance prepares 
the government's budget and provides the funding for other government agencies (including 
the MOCI) to establish their projects (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The Ministry of Economy 
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and Planning also plays a vital role in preparing the five-year plans and providing assistance 
to other government agencies, including the MOCI through economic studies. 
5.6.4 THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND PLANNING 
The Ministry of Economy and Planning is one of the most important ministries with a vital 
role in enhancing development. This ministry has responsibility for preparing the five-year 
development plans (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 d). The objectives of the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning are (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2012 d): 
1- Preparing the development plans of the Kingdom. 
2- Preparing periodic economic reports with full analysis and explanation of the Saudi 
economy. 
3- Estimating the amount needed to implement the development plans for agreement by 
the Council of Ministers. 
4- Providing other ministries and government agencies with assistance and solving 
issues related with planning. 
5- Conducting specialist economic studies which provide important recommendations. 
5.6.5 THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
The Ministry of Finance has evolved over time. The first stage started in 1927 when it was in 
the form of General Directorate of Finance which was responsible for financial matters in the 
Kingdom of Hejaz (the name of the state before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The second 
stage commenced in 1932 when its name was changed to the Ministry of Finance to become 
the second ministry established after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Finance, 
2012). The third stage was initiated in 1936 when a number of general directorates were 
established under the control of the Ministry of Finance, including the Petroleum and 
Minerals Directorate, the Public Works Directorate and the Customs Directorate (Ministry of 
Finance, 2012). Further directorates were added in later years such as the Agricultural 
Directorate in 1948 (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The fourth stage started in 1954 with the 
merging of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy to become the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The final stage to date occurred 
in 2003 with the separation for the responsibility for economic activities which were added to 
the Ministry of Planning which then became the Ministry of Economy and Planning, with the 
Ministry of Finance reverting to its former name (Ministry of Finance, 2013). 
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The main duties of the Ministry of Finance are (Ministry of Finance, 2012): 
1. Supervising and monitoring the implementation of the government's fiscal and the 
monetary policies. 
2. Preparing the government's budget. 
3. Controlling the accounts between the Ministry of Finance and others ministries and 
government agencies. 
4. Supervising the revenue of the government.   
5. Supervising the annual closing accounts of the government. 
5.6.6 SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AGENCY  
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central bank, was established on 20 April 
1952 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 2013). SAMA was the government body which had 
responsibility for regulating and monitoring the capital market activities until the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) was established in July 2003 (Tadawul, 2012).  
The main roles of the SAMA are as follows (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 2013): 
1. Issuing the national currency, which is the Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR). 
2. Acting as the banker to the Saudi government.  
3. Supervising all commercial banks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
4. Managing the Kingdom's foreign exchange reserves. 
5. Conducting monetary policy in order to promote price and exchange rate stability. 
6. Promoting economic growth. 
7. Ensuring the soundness of the financial system. 
5.7 THE REGULATION OF COMPANIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
5.7.1 THE COMPANIES ACT (1965) 
The Companies Act was issued in its first version on 20
 
July 1965 (Basheikh, 2002) to 
regulate the operations of Saudi companies (Alghamdi, 2012). The first version was derived 
from the British Companies Act (Alghamdi, 2012). The main function of the Companies Act 
is to regulate the transactions of commercial companies, such as joint stock companies, 
particular partnership, liability companies, limited liability companies, and also, foreign 
companies (Alshehri, 2012). The Companies Act has been amended four times in 1967, 1982, 
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1985 and 1992 (Basheikh, 2002). Furthermore, a new version is expected shortly (Alshehri, 
2012).  
5.7.2 THE INCOME TAX AND ZAKAT LAW 
Zakat is a religious tax levied at the end of every financial year at the rate of 2.5% of the total 
monetary values of an individual’s assets (Basheikh, 2002; Alkhtani, 2010). The Zakat law 
was issued by Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/8634 in 1951, which has been amended twice in 
1951 and 1956 (Department of Zakat and Income Tax, 2012 a). According to Article No. 1 
“Zakat duty shall be collected in full in accordance with provisions of Islamic Law (Shariah) 
from all Saudi person, shareholders of Saudi companies whose all shareholders are Saudi, 
and Saudi shareholders of joint companies whose shareholders are Saudi and non-Saudi" 
(Department of Zakat and Income Tax, 2012 a). Article 6 of the Zakat law states that all 
individuals and companies must keep organized books that shows the capital, revenue and 
expenses accounts for each year in order to calculate the amount of Zakat (Department of 
Zakat and Income Tax, 2012 b). 
The regulation of Income Tax first started with issuance of Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/3321 
dated 2 November 1950. It has been amended several times in 1951, 1956 and 1986 
(Basheikh, 2002; Department of Zakat and Income Tax, 2012 a) and last amended was in 
2004 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). According to Article 2 of the Income Tax law, the 
individuals subject to pay income tax are (Department of Zakat and Income Tax, 2012 c): 
1- A resident capital company with respect to the share of a non-Saudi partner. 
2- A resident non-Saudi person who conducts business in Saudi Arabia. 
3- A non-resident who conducts business in Saudi Arabia through a permanent 
establishment. 
4- A person engaged in the natural gas and hydrocarbons investment field.  
5.7.3 THE SAUDI ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION 
In 1979, Yousef Al-Hamdan, the Deputy Minister of Commerce, and Abdulaziz Al-Rashed, 
the head of the Al-Rashed firm, entered into discussions as how to develop an accounting and 
auditing professional environment in Saudi Arabia (SOCPA, 2011). At the end of 1981, the 
Scientific Board of the King Saud University agreed to establish the Saudi Accounting 
Association (SAA) as a non-profit society supervised by King Saud University (Saudi 
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Accounting Association, 2012). The main objectives of the Saudi Accounting Association are 
(Saudi Accounting Association, 2012; Alkhtani, 2010): 
1. Developing the accounting concepts in Saudi Arabia. 
2. Providing advice and studies to other institutions and companies in the accounting 
field. 
3. Producing and supervising accounting research. 
4. Running conferences and seminars to discuss the issues related to the accounting 
field. 
5.7.4 THE ORGNIZATION FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) was established by Royal 
Decree No. M/12, in 1992, as a professional organization (SOCPA, 2013). It is operated by a 
board of directors under the supervision of the MOCI (SOCPA, 2013). The board contains 
thirteen members, with the Minister of Commerce and Industry as the Chairman (Alkhtani, 
2010). The main activities of this organization are (SOCPA, 2013): 
1. Reviewing, developing, and approving accounting and auditing standards. 
2. Setting and supervising the rules for the fellowship certificate examinations. 
3. Organizing courses for accounting and auditing topics in order to solve new issues 
and problems. 
4. Promoting research work in the accounting and auditing fields. 
5. Publishing books covering accounting and auditing topics. 
6. Establishing a specific program in order to ensure that certified public accountants 
comply with accounting and auditing standards. 
7. Participating in local and international conferences and committees in the accounting 
and auditing fields. 
It is worth noting that corporate governance is not specifically covered in any of these 
activities, except to the extent that external auditing may be regarded as part of a company’s 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
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5.7.5 THE CAPITAL MARKET AUTHORITY 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia started unofficially in the early 1950s 
(Capital Market Authority, 2012). The official CMA was established by Royal Decree in 
2004 as an independent government organization with full financial, legal, and administrative 
independence. It reports directly to the Prime Minister (Falgi, 2009; Alkhtani, 2010; Capital 
Market Authority, 2012). The main objective of the CMA is to regulate and develop the 
Saudi Arabian Capital Market (Capital Market Authority, 2012), including establishing 
regulations, rules and instructions which related to Saudi Stock Exchange (Alshehri, 2012). 
To achieve this objective the CMA is entrusted with the following duties (Capital Market 
Authority, 2012): 
1. To issue the rules and regulations for implementing the provisions of the Capital 
Market Law. 
2. To protect investors from unfair and unsound practices such as fraud, cheating, deceit, 
manipulation and insider trading. 
3. To provide and maintain fairness, and achieve efficiency and transparency in equity 
transactions. 
4. To take measures to reduce risks pertaining to the transactions of securities.  
5. To develop, regulate and monitor the issuance of equities. 
6. To regulate and monitor the activities of entities that work under the CMA control. 
7. To regulate and monitor full disclosure of information related to securities and 
issuers.  
The CMA is governed by a board of five members, who should be Saudi nationals and 
appointed by Royal Decree (Capital Market Authority, 2012). One of the most important 
regulations is corporate regulations which issued by the board of the CMA in 2006 as a 
recommended regulation that became compulsory in 2010 (Alghamdi, 2012).  
5.8 THE SAUDI STOCK MARKET 
5.8.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1934, the Arabian Automobiles Company became the first joint stock company to be 
established in Saudi Arabia (Basheikh, 2002; Alkhtani, 2010). During the 1950s, the number 
of joint stock companies increased by four with a total paid-up capital of SR943m divided 
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into 9.3 million shares, with the establishment of three electricity companies and the Arab 
Cement Company (Basheikh, 2002; Al-harkan, 2005). The number of companies increased 
rapidly during the economic boom of the 1970s, when 17 companies mainly concentrated in 
the cement, electricity and banking sectors were set up (Basheikh, 2002; Alkhtani, 2010). 
As a result of the Souk Al-Manakh crisis in Kuwait, in 1984 the Saudi Arabian government 
was called upon to establish a committee responsible for regulating and developing the stock 
market in Saudi Arabia (Al-harkan, 2005). This committee consisted of representatives from 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the Ministry of Commerce and SAMA 
(Basheikh, 2002; Al-harkan, 2005). This committee delegated the responsibility of the capital 
market to SAMA (Basheikh, 2002). To achieve this role SAMA established a specific 
department called the Stock Control Department, which is responsible and oversees the daily 
stock transactions (Basheikh, 2002; Al-harkan, 2005). By 1985, the number of companies 
listed on the stock exchange reached 57 with a total share capital of SR52bn (Basheikh, 
2002).   
5.8.2 THE NEW SAUDI STOCK MARKET (TADAWUL) 
In July 2003, SAMA delegated the responsibility for the Saudi stock market operations to the 
CMA (Tadawul, 2012). In March 2007, the Council of Ministers agreed to establish the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul) (Tadawul, 2012) as a joint stock company to look after the day-
to-day operations of the Tadawul (Alshehri, 2012). According to Piesse et al. (2012), the 
features of the Saudi stock market are that it is one of the largest, has one of the highest 
annual turnovers, is one of the most active and has one of the highest capitalizations in 
MENA.  
The number of share traded increased from 2.77 billion in 2000 to 68.515 billion in 2006 and 
by 2005 the capitalization reached a peak of SR2,438.2bn (approximately US$651bn) with 
the share price index hitting 16,712.2. At the beginning of 2006 the Tadawul crashed 
(Alkhtani, 2010), with capitalization falling by almost half to SR1,225.9bn (approximately 
US$327bn). Because of the crash, the CMA formulated new regulations and requirements for 
corporate governance codes with higher levels of disclosure and compliance (Alkhtani, 
2010). However, by 2012, the Saudi Arabia stock market was the 27
th 
 largest in the world by 
total market capitalization USD373.375bn, the 15
th
 largest in the emerging economies, and 
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the largest Arabic market in MENA (World Federation of Exchanges, 2013). The table below 
shows the Saudi capital market performance for the period 2000 to 2011 
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Table ‎5-3 The Saudi capital market performance for the period 2000-2011 
Year NO. of share traded 
(Million) 
Value of share traded 
(Billion SR) 
Market capitalization of 
issued shares (Billion 
SR) 
Number of transaction 
(Thousand) 
Share price index 
2000 2774.6 65.3 254.5 498.1 2258.3 
2001 3459.2 83.6 274.5 605 2430.1 
2002 8679.2 133.8 280.7 1033.7 2518.1 
2003 27829.3 596.5 589.9 3763.4 4437.6 
2004 51491.7 1773.9 1148.6 13319.5 8206.2 
2005 61406.7 4138.7 2438.2 46608 16712.6 
2006 68515.3 5261.9 1225.9 96095.9 7933.3 
2007 57829 2557.7 1946.4 65665.5 11038.7 
2008 58726 1962.9 924.5 52135.9 4803 
2009 56685 1264 1195.5 36458.3 6121.8 
2010 33255 759.2 1325.4 19536.1 6620.8 
2011 48545 1098.8 1270.8 25546.9 6417.7 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2013) 
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Table  5-4 World's largest stock markets by total market capitalization for 2012 
Rank of 
emerging 
market 
Rank of 
all 
countries Market 
Market CAP. 
(Million US $) 
  
  
  
  
  
1 NYSE Euronext (US) 14085944 
2 NASDAQ OMX 4582389 
3 Japan Exchange Group - Tokyo 3478832 
4 London SE Group 3396505 
5 NYSE Euronext (Europe) 2832189 
1 6 Hong Kong Exchanges 2831946 
2 7 Shanghai SE 2547204 
  
  
  
8 TMX Group 2058839 
9 Deutsche 1486315 
10 Australian SE 1386874 
3 11 BSE India 1263336 
4 12 National Stock Exchange India 1234492 
  13 SIX Swiss Exchange 1233439 
5 14 BM&FBOVESPA 1227447 
6 15 Korea Exchange 1179419 
7 16 Shenzhen SE 1150172 
  
  
  
17 NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange  995719.2 
18 BME Spanish Exchanges 995088.5 
19 Johannesburg SE 907723.2 
8 20 MICEX / RTS 825340.5 
9 21 Singapore Exchange 765078 
10 22 Taiwan SE Corp. 735292.6 
11 23 Mexican Exchange 525056.7 
12 24 Bursa Malaysia 466587.6 
13 25 Indonesia SE 428222.6 
14 26 The Stock Exchange of Thailand  389756.3 
15 27 Saudi Stock Exchange - Tadawul 373374.8 
  28 IMKB 315197.5 
  29 Santiago SE 313325.3 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2013) 
According to Tadawul (2013), it has two main objectives, with a number of sub-objectives: 
1. Operating the market efficiently and delivering excellent service: 
 Operating the market effectively and efficiently. 
 Ensuring market integrity, quality, and fairness.  
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 Supporting investors’ education by holding seminars. 
 Developing service excellence for customers and other stakeholders. 
 Developing the exchange's capabilities and competencies. 
2. Developing a leading financial exchange by supporting competitive investment and 
financing channels: 
 Supporting efficient capital-raising for companies. 
 Providing innovative, diversified, and integrated financial market products, 
services, and investment. 
 Attracting national and international market participants. 
 Integrating and leveraging offerings across the value chain. 
 Providing superior financial returns and shareholder value. 
The table below shows the market performance of Arab countries for the period 1 Jan 2013 to 
2 Jul 2013 
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Table ‎5-5 The market performance of Arab countries for the period 1 Jan 2013 to 2 Jul 2013 
Market Value Traded 
(Million US $) 
Shares Traded 
(Million) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Million US $) 
NO. of 
Contracts 
Turnover (%) 
ABU DHABI SECURITIES MARKET  9,703.4931  23,039.0646  101,678.19  252463  9.5433 
AMMAN STOCK EXCHANGE  2,903.9845  1,739.7447  25,672.66  640593  11.3116 
BAHRAIN STOCK EXCHANGE  359.3026  1,213.425  17,356.38  7582  2.0701 
BEIRUT STOCK EXCHANGE  131.8692  17.7483  16,593.43  5496  0.7947 
CASABLANCA STOCK EXCHANGE  3,578.6580  92.4027  49,605.52  61988  7.2142 
DAMASCUS SECURITIES EXCHANGE  15.1069  10.3832  1,553.44 5558  0.9725 
DOHA SECURITIES MARKET  9,217.1051  828.6349  148,112.57  418402  6.2230 
DUBAI FINANCIAL MARKET  16,222.5882  45,416.5913  58,953.35  553030  27.5177 
EGYPT CAPITAL MARKET  8,220.5922  11,240.9134  49,006.52  2056921  16.7745 
KUWAIT STOCK MARKET  0.0000  0  102,653.61 0   0.0000 
MUSCAT SECURITIES MARKET  2,934.3798  4,541.2752  25,234.11  245065  11.6286 
PALESTINE SECURITIES EXCHANGE  132.5954  73.6482  2,762.46  20257  4.7999 
SAUDI STOCK MARKET  204,125.0706  29,014.071  404,774.76  4733639  50.4293 
TUNIS STOCK EXCHANGE  469.5387  110.5056  9,076.48  298195  5.1731 
Total 258,014.2843 117,338.4081  1,013,033.48 9299189  25.4695 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2013)
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5.9 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA 
5.9.1 BACKGROUND TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN COROPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODES 
Until 2006, there were no specific corporate governance regulations. As the CMA was only 
established in 2003, the gap between its setting up and the issuance of corporate governance 
regulations was only three years. In February 2006, the Saudi stock market suffered a huge 
crash (Alshehri, 2012), which provoked the CMA to approve new regulations for corporate 
governance in order to help protect shareholders and other stakeholders.  
Figure ‎5-2 Saudi General Stock Market Index, 2006 
 
Source: reproduced from (Alshehri, 2006) (as cited in Alshehri, 2012) 
On 12 November 2006, the board of the CMA issued the regulations of corporate governance 
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, 2006). The codes are strongly influenced by the 2004 OECD principles, with 
most articles based on or similar to the OECD code (Alshehri, 2012). The Codes adopt a 
'comply or explain' policy which requires companies to disclose in the board's report 
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provisions that have been implemented and those not implemented and explain the reasons 
for non-compliance (Falgi, 2009; Alshehri, 2012). 
Since 2006, some elements of the Saudi Arabian corporate governance codes have been 
revised, while a number of articles have become mandatory (Alshehri, 2012). For example, in 
November 2008, Article 9 which relates to disclosure in the board of directors' report became 
mandatory for all companies listed on the Saudi Arabian stock market. These companies now 
have to report certain provisions; for example, classify the board of director types into 
executive and non-executive, name any joint stock companies to which the member of the 
board also acts as a member of its board, detail the remuneration paid to board members, and 
report any punishment imposed on the company by the CMA. Moreover, on the same date a 
number of elements of Article 12, which is related to the majority of the board of directors, 
became mandatory. 
On 10 November 2008, Article 14, which is related to the appointment, duties and 
responsibilities of the audit committee, also became mandatory. In addition, Article 15, which 
discusses the nomination and remuneration committee, was slated to become mandatory from 
March 2010. Lastly, elements of Articles 5, 10 and 12 were to become mandatory from 30 
December 2012. These related to shareholders’ rights, the function and formation of the 
board of directors.  
The Saudi Arabian corporate governance regulations, which comprise five sections with a 
total of 19 articles, regulate and operate the listed companies in the Saudi stock market. These 
regulations deal with the right of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, and the board of 
directors. Also, in Article 2 the regulations defines key terms such as independent member, 
non-executive director, first-degree related, shareholders, accumulative voting and minority 
shareholders in order to ensure the code is understood and applied correctly. 
5.9.2 COMPANY STRUCTURE 
According to the Companies Act 1965, Article 66 stipulates that each company is directed by 
a board of directors with at least three members, who are appointed at Annual General 
Assembly for a period of not more than three years. The board of directors of Saudi Arabian 
companies contains of two types of members, executive and non-executives, in a one-tier 
board that takes the form of unitary board, following the Anglo-Saxon model (Mallin, 2007; 
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Solomon, 2007). Article 68 stipulates that to be a member of board of director must own 
1000 shares in the company with a market value of not less than SR10,000. Also, the 
Companies Act permits a board member to be a member of boards in other companies 
without limit (Falgi, 2009). 
5.9.3 SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS 
The Companies Act endorses and protects shareholders' rights in a number of articles. The 
general rights of the shareholders include the right to share in the distribution of profits, 
attend the general assembly and participate in its deliberations. Thus, Article 78 gives all 
shareholders the right to claim against for any member of the board of directors for any 
wrong or mistaken actions, while Article 83 stipulates that each shareholder who holds 20 or 
more shares has the right to attend the company's general assemblies. Furthermore, each 
shareholder has the right to discuss the topics of the assembly and ask questions to any 
member of the board of directors or external auditor (Article 94, Companies Act 1965). 
Moreover, Article 109 stipulates that shareholders who own 5% or more of the capital have 
the right to request from the Dispute Resolution Authority an inspection of the company if 
they find any reason or doubt about the behaviour of the board of directors or external 
auditors.   
Furthermore, the Corporate Governance Regulations of Saudi Arabia (2006) contains five 
articles which relate to shareholders’ rights. The first article is concerned with the general 
rights of shareholders such as attending the general assembly, access to the distribution of 
profits and the right to supervise the board members. The second article is related to access to 
available information which should be comprehensive, accurate and updated. The third article 
discusses on the general assembly including the announcing of the date, place and agenda at 
least 20 days prior the date of meeting. It also highlights the rights to discuss  any topic on the 
agenda and ask questions to the board of directors and auditors. The fourth article focuses on 
voting rights which include the right to vote in the general assembly for the nomination to the 
board members. In addition, the shareholder is given the right to appoint in writing any other 
shareholder who is not a board of member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the general assembly on his/her behalf. The fifth article which is related to the right to 
dividends includes the right to be informed of policy regarding dividends, of the date and of 
the amount of the distribution.  
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5.9.4 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The Companies Act of Saudi Arabia discusses the board of directors in a number of articles 
which set out their main duties and responsibilities, how board members are appointed and 
stipulate the regulations and rules that are related to the work and mechanisms of the board 
members. The main objectives of the boards of directors are to protect and secure the 
investment of shareholders and the interests of other stakeholders (Al-harkan, 2005). The 
board of directors in Saudi Arabian companies is similar in structure to Anglo-American 
companies (a one-tier board) (Piesse et al., 2012). According to Piesse et al., the average size 
of the board of directors in Saudi Arabia is 8.6 members. Also, Falgi (2009) suggests that the 
board size should be related to the company size. His research indicates that small companies 
should have a board of directors containing between four and eight members, medium-size 
companies should have six to ten members, and large companies should have seven to 12 
members (the company size depends on the total assets and the capital structure) (Falgi, 
2009). 
Section four of the Saudi Arabian Regulation of Corporate Governance discusses the board of 
directors. Article 10 sets out the main functions of the board of directors as:  
 Approving strategies, plans, and objectives of the company.  
 Creating and developing an internal control system for the company to ensure the 
integrity of the accounting procedures related to the preparation of the financial 
reports. 
 Creating a policy that regulates the relationship with stakeholders and states how to 
protect their rights. 
 Creating the policies and standards for the membership of the board of directors and 
implementing them after they have been approved by the general assembly. 
The Regulations stipulates that the number of the board members should not be less than 
three and not more than eleven depending on the company size. The majority of the board 
must be non-executive members (Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, 2006). The Corporate Governance Regulations recommend the separation of 
the position of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and that 
the Chairman must be a non-executive member. Moreover, the independent members should 
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not be less than two members, or one-third of the total directors (Corporate Governance 
Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006).  
In addition, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (2006) recommend the 
establishment of a suitable number of sub-committees in order to enable the board  to 
perform its duties in an effective manner. There are three sub-committees that require to be 
set up in the companies listed on the Saudi stock market: the audit committee; the nomination 
and remuneration committee; and the executive committee. Previously, the audit committee 
was the only sub-committee that existed in Saudi companies (Al-Moataz, 2003). According 
to Falgi (2009) in 2003 SOCPA created a committee to evaluate the performance of audit 
committees in the listed companies, which made the following conclusions (SOCPA, 2007 
cited in Falgi, 2009): 
 There is a lack of clarity concerning the tasks and field of action of audit committees. 
 Some board members and committee members are unaware and misunderstand the 
purpose of the audit committee. 
 The concept of independent members of the audit committee is not well known. 
 The professional and academic qualifications of some committee members are 
inadequate. 
 There is a lack of a control system to monitor audit committee practices. 
After these conclusions, the committee established a project in order to improve the 
performance of the audit committees (Falgi, 2009). According to Article 14 of the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Regulations (2006) there should be no less than three non-executive 
members on the audit board committees with good financial and accountancy backgrounds. 
According to the Regulations the main functions and responsibilities of the audit committees 
are: 
1. To independently supervise the company's internal audit in order to ensure the 
company’s effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified by the board 
of directors. 
2. To review the internal audit procedures, review the internal audit reports for errors 
and provide recommendations. 
3. To supervise the activities of the external auditors. 
4. To review with the external auditors the audit plan. 
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5. To review the external auditor's comments on the financial statement.  
6. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to presentation to the 
board of directors and give advice and opinions. 
7. To review the accountancy policies and providing any advice or recommendations in 
relation to them. 
The nomination and remuneration committees recommended by the Corporate Governance 
Regulations are responsible for issuing rules in relation to the appointment of members of the 
board of directors, to review annually the skills required for membership of the board; and set 
out clear policies regarding the remuneration of board members and top executives 
(Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006).  
5.9.5 THE COMPANY'S INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
In 2001 a ministerial committee was established to study the situation of the Saudi listed 
companies. The Higher Economic Council approved the recommendations of the committee 
in relation to the internal control system in the listed companies in the Saudi stock market 
(Falgi, 2009). The recommendations were: (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2012, cited 
in Alshehri, 2012): 
1. To strengthen the important role of internal control in the listed companies and to 
educate shareholders about their role in monitoring companies' performances. 
2. To ensure that adequate information appears in the company financial statements in 
order to enable investors to assess company performance in order to take the right 
decisions to protect their investments. 
5.9.6 DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Disclosure and transparency are important practices that are integral to good corporate 
governance and to reducing the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
(Piesse et al., 2012). Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations state that the company should 
disclose and write policies, procedures, and rules that are related to corporate governance 
mechanisms (Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006). 
The Regulations require disclosure of certain information in the board of directors’ report, 
which is appended to the annual financial statement (Corporate Governance Regulations in 
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006). This report should include the following information 
(Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006): 
 The implemented and unimplemented provisions of these regulations, with 
justifications for not implementing them. 
 The disclosure of the names of any board members who act as a board member of 
other joint stock companies. 
 The classification into executive, non-executive or independent board members. 
 The description of all sub-committee boards, such as audit, nomination and 
remuneration. 
 The full details concerning compensation and remuneration paid to the Chair and 
other board members. 
 The details of any punishment imposed on the company. 
 The results of the annual audit concerning the internal control of the company.  
5.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a brief background to the Saudi Arabian environment in terms of its 
economy, legal and political systems. It also provides a brief description of bodies in the 
Kingdom that play a significant role in improving and developing the Saudi business 
environment such as the Ministries of Finance, of Economy and Planning, and of Commerce 
and Industry and other agencies such as SAMA. In addition, it focuses on the regulation of 
the Saudi Arabian companies through the Companies Act, SOCPA and the CMA. Moreover, 
the chapter sheds light on the Corporate Governance Regulations in Saudi Arabia, 
specifically looking at company structure, shareholders’ rights, boards of directors, internal 
control, and disclosure and transparency; all of which are important elements for 
understanding the mechanisms of the corporate governance regulation in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.  
The next chapter provides details on the research methodology and design in order to help 
achieve the research objectives. 
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6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents and discusses the research methodology and data collection used in this 
study, beginning with the definition of research, followed by the research types. The 
researcher then identifies the two main research paradigms and explains the quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies used in this study, which resulted in a triangulation 
methodology. After that, the text provides details about the data collection methods and the 
sample that was included in the study, ending with a brief conclusion and summary.  
6.2 DEFINITION OF RESEARCH 
There is a debate about the term 'research', which normally refers to the way in which the 
data are collected (input) and the results that may be produced from these data (output) 
(Saunders et al., 2007). However, some scholars define 'research' as a systematic approach 
that contains a specific set and sequence of activities that lead to finding out useful 
information and to investigating the unknown in order to solve a problem (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005; Saunders et al., 2007). Sekaran (2005, p. 370) (as cited in Alshehri, 2012) 
defined research as ''an organised, systemic, data-based, critical, scientific inquiry or 
investigation into a specific problem, undertaken with objective of finding answers or 
solutions to it''. Saunders et al. (2007) highlight characteristics of aspects of research: data are 
collected systematically, data are interpreted systematically, and the study’s clear purpose is 
to find things out.  
Research is essential for understanding at basic phenomena in our lives, such as economic, 
education, and business. Also, it provides the decision-maker with a good decision and with 
judgement about the right solution to a particular problem, and it gives the decision-maker a 
good prediction about the future (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). Collis and Hussey (2003) 
summarised the purpose of research as follows: 
1. To review and synthesise existing knowledge 
2. To investigate some existing situation or problem 
3. To provide solutions to a problem 
4. To explore and analyse more general issues 
5. To develop or create a new procedure or system 
6. To explain a new phenomenon 
7. To contribute new knowledge 
Chapter Six 
138 | P a g e  
Research Design and Methodology 
6.3 TYPES OF RESEARCH 
Collis and Hussey (2003) classified types of research into four groups based on purpose, 
process, logic, and outcomes. The table below shows the classification of the main types of 
research based on various classifications. 
Table ‎6-1 Classification of main types of research 
Type of research Basic of classification 
Exploratory, descriptive, analytical, or predictive research Purpose of the research 
Quantitative or qualitative research  Process of the research 
Deductive or inductive research  Logic of the research 
Applied or basic research Outcome of the research 
 Source: Collis and Hussey (2003) 
First, classification is the purpose of the research, of which four types exist: exploratory, 
descriptive, analytical, or predictive research: 
 Exploratory research is conducted in a research problem when there are very few or 
no earlier studies (Collis and Hussey, 2003) and also when the research problem is 
badly understood (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). The main aim of this type of research 
is to look for an idea or hypothesis rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997). This type of research requires special skills, such as the 
ability to observe, get information, and construct an explanation that is theorizing 
(Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). It can be used in case studies, observation, and 
historical analysis, which can provide both quantitative and qualitative data (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003). 
 Descriptive research involves describing phenomena as they exist (Collis and Hussey, 
2003), and this type of research is structured and well-understood (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug, 2005). This type of research’s main objective is to gain and to obtain 
accurate profile information of events, persons, or situations (Saunders et al., 2012). 
The data collected are often quantitative, and statistical techniques are usually used to 
summarise the information (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
 Analytical research is a continuation of descriptive research, with more explanation 
and analysing of why or how the problem happened (Collis & Hussey, 2003). The 
emphasis is on studying a situation or a problem in order to understand phenomena by 
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discovering and measuring causal relations between variables (Collis and Hussey, 
2003; Saunders et al., 2012). 
 Predictive research goes even further than analytical research does; it aims to make 
generalizations from the analysis by predicting certain phenomena on the basis of a 
hypothesis and a general relationship (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
The second classification is the process of the research, which is divided into two main types 
of research: quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitative research is objective in nature 
and concentrates on measuring phenomena, which involves collecting and analysing 
numerical data as well as applying statistical tests, whereas, qualitative research is more 
subjective in nature and involves examining and reflecting on perception in order to obtain 
and to gain more of an understanding of the situation (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
The third classification is the logic of the research, which is divided into two main types of 
research: deductive and inductive research. Deductive research is a study in which a 
conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and in which the researcher draws 
conclusions through logical reasons (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Ghauri and Grønhaug,, 2005). 
After that, the researcher tests theory via empirical observations; thus, some particular 
instances are deduced from general inferences, which means that the deductive method is to 
move from general to particular (Collis and Hussey, 2003); this type of research is more 
suitable with quantitative type of research (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). In contrast, 
inductive research is a study in which theory is developed from the observation of empirical 
reality; thus, general inferences are induced from a particular instance, which means that the 
researcher draws general conclusions from an empirical observation, and this type of research 
is often used in qualitative research (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). 
The table below distinguishes between deductive and inductive research. 
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Table ‎6-2 Comparison between deductive and inductive research 
 Deductive Inductive 
Logic In a deductive inference, when the 
premises are true, the conclusion 
must also be true. 
In an inductive inference, known 
premises are used to generate untested 
conclusion. 
Generalisability Generalising from the general to the 
specific 
Generalising from the specific to the 
general 
Use of data Data collection is used to evaluate 
propositions or hypotheses that are 
related to an existing theory. 
Data collection is used to explore a 
phenomenon, to identify themes, and 
patterns, and to create a conceptual 
framework. 
Theory Theory falsification or verification Theory generation and building 
Source: Saunders et al. (2012) 
The fourth classification is the outcome of the research, which is divided into two main types 
of research: applied and basic research. Basic research is referred to as fundamental or pure 
research; however, applied research is designed to apply its findings to solving a specific 
problem (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The table below distinguishes between basic and applied 
research. 
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Table ‎6-3 Comparison between basic and applied research 
 Basic research Applied research 
Purpose  Expand knowledge of processes 
business and management. 
 Results in universal principles 
that relate to the process and its 
relationship to outcomes 
 Findings of significance and 
value to society in general 
 Improve understanding of a 
particular business or 
management problem.  
 Results in solution to problem 
 New knowledge limited to 
problem 
 Findings of particular relevance 
and value to manager(s) in 
organisation(s) 
Context  Undertaken by people based 
at universities 
 Choice of topic and 
objectives determined by the 
researcher 
 Flexible time scales 
 Undertaken by people based 
in a variety of settings, 
including organisations and 
universities 
 Objectives negotiated with 
originator 
 Tight time scales 
 Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2008); Hedrick et al. (1993) (as cited in Saunders et al., 2012). 
6.4 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Thomas Kuhn and his essay ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962) introduced the 
term ‘paradigm’ and gave more attention to philosophers and sociologists of science 
(Corbetta, 2003). Corbetta (2003) argued the importance of paradigms for the sciences and 
that any sciences that lack paradigms seem to lack orientation and do not have clear criteria 
of choice (Falgi, 2009). 
Saunders et al. (2012) argued that the term ‘paradigm’ leads to more confusion because it 
tends to have multiple meanings. For example, Collis and Hussey (2003) defined paradigm as 
the progress of social scientific practice based on philosophers and assumptions about the 
world as well as the nature of knowledge and how the research should be conducted. 
Saunders et al. (2012) defined paradigm as a way of studying and examining social 
phenomena from which particular understandings of these phenomena can be obtained and 
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explanations attempted. Bryman (1988, p. 4) stated that a paradigm is ''a cluster of beliefs and 
dictates which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how 
research should be done, [and] how results should be interpreted''. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) said that the term of paradigm is used quite loosely in academic 
research, so it can have different means. Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggested that the term  
‘paradigm’ can be used at three different levels (as cited in Collis & Hussey 2003): 
1. The philosophical level, where it is used to reflect basic beliefs about the world 
2. The social level, where it is used to provide guidelines about how the researcher 
should conduct his or her endeavours 
3. The technical level, where it is used to specify the methods and techniques which 
ideally should be adopted when conducting research 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1982) (as cited in Saunders et al., 2012), the purpose of a 
paradigm is as follows: 
 to help researchers to clarify their assumptions about their views of the nature of 
science and society; 
 to provide a useful way of understanding the way in which other researchers approach 
their work; 
 to help researchers to plot their own routes through their research, and to understand 
where it is possible to go and where they are going.  
Collis and Hussey (2003) classified a research paradigm into two main philosophies: 
positivist and interpretivist. The table below presents some of the more common terms used 
to describe both paradigms.  
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Table ‎6-4 The common terms for both two main paradigms 
Positivistic paradigm Interpretivist paradigm 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Objectivist Subjectivist 
Scientific Humanistic 
Experimentalist Interpretivist 
Traditionalist  
Source: Collis and Hussey (2003) 
The table below presents a number of different methodologies associated with two main 
paradigms that are used in the management and business research. 
Table ‎6-5 The methodologies associated with two main paradigms 
Positivistic paradigm Interpretivist paradigm 
Cross-sectional studies Action research 
Experimental studies Case studies 
Longitudinal studies Ethnography  
Surveys Feminist perspective 
 Ground theory 
 Hermeneutics 
 Participative enquiry 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2003) 
6.4.1 THE POSITIVISTIC PARADIGM  
Alshehri (2012) described the positivist paradigm as an umbrella term for research using the 
quantitative methodology. This approach emerged in the 19
th
 century by French philosopher 
Auguste Comte (1789–1857) (Benton and Craib, 2001; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). The 
positivistic paradigm in social science is based on the approach used in the natural sciences, 
such as biology and physics, and the end of the 19
th
 century, social science adopted this 
approach (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Bryman and Bell (2003, p. 14) defined positivism as ''an 
epistemology position that advocates the application of the methods of natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond. But the tem stretches beyond this principle, though the 
constituent elements vary between authors''.  
Bryman and Bell (2003) outlined some principles that positivism entails: 
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1. Principle of phenomenalism: Only phenomena and hence knowledge confirmed by 
the senses can genuinely be warranted as knowledge. 
2. Principle of deductivism: The purpose of theory is to generate hypotheses that can be 
tested and that will thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed. 
3. Principle of inductivism: Knowledge is arrived at through the gathering of facts that 
provide the basis for laws. 
4. Science must be conducted in a way that is value-free. 
5. There is a clear distinction between scientific statements and normative statements, 
and a belief exists that the former is a true domain of the scientist. 
The positivistic approach involves trying to seek the facts or causes of the social problem and 
phenomena, with little regard to the subjective state of the individual (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). It is founded on the belief that the study of human behaviour should be conducted in 
the same way that studies are conducted in the natural sciences, and it should be concerned 
with the examination of social science’s observable reality, in which the final product can be 
law-like generalizations, such as those produced by scientists (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Gill 
and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al., 2012; Alshehri, 2012).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) outlined the main features of the positivistic paradigm: 
 Tends to produce quantitative data; 
 Uses large samples; 
 Concentrated with hypothesis testing; 
 Data are highly specific and precise; 
 The location is artificial; 
 Reliability is high; 
 Validity is low; 
 Generalises from sample to population. 
However, there are some criticisms of the positivistic paradigm (Collis & Hussey, 2003): 
 It is impossible to treat people as being separate from their social contexts, and they 
cannot be understood without examining the perceptions they have of their activities. 
 Research design is highly structured, imposes certain constraints on the results, and 
may ignore other related and relevant findings. 
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 Researchers are not objective but rather are part of what they observe. 
 Capturing complex phenomena in a single measure is misleading. 
6.4.2 THE INTERPRETIVIST (PHENOMENOLOGICAL) PARADAIGM 
The conflict between the positivist and interpretivist paradigms can be traced back to the 19
th
 
century in Germany (Hammersley, 2013). Interpretivist is a term that is opposite of 
positivism, which obtained its importance as a result of the failure of positivism to provide 
social sciences with a suitable measure for social phenomena and problems (Alshehri, 2012). 
The interpretivist paradigm comes from this view of philosophers: The physical and natural 
sciences deal with objects that are outside of us, whereas the social sciences deal with action 
and behaviour that are generated from within the human mind (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), the interpretivist paradigm is focused on the 
understanding of human behaviour from the participant’s own frame of reference.  
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 28) defined interpretive paradigm '' is informed by a concern to 
understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the 
level of subjective experience''. Other definition that Bryman and Bell (2003, p. 16) 
introduced defined interpretivism as being ''predicated upon the review that a strategy is 
required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural science 
and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp subjective meaning of social action''. In 
addition, philosophers believe that social science’s reality is dependent on the mind;  no 
reality exists independently of the mind (Collis & Hussey, 2003).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) outlined the important features of the interpretivist paradigm: 
 Tends to produce qualitative data ; 
 Uses small samples; 
 Concerned with generating theories; 
 Data are rich and subjective; 
 The location is natural; 
 Reliability is low; 
 Validity is high; 
 Generalises from one setting to another. 
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The table below describes the assumptions of the two main paradigms (positivistic and 
interpretivist): 
Table ‎6-6 The assumptions of the two main paradigms 
Assumption Question Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontological: the 
researcher's view of 
the nature of reality 
or being. 
What is the nature of 
reality? 
Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher.  
Reality is subjective, 
socially constructed 
and multiple as seen by 
participants in a study.  
Epistemological: 
the researcher's 
view regarding 
what constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge 
What is the relationship 
of the researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is 
independent from that 
being researched. Only 
observable phenomena 
can provide credible 
data. Focus on 
causality and law, such 
as generalisation, 
reducing phenomena to 
simplest elements.  
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched. Subjective 
meanings and social 
phenomena. Focus 
upon the details of 
situation, a reality 
behind these details, 
subjective meanings 
motivating actions. 
Axiological: the 
researcher's view of 
the role of values in 
research 
What is the role of value? Value-free and 
unbiased. The 
researcher is 
independent of the data 
and maintains an 
objective stance. 
Value-laden and 
biased. The researcher 
is part of what is being 
researched, cannot be 
separated and so will 
be subjective. 
Rhetorical  What is the language of 
research? 
Formal, based on set 
definitions, impersonal 
voice, and use of 
accepted quantitative 
words. 
Informal, evolving 
decisions, personal 
voice, use of accepted 
qualitative words. 
Methodological  What is the process of 
research? 
 Deductive process. 
 Cause and effect. 
 Static design-
categories isolated 
before study. 
 Context-free. 
 Inductive process. 
 Mutual 
simultaneous 
shaping of factors. 
 Emerging 
design-
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 Generalisations 
leading to 
prediction, 
explanation, and 
understanding. 
 Accurate and 
reliable through 
validity and 
reliability. 
categories 
identified 
during research 
process. 
 Context-bound. 
 Patterns, theories 
developed for 
understanding. 
 Accurate and 
reliable through 
verification.  
Source: Adapted from Creswell (1994); Collis and Hussey (2003); and Saunders et al. (2009). 
6.5 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGIES 
Depending on process of the research being conducted, research methodology can be 
classified in two different categories: quantitative and qualitative (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
Researchers should decide which approach would be the best for their research in terms of 
the nature of the research problem and data available (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Alshehri, 
2012).  
6.5.1 QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
Collis and Hussey (2003) provided a simple description of quantitative approach, which 
involves collecting and analysing numerical data and then applying statistical tests. The main 
concept of quantitative research is to build blocks of theory that represent the points around 
which social research is conducted (Bryman, 2012). Techniques that are used in quantitative 
research share language and logical forms based on positivism that distinguish them from 
qualitative research methods (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Neuman, 2006; Alshehri, 2012). 
The main concerns of the quantitative approach are to build and establish a causal 
relationship between two or more variables and to predict or explain a relationship among 
various variables (Creswell, 2007; Alshehri, 2012). Bryman (2012) asserted that quantitative 
research can be interpreted as a research strategy that emphasizes quantification of data 
collection and analysis of data. Additionally, quantitative data collection and that: 
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 entails a deductive approach to study the relationship between theory and research, in 
which the accent is placed on the testing of theories; 
 has incorporated the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of 
positivism in particular; and 
 embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality. 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) and Alshehri (2012), quantitative research methods 
include a variety of different designs including: 
 cross-sectional studies, 
 experimental studies consisting of true experiments and quasi-experiments, 
 surveys including descriptive or analytical surveys, and 
 correlational studies that aspire to discover or clarify relationships through the use of 
correlation coefficients. 
Bryman (2012) mentioned that there are three main reasons for a preoccupation with 
measurement in quantitative research: 
1. Measurement allows us to delineate fine differences between people in terms of the 
characteristics in questions. 
2. Measurement gives us a consistent device or yardstick for making such distinctions.  
3. Measurement provides the basis for more precise estimates of the degree of 
relationship between concepts through correlation analysis. 
Denscombe (2007) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative data collection 
and analysis; the advantages are as follows: 
1. Quantitative data is scientific, which means that the analyses appear to be based on 
objective law rather than the values of the researcher. 
2. Quantitative data is more confident, which means that statistical tests of significance 
give researchers more credibility in terms of the interpretations they make and the 
confidence they have in their findings. 
3. Quantitative research can be measured and provides a solid foundation for description 
and analysis. 
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4. Quantitative research can be analysed relatively quickly, provided that adequate 
preparation and planning has been done. 
5. Quantitative research uses tables and charts, which are good or presentations. 
Computer software aids in the design of these tables and charts. 
Denscombe (2007) described the disadvantages as follows: 
1. Quantitative research is only as a good as the methods used and the questions that are 
asked, which means that it has limited uses. 
2. There is a danger of researchers becoming obsessed with the techniques of analysis at 
the expense of the broader issues underlying the research. 
3. A large amount of data can be an advantage of quantitative analysis, but it can lead to 
too many cases, variables, and factors to consider- the analysis, then, can be too 
complex. 
4. Decisions made during the analysis of quantitative data can have far-reaching effects 
on the findings.  
The current study applied quantitative methods to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. The researcher used secondary data from the 
Saudi capital market and applied statistical and econometrics tests to examine this 
relationship. The researcher used ROA and Tobin's Q as a dependent variables while using 
board structures (board size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family 
board members and board committees) and ownership structure (managerial ownership, 
family or individual ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, financial firms 
ownership, and non-financial firms ownership) as independent variables.  
6.5.2 QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
Collis and Hussey (2003) provided a simple description of qualitative approach, indicating 
that it is more subjective in nature and involves examining and reflecting on perceptions in 
order to obtain an understanding of social and human activities. Sandelowski (2004, p. 893) 
(as cited in Hammersley, 2013) defined quantitative research is ''an umbrella term for an 
array of attitudes toward and strategies for conducting inquiry that are aimed at discovering 
how human being understand, experience, interpret, and produce the social world''. In 
addition, Hammersley (2013, p. 12) provides a more specific definition of qualitative 
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research, asserting that it is ''a form of social inquiry that tends to adopt a flexible and data-
driven research design, to use relatively unstructured data, to emphasize the essential role of 
subjectivity in the research process, to study a small number of naturally occurring cases in 
detail, and to use verbal rather than statistical analysis'' 
Bryman (2012) claimed that quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that 
usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data and 
that it: 
 predominantly emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory 
and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories; 
 has rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism, 
in particular, the emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social 
work; and 
 embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting, emergent property of 
individuals' creation. 
Bryman (2012) listed all of the main research methods associated with qualitative research 
such as: ethnography/participant observation, qualitative interviewing, focus groups, 
language-based approaches to the collection of qualitative data (such as discourse and 
conversation analysis), and the collection and qualitative analysis of text and documents. 
Denscombe (2007) described the principles of the qualitative approach as follows: 
1. The first principle is that the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from the 
research should be firmly rooted in the data. 
2. The second principle is that the researcher's explanation of the data should emerge 
from a careful and meticulous reading of the data. 
3. The third principle is that the researcher should avoid introducing unwarranted 
preconceptions into the data analysis. 
4. The fourth principle is that the analysis of data should involve an iterative process. 
Denscombe (2007) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative approach; the 
advantages are as follows: 
1. The data and analysis used in qualitative approach are grounded. 
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2. There is a richness and detail to the data. 
3. There is tolerance of ambiguity and contradictions. 
4. There is the prospect of alternative explanations.  
Denscombe (2007) described the disadvantages as follows: 
1. The data might be less representative. 
2. Interpretation is bound up with the values of the researcher. 
3. There is a possibility of decontextualizing the meaning.  
4. There is a danger of oversimplifying the explanation. 
5. The data analysis of qualitative method takes more time. 
This current study also used a semi-structured interview to obtain a better understanding of 
the concepts of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the researcher asked the 
participants some questions to provide more explanation of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance to support the quantitative results 
(secondary data). 
Table ‎6-7 Comparison between quantitative and qualitative research 
Distinguishing Points Quantitative method Qualitative method 
Paradigm Positivism Interpretivism 
Research logic Deductive Inductive 
Data used Numerical Linguistic 
Points of orientation View of researcher View of participants 
Sample size Large sample Small sample 
Relationship with 
researcher 
Passive Active 
Concepts Examining theory Developing theory 
Characteristics Presenting reality statically Explaining processes 
Research design Structured Unstructured 
Scope of results Generalizable Specific 
Sort of data Hard and reliable Rich and deep 
Field Macro Micro 
Concern People's behaviour Action based 
Study field  Artificial settings Natural settings 
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Objective of analysis Analysing variables Analysing individuals 
Data presentation Tables, relationships Text extracted from interviews 
Reliability  High Low 
Validity Low High 
Strengths  It can provide a wide coverage of a 
range of situations. 
 It can be fast and economical. 
 Statistical are accumulated from 
large samples. 
 It may hold considerable relevance 
to policy makers. 
 Methods of conducting data 
is seen as natural. 
 It tends to evaluate change 
processes over time. 
 It aims to understand 
people's meanings. 
 It can generate theories. 
Weaknesses  Method may be seen as inflexible 
and artificial. 
 It does not support the 
understanding of actions. 
 It cannot generate theories. 
 It does not supported policy makers' 
decisions.  
 More resources required for 
collecting data. 
 Difficulties in analysis and 
interpretation of data. 
 It is hard to control the 
whole process. 
 It could be less credibility is 
given by policy makers to 
this methods 
Source: Adapted from (Amaratunga et al., 2002), (Bryman and Bell, 2003), (Corbetta, 2003), 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and (Collis and Hussey, 2009) (as cited in Alshehri, 2012). 
6.6 COMBINED QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS - 
TRIANGULATION 
Mixed methods research has become more common in business research, especially in the 
corporate governance field (Al-Saidi, 2012; Alshehri, 2012; Alghamdi, 2012). Saunders et al.  
(2012, p. 683) defined triangulation as “the use of two or more independent sources of data or 
data-collection methods within one study in order to help ensure that the data are telling you 
what you think they are telling you”. Collis and Hussey (2003) mentioned that the use of 
different research methods and techniques in the same study could overcome the potential 
bias and sterility of a single-method approach. Crowther and Lancaster (2009) articulate that 
the main reason for the applied triangulation method is because qualitative data, such as an 
interview, tends to be more detailed and more understanding about the research problem. At 
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the same time, these details come from a small number of sources, and because a greater 
element of judgment is required in its analysis, it is apparent that there is a concomitantly 
greater need for mixed methods and data (triangulation).  
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) (as cited in Collis and Hussey, 2003) identify four types of 
triangulation: 
 Data triangulation, where data is collected from different sources. 
 Investigators triangulation, where different researchers independently collect data on 
the same phenomenon and compare the results. 
 Methodological triangulation, where both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection are used. 
 Triangulation of theories, where a theory is taken from one discipline and used to 
explain a phenomenon in another area.  
Bryman (2006); Greene et al. (1989); Molina-Azorin (2011) (as cited in Saunders et al., 
2012) provided some reasons for using mixed methods: 
1. Using mixed methods may allow meaning and findings to be elaborated, enhanced, 
clarified, confirmed and linked. 
2. One method, such as qualitative, may be used to explain in more details the results of 
another method (quantitative) to examine the relationship between variables. 
3. Using mixed methods may allow for greater diversity of views to inform and reflect 
upon the study. 
4. Using an alternative method may help to interpret the unexplained results or 
insufficient data. 
5. Using mixed methods may help to establish the generalisability of a study or its 
relative importance; also, it may help to establish the credibility of a study or to 
produce more complete knowledge.  
6. One method may be used to focus on a single attribute or to answer one or more 
research questions, while the other method may be used to focus on and answer other 
research questions in the same study. 
The current study employed both data triangulation and methodological triangulation to link 
and enhance the findings and results and also to give more details and explain the concept of 
Chapter Six 
154 | P a g e  
Research Design and Methodology 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia with more credibility of the findings. The researcher 
used statistical and econometrics tests to answer the main research question, which is 
concerned with examining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance based on data collected from the Saudi Capital Market Authority, the 
Tadawul website, and board of directors reports from the company. Furthermore, the 
researcher used a semi-structured interview to explain in more detail and support the 
quantitative results and findings. The semi-structured interview tried to answer some of the 
researcher’s questions, such as the concepts of corporate governance and the evaluation of the 
current regulations, which cannot be answered with regression analysis.   
6.7 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
There are two main data sources: original data are the primary data and the next source is 
secondary data (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Primary data are collected at sources for specific 
phenomenon such as survey data gathered by questionnaires, observations, experiments, or 
interviews. In contrast, secondary data already exist in books, published statistics, and the 
annual reports of companies (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The following section explains the 
main tools used in this research, which are secondary data from the published statistics from 
the Saudi capital markets, annual reports from listed companies, and semi-structured 
interviews. 
6.7.1 SECONDARY DATA 
Saunders et al. (2007, p. 611) defined secondary data as “data used for a research project that 
were originally collected for some other purpose” Secondary data sources provide 
information that may be used for different research studies and purposes. It is therefore useful 
not only to find information to answer the research questions, but also to obtain a better 
understanding and explanation of the research problems (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005).  
Data was obtained from the Tadawul website and the Capital Market Authority’s website for 
the listed companies in the Saudi capital markets. The researcher used board of directors 
reports that were available from these two websites to obtain information about boards of 
directors (board size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family board 
members, and board sub-committees), and ownership structures (managerial ownership, 
family or individual ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, financial firm 
ownership, and non-financial firms ownership). All data were available as a pdf file on these 
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websites and the researcher extracted the information he needed and placed it in an Excel 
spreadsheet. For heightened reliability, data were checked by one colleague in the King 
Faisal University’s School of Management to make sure it was accurate and complete. 
Regarding ROA, the data collected directly from the Tadawul website was in the form of a 
percentage and was thus, ready to use for the research. For Tobin's Q,  the market value of 
each company’s equity capital was collected from the Tadawul website and the ratio was then 
calculated using data from each company’s financial statements. 
This study’s sample contained 458 observations of unbalanced data from non-financial firms 
in the Saudi capital market. Due to different regulations and capital structures, this study 
excluded firms in the banking and insurance sectors from the sample. In addition, the banking 
and insurance companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia refer to Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency regulations. Also, there is missing data from among these five years due to the fact 
that the regulations of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia began as guideline codes and 
some codes were not mandatory. However, the Saudi Capital Market Authority demanded the 
listed companies comply with the regulations or explain why they failed to do so. Data were 
collected for five years (2007 to 2011; Tables 6-8). The rationale for using this study period 
was that the implementation of the best practices for corporate governance began in the 
beginning of 2007.  
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Table ‎6-8 Description of the Study's Data Samples 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Pooled 
The listed Saudi 
companies 
122 134 144 146 150 696 
Banking sector 11 11 11 11 11 55 
Insurance sector 15 22 30 31 31 129 
Missing annual 
reports and data 
23 14 9 3 5 54 
Final sample 73 87 94 101 103 458 
6.7.1.1 Dependent and independent variables 
This study used two indicators to measure firm performance: return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables. The study also used some corporate governance 
mechanisms as independent variables that may have affected firm performance. The first 
variable is the Board of Directors (board size, non-executive directors, family board 
members, royal family board members and board committees). The second variable is 
ownership structure (managerial ownership, family or individual ownership, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, financial firm ownership and non-financial firm ownership).  
Firstly, this research uses an accounting measure (ROA), which is earnings after tax and 
zakat (net income) divided by the total assets of the company (Mehran, 1995; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). The ROA is a backward-looking measure which reflects accounting rules and 
is used as a measure of productivity and profitability (King and Santor, 2008). According to 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p. 1045), “a higher ROA indicates effective use of companies’ 
assets in serving shareholders’ economic interests” which means that managers’ manipulation 
of their earnings and use of their firm’s assets for their interests lead to a lower ROA and less 
effective use of the company’s assets (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). The ROA was collected 
directly form the Tadawul website database as a percentage. The Tadawul website calculates 
the ROA as earnings after tax and zakat (net income) divided by the total assets of the 
company. In addition, all the listed companies use the same accounting policies for preparing 
the financial statemants. These policies are issued by the Saudi Orgnaization for Cerified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA). 
Secondly, this research uses Tobin’s Q to measure market valuations as a measure of firm 
performance. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Abdullah et al (2011) , Tobin’s Q 
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is measured as the ratio of the market value (common share plus total debt) divided by the 
book value of the total assets of the company. However, there are number of methods to 
calculate Tobin's Q such as Yermack (1996) measured Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the firms’ 
market value divided by the replacement cost of their assets. Also, Chung and Pruitt (1994) 
defined Tobin’s Q as a market value of common stock share, the preferred stock and total 
liabilities divided by the total assets. The researcher calculate the Tobin's Q as the ratio of the 
market value of equity at the 31/12 plus the preferred stock for the firm (this value is omitted 
because the Saudi firms do not issue preferred stock) plus total liabilities divided by total 
assets as the majority of the literature used this method (Morck et al., 1988; Chung and Puitt, 
1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Davies et al., 2005; Omran et al., 2008) 
King and Santor (2008) point out that Tobin’s Q is used to measure market performance; it is 
a forward-looking measure that reflects the market’s valuation of the firm’s assets relative to 
book value, and it is used as a proxy for a firm’s future growth opportunities. In addition, 
Weir et al. (2002, P.17) stated, “Q is a proxy for how closely shareholder and manager 
interests have been aligned” They also highlighted that a higher Tobin’s Q indicated more 
effective governance mechanisms and a better market perception of firm performance.  
The independent variables used in this study were divided into two types: board structures 
and ownership structures as a table below   
Table ‎6-9 Definitions of independent variables and their measures 
Variable name Symbol Measures 
Boards of Directors 
Board size BSIZE The total number of directors on the 
board (executive and non-executive). 
Non-executive members NEXE The number of non-executive 
directors who sit on the boards of 
directors as identified by the 
company. 
Family board members FBM The number of family members who 
sit on the boards of directors as they 
already have shares in the companies 
under the name of the family and they 
represent the family ownership of the 
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Variable name Symbol Measures 
company's shares. 
Royal family board members RFBM Dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if the board of directors have a 
member from royal family, and 0 
otherwise. As identify with any 
member who is from the 'Al-Saud' 
family. 
Board committees BCOM Dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if a company has these 
committees (Audit, executive, 
nomination and remuneration), and 
otherwise is 0. 
Ownership structures 
Managerial ownership MANOWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by the board of directors of the 
company to the total of ordinary 
shares. 
Family or individual ownership FAMOWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by the family or individual to 
the total of ordinary shares. 
Government ownership GOVOWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by the government to the total 
of ordinary shares. 
Foreign ownership FOROWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by the foreign investors to the 
total of ordinary shares. 
Financial firms ownership FINOWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by the financial corporations 
to the total of ordinary shares. 
Non-financial firms ownership NFINOWN Measured by the proportion of shares 
owned by non-financial investor 
ownership to the total of ordinary 
shares. 
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6.7.1.2 Control variables 
The current study includes two control variables in the analysis that may affect the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms; namely, firm 
size and industry types. These variables have been used in many previous studies to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance (Al-Saidi, 
2010).  
The first control variable is firm size (FSIZE), which is measured by the logarithm of the 
total assets (Mura, 2007). Short and Keasey (1999) argued that firm size may affect firm 
performance in two ways: 1) larger firms may find it easier to generate funds internally and to 
access funds from external sources (potential financial effect) and 2) the economies of scale 
that accompanies firm size allows the firm to create entry barriers with the associated 
beneficial effects on the firm performance. 
Empirically, the relationship between firm size and firm performance is ambiguous and has 
had mixed results (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Ntim, 2009). Mehran (1995), Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Bai et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2005), Cho (1998), and Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) report a negative relationship between firm size and firm performance. However, 
some studies found a positive relationship between firm performance and firm size, e.g., 
Wintoki et al. (2012). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found a positive relationship between firm 
size and ROA.  
The second control variable is industry dummies (IND). This study includes industry 
dummies as control variables because the firm performance may also depend on the 
sensitivity of certain industries to changes in the macroeconomic factors (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found the construction sector performing better 
than its counterparts, which means the sector types perform differently. The industry 
dummies include manufacturing (IND 1) 'baseline', services (IND 2), foods (IND 3), 
investment (IND 4), and trading (IND 5) excluded. 
6.7.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
Interviews are a useful discussion between two or more people and can help a researcher to 
gather valid and reliable data related to the research questions and to achieve the objectives of 
the study (Saunders et al., 2007). According to Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 472), “the 
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interview is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative research”. Many types 
of interviews—structured, semi-structured and unstructured— are used in social sciences 
research. 
Bryman and Bell (2007, p. 474) define the semi-structured interview as follows: 
The researcher has a list of questions on fairly specific topics to be covered, 
often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way 
outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not included in the guide may be 
asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees. But, by and 
large, all the questions will be asked and a similar wording will be used from 
interviewee to interviewee. 
Semi-structured interviews are a more flexible method that allows the researcher to ask new 
questions that arise from the interview and to gain rich information about the subject (Falgi, 
2009). In addition, the main purpose of a semi-structured interview is to obtain a feeling for 
the respondent’s attitudes and opinions about a specific situation (Baker and Foy, 2008). 
Furthermore, a semi-structured interview is designed to cover a range of issues about a 
specific subject in order to receive elaborated responses (Lillis, 1999). For this reason, the 
researcher in this study used a semi-structured interview to achieve the purposes of this study: 
to build a comprehensive picture of the corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia, to 
gain a deeper insight into how corporate governance operates in practice in Saudi Arabia and 
to obtain information about how key actors in corporate governance perceive that 
governance. 
Accordingly, in this study, the researcher adopted a semi-structured interview to examine 
corporate governance mechanisms in the Saudi Arabia companies listed in the Saudi Arabian 
capital markets. The researcher asked various broad questions about corporate governance 
mechanisms, including general definitions and concepts. In addition, the researcher asked 
broad questions about the boards of directors and ownership structures of Saudi Arabian 
companies listed in the Saudi capital market. Finally, the interview questions sought to 
identify the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm performance. 
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The interview covered three main topics for corporate governance. The first topic included 
general definitions and concepts of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. This section asked 
general questions about the stakeholders’ views about their own definitions of corporate 
governance, how corporate governance is regulated in Saudi Arabian companies, the 
importance of Saudi codes of corporate governance and the challenges that arise with these 
codes. 
The second topic was variables of boards of directors, including their responsibilities and 
roles, how they are structured and requirements for membership. In addition, this section 
asked general questions about non-executive directors. This part also covered some 
information regarding board size, family board members and CEO duality and board sub-
committees. The researcher sought to examine the effects of the variables of a Board of 
Directors on firm performance. 
The third topic of the interview was the ownership structures of Saudi Arabia companies. 
This part included some questions about managerial ownership, family ownership, 
government ownership and other stockholders’ ownership. The researcher aimed to 
determine how ownership structure can impact firm performance. 
The researcher used a non-probability sampling technique called the non-random sampling 
method (Saunders et al., 2012) to select interviewees. The researcher selected interviewees 
who would likely have knowledge and information about corporate governance mechanisms 
and who were likely to understand how these mechanisms function in the Saudi business 
environment. The researcher selected the study participants from Boards of Directors, large 
ownership stockholders, auditors, academic researchers and regulators, as these individuals 
could answer the research questions knowledgeably and assist the researcher in meeting the 
study’s objectives. The researcher was fortunate in being able to gain access to all potential 
interviewees. 
The researcher interviewed 17 participants from various stakeholders. Each participant had 
specific views about corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with board members (non-executives, CEOs, chairmen and secretaries), 
experienced shareholders, academics, a regulator, auditors and a government representative. 
The interviews were conducted in four cities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Alahsa, 
Dammam, Jubail and Riyadh) from February 2012 until end of April 2013. Interviews were 
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conducted in Arabic and lasted between 45 and 70 minutes. Some of the participants agreed 
to have their interviews recorded, while others only agreed to note taking without recording. 
All participants were qualified, knowledgeable experts with experience in corporate 
governance and the Saudi capital markets. All interview data were trascribed verbatim in 
Arabic language into a Microsoft World file, the translation process takes long time, one hour 
of interview data need more than ten hours of translating from Arabic to English (Alshehri, 
2012). Discussion and quotations passages were translated by the researcher to the English 
language. 
Of the 17 participants (Table below), there were two nonexecutives with broad experience in 
Saudi joint-stock companies, three shareholders with a 5% or higher stake in joint-stock 
companies, two board secretaries responsible for preparing board-meeting agendas, one 
Capital Market Authority regulator, one government representative from the Board of 
Directors of joint-stock companies and two auditors. In addition, there were semi-structured 
interviews conducted with two academics who have a research interest in corporate 
governance and the Saudi capital markets. Furthermore, there were two interviews conducted 
with CEOs who have postgraduate degrees (Master’s) and two chairmen. One of the 
chairmen has more than eight years of experience as a chairman in joint companies listed on 
the Saudi stock market, and the other  comes from background in accounting and auditing, 
earned a PhD degree, and has worked as an external auditors for many years. 
Table ‎6-10 Backgraounds of 17 interviewees 
NO Position Code Sector 
1 Shareholder SH1 Petrochemical Industries and Real Estate 
Development 
2 Shareholder SH2 Cement, Petrochemical Industries and Retail 
3 Shareholder SH3 Multi-Investment, Cement, Building and 
Construction, Agricultural and Food    
4 Chief Executive Officer  CEO1 Building and Construction 
5 Chief Executive Officer  CEO2 Industrial Investment 
6 Chairman CH1 Petrochemical Industries 
7 Chairman CH2 Hotel and Tourism 
8 Regulator R1 Capital Market Authority 
9 Academic AC1 King Faisal University 
10 Academic AC2 King Faisal University 
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11 Board Secretary SEC1 Petrochemical Industries 
12 Board Secretary SEC2 Building and Construction 
13 Auditor AU1 Saudi Accounting 
14 Auditor AU2 Saudi Accounting 
15 Government Representative 
member 
GOV1 Public Pension Agency 
16 Non-executive NEXE1 Multi-Investment, Hotel and Tourism and 
Petrochemical Industries 
17 Non-executive NEXE2 Building and Construction, Banking and 
Insurance Industries and Energy and 
Utilities  
 
Each interview started with an explanation of the objectives and the importance of this study 
by providing the participants with a copy of a brief description of this study. Appointments 
for the interviews were arrangement by telephone and email. All interviews were conducted 
face-to- face. Most of the interviews at the interviewees’ office, and some of them preferred 
to meet in a coffee shop. Interviewees were provided with a copy of the letter from the 
researcher’s supervisor and a copy of a brief descripion of this study. 
6.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the research methodology and data collection method used, 
including the two types of research methods: a quantitative method (secondary data of the 
listed company in Saudi capital market) and a qualitative method (primary data collected 
from different stakeholders). This study adopted triangulation methodology to increase the 
confidence in the study (Alghamdi, 2012) and support the results from the secondary data. 
This study focuses on quantitative technique by using regression analysis to answer the main 
question of this study. After that, the researcher applies semi-structured interviews 
(qualitative) to interpret with more explanation and elicit the interpretation of the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Furthermore, the area of corporate 
governance and firm performance is still a new area in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
need more knowledge to explore and interpret the phenomenon of corporate governance. For 
this reason, the researcher adopts triangulation methodology. Filatotchev and Nakajima 
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(2010) suggested thta the corporate governance research may incorporate a more qualitative 
understanding of outcomes of quantitative findings.   
This study seems to involve a mixed paradigm, meaning that under the positivistic approach, 
it seeks to examine the facts or causes of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Additionally, however, this study used interpretivist 
paradigm by interpreting qualitative data (semi-structured interview) with a small number of 
participants in order to support the main results of the quantitative data, which focused on the 
details of situations or phenomena to better understand and explain the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
The researcher used secondary data from the Saudi capital market and applied statistical and 
econometrics tests to examine this relationship. The researcher used ROA and Tobin's Q as 
dependent variables while using board structures (board size, non-executive members, family 
board members, royal family board members, and board committees) and ownership 
structures (managerial ownership, family or individual ownership, government ownership, 
foreign ownership, financial firms ownership, and non-financial firms ownership) as 
independent variables. Furthermore, this current study also used a semi-structured interview 
to obtain a better understanding of the concepts of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the researcher asked the participants some questions to provide more 
explanation of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance to support the quantitative results (secondary data).  
Using both methods, known as triangulation, links and enhances the results as well as gives 
more details and explains the concept of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, giving more 
credibility to the findings. The researcher used statistical and econometrics tests to answer the 
main research question, which is concerned with examining the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance based on data collected from the 
Saudi Capital Market Authority, the Tadawul website, and board of directors reports from the 
company. Furthermore, the researcher used a semi-structured interview to explain in more 
detail and support the quantitative results and findings. The semi-structured interview was an 
attempt to answer some of the researcher’s questions regarding the concepts of corporate 
governance and the evaluation of the current regulations, which cannot be answered with 
regression analysis.  
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results of the study's quantitative data (secondary data from annual 
reports). It seeks to achieve the main objective of this study, which is examining the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in Saudi 
Arabia. This study discusses that relationship by using various dependent and independent 
variables. The dependent variables reflect measures of firm performance, such as ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. The independent variables include corporate governance mechanisms, board 
structure (including board size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family 
board members and board sub-committees), and ownership structure (including managerial 
ownership, family or individual ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, 
financial firms ownership and non-financial firms ownership). It first provides results of the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis, after resolving some concerns related to the 
assumptions of OLS models. The OLS results provide a first view of the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables, but statistical methods that mitigate the 
shortcomings of OLS are also utilised. This study thus provides the results of a two stage 
least squares model (2SLS) that addresses endogeneity and causality, while seeking to study 
the interdependent effects of corporate governance mechanisms and examines the impact of 
firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) on those corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, 
this study uses a dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) model to detect 
unobserved heterogeneity. GMM is applied for two main reasons: first, the failure to capture 
all influences of previous performance on current performance could leave models 
misspecified which may cause omitted variable bias; second, it can be argued that all older 
lags are exogenous with respect to the residuals of the present, which can then be used as 
instruments (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
7.2 DATA 
This study sample contains 458 observation from non-financial firms in the Saudi Capital 
Market. Data were collected for five years, from 2007 to 2011. This study used two indicators 
to measure firm performance: ROA and Tobin’s Q as a dependent variables. In addition, the 
study used some corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables which may have 
an effect on firm performance. The first variable is the board of directors (board size, non-
executive directors, family board members, royal family board members and board 
committees); the second variable is ownership structure (managerial ownership, family or 
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individual ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, financial firm ownership, 
and non-financial firm ownership).  
Focusing on the dependent variables, the mean ROA was 6.079 percent. The mean ROA in 
2007 was 8.822 percent; it decreased in the same range for the other years, falling to between 
5.997 and 5.160 percent. Al-Shiab and Abu Tapanjah (2005) showed similar results for ROA 
in 50 of the largest Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
from 1996-2002. They found the mean ROA to be 7.7 percent. In addition, Omran et al. 
(2008) applied their study in several Arabic countries, in which they found that the mean 
ROA for Egypt was 7 percent.  
The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.713. Dwivedi and Jain (2005) studied the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance for 340 large listed Indian firms for the period 
1997-2001, determining that the mean of Tobin’s Q was 1.71, the same results as in the 
current study. In addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) examined the relationship between the 
corporate governance structure and performance of 347 companies listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange, finding that the mean of Tobin’s Q was 1.13 in Malaysia. Aljifri 
and Moustafa (2007) examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm the 
performance of 51 firms in the UAE, concluding that the mean of Tobin’s Q was between 
1.95 and 2.04. Also, Sulong and Nor (2010) found the mean of Tobin’s Q of 403 firms listed 
on the Bursa Malaysia from 2002-2005 to be 1.83, which is in the same range as for this 
study. 
On the other hand, for the independent variables, in the current study, the mean of the board 
size in Saudi companies was 8.310 with a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 4. The mean of 
the board size in Saudi Arabia aligned with Jensen (1993), who suggested that a board size of 
7 or 8 members is easier for a CEO to control and also makes communicating with other 
members easier. In addition, the Saudi regulations for corporate governance (2006) suggested 
that board size should be no less than 3 and no more than 11. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) 
studied the relationship between board structure and firm performance in 250 publicly traded 
firms in the UK; the mean of the board size of their study was 8.07, which is the same mean 
as the Saudi companies listed in the Capital Market. A study by Guest (2009) using a large 
sample, 2,746 UK-listed firms from 1981 to 2002, found the mean of the board size to be 
7.18, which is not much different from the mean in this study. According to Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005), who examined the relationship between board size and performance across 
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Malaysian and Singaporean firms, the mean of the board size was 7.27, which it is not much 
different from the results in this current study. Sulong and Nor (2010) found the mean of the 
board size to be 7.972 for Malaysian firms for the period 2002–2005, which is the same as 
the mean number of members in the board of directors in this current study.  
The mean of the non-executive directors in this study was 4.450. The mean of the board size 
in Saudi Arabia is around 8 members, and the Saudi regulations for corporate governance 
(2006) suggested that the majority of board members should be non-executives; our findings 
showed that the half the board members were non-executives. Solomon (2007) suggested that 
the presence of an adequate number of non-executives on a company board helps to reduce 
the notorious conflict of interest between shareholders and management. However, the non-
executive members should have experience and knowledge to elevate the company 
performance and to perform competently (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). Clifford and Evans 
(1997) found the mean of number of non-executive directors for small companies to be 3.44; 
in medium-sized companies it was 4.14, and it was 5.41 in large companies. Laing and Weir 
(1999) found the same results as this study in their sample of 115 randomly selected UK 
companies; they found that the mean of non-executive directors in 1992 was 4.51 and was 
4.93 in 1995. 
For family board members, the mean was 1.120. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the 
existence of the family board member on the board of directors of the company give the 
company more advantages in monitoring and disciplining related to decision agents, which 
lead to reduced monitoring costs. According to Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), the mean of 
family directors was 3.06 across Canadian companies, which is a different result from this 
study. However, in Saudi Arabia, family board members are widespread in family 
companies; other companies have few family board members because the individual or 
family need to own 5% or above ordinary shares in firms. 
The mean of companies that have three board sub-committees increased from 24 percent in 
2007 to 61 percent in 2011; the mean for all 5 years was 43 percent, indicating that the listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia increased commitment with these sub-committees during those 
years. The mean percentage of directors on the boards from the Saudi royal family was 20.5 
percent. However, the mean of listed companies that have one or more royal family members 
sitting on the board of directors decreased from 23.2 percent in 2007 to 19.4 percent in 2011. 
This indicated that perhaps the royal family board members moved from non-financial firms 
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to banking and insurance sectors, which led to a reduction in the percentage, or perhaps they 
lacked the experience or knowledge to sit as a board member. 
The mean of managerial ownership was 9.597 %. This study revealed a low mean percentage 
in terms of managerial ownership. However, there are a few companies where management 
owns nearly all the shares. Davies et al. (2005) studied the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value in the UK, finding the mean of managerial ownership to be 
13.02%. Short and Keasey (1999) studied the relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance in the UK from 1988-1992, concluding that the percentage of mean of 
managerial ownership in the ranged from 13.344% - 11.473%. However, Chen et al. (2003) 
examined how managerial ownership affected firm performance in 123 Japanese firms from 
1987-1995, finding a low percentage in terms of the mean of managerial ownership (2%) in 
Japanese firms. A study conducted by Crutchley et al. (1999) in the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange concluded that the mean of managerial 
ownership was 12.9% in 1987 and 14% in 1993, which agreed with Short and Keasey’s 
(1999) results in the UK market. 
The current study found low means of family and individual ownership according to the 
literature. This study found the mean of family or individual ownership is 11.124%. 
However, most other studies found higher results. For example, Chen et al. (2005) found 
24.4% in 412 publicly listed Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998. In addition, Zeitun and 
Tian (2007) studied this relationship in 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989-2002,  
concluding that the mean of individual ownership in defaulted firms was 48.109% and 
45.151% in non-defaulted firms. Shyu (2011) found the mean of family ownership 21.03% in 
Taiwanese listed companies. In the U.S., the mean of the family ownership is  85.46%.  
The mean of government ownership in this current study is 8.714%. Al-Shiab and Abu-
Tapanjah (2005) found that the mean of government ownership is 10.2% in Jordanian 
industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. According to the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Flow of Funds, the Japanese Flow of Funds, the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report, Dittus and Prowse (1996), and Claessens et al. (1996) (as cited in Xu and Wang, 
1999), the mean percentage of government ownership in U.S. firms is 0%, in Japan it is 0.7%, 
in Germany it is 5%, in the Czech Republic it is 3.2%, and in China it is 30.9%. Additionally, 
Cueto (2008) found that the percentage of the mean of government ownership in Latin 
American firms is very low (1.65%). 
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The current study used foreign ownership as an independent variable. The mean of foreign 
ownership in this study was 1.480%; this percentage is very low because the Saudi capital 
market is still new in reference to worldwide investment. According to Douma et al. (2006), 
who studied the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance across 1,005 firms from 
1999-2000 on the Bombay Stock Exchange, the mean of foreign ownership is 3.62%. 
However, Zeitun and Tian (2007) studied this relationship among 59 publicly listed firms in 
Jordan from 1989-2002,  determining that the mean of foreign ownership in defaulted firms 
was 5.838%, and in non-defaulted firms it was 11.015%. In addition, according to the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, the Japanese Flow of Funds, the Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monthly Report,  Dittus and Prowse (1996), and Claessens et al. (1996) (as cited in Xu and 
Wang, 1999), the mean percentage of foreign ownership in U.S. firms is 5.4%, in Japan it is 
4%, in Germany it is 14%, in the Czech Republic it is 3.4%, and in China it is 6.1%. 
Another independent variable is financial firm ownership; the mean of financial firm 
ownership is 0.607%. According to Prowse (1992), the mean of the share held by financial 
institutions is 25% in Japan, which is a very large gap in reference to our current study. A 
study conducted in Japan by Morck et al. (2000) found the mean of ownership by financial 
block holders to be 14.50%. This current study found that the mean of shares held by non-
financial firms was 14.721%. According to the U.S. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, the 
Japanese Flow of Funds, the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, Dittus and Prowse 
(1996), and Claessens et al. (1996) (as cited in Xu and Wang, 1999), the percentage of non-
financial corporation ownership in the U.S. is 14.1, which is the same result as in this current 
study. In Taiwan, the mean of the shares held by corporate firms is 18.63% (Filatotchev et al., 
2005). 
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Table ‎7-1 Descriptive Analysis of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables Measures 2007 (N=73) 2008 (N=87) 2009 (N=94) 2010 (N=101) 2011 (N=103) all (N=458) 
ROA 
Mean 8.822 5.997 5.160 5.695 5.420 6.079 
Median 8.360 6.300 3.390 5.880 5.350 5.679 
Standard deviation 7.845 11.579 8.165 9.292 11.875 10.018 
Skewness 0.412 -1.638 0.347 -0.347 -2.032 -1.247 
Kurtosis 0.404 11.650 1.328 4.115 14.835 11.197 
Minimum -13.540 -58.980 -18.000 -30.210 -67.810 -67.810 
Maximum 27.100 43.450 29.910 38.610 43.980 43.980 
Tobin's Q 
Mean 2.343 1.295 1.596 1.574 1.862 1.713 
Median 2.220 1.160 1.375 1.350 1.450 1.430 
Standard deviation 0.995 0.541 0.714 0.776 1.108 0.911 
Skewness 0.847 1.984 1.789 1.942 1.797 1.766 
Kurtosis 0.713 5.627 3.691 4.361 3.485 3.687 
Minimum 0.533 0.540 0.730 0.680 0.670 0.533 
Maximum 5.320 3.870 4.620 4.910 6.600 6.600 
Board Size 
Mean 8.320 8.240 8.290 8.390 8.310 8.310 
Median 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Standard deviation 1.715 1.562 1.584 1.697 1.502 1.603 
Skewness -0.032 -0.019 0.093 0.488 0.285 0.190 
Kurtosis -0.514 -0.113 -0.032 -0.133 -0.446 -0.230 
Minimum 4.000 4.000 4.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 
Maximum 12.000 12.000 12.000 13.000 12.000 13.000 
Non-
Executive 
Mean 4.320 4.460 4.810 4.370 4.270 4.450 
Median 5.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 
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Director Standard deviation 3.395 3.117 3.146 2.641 2.272 2.894 
Skewness -0.049 -0.184 -0.266 0.454 0.628 0.043 
Kurtosis -1.438 -1.280 -1.182 -0.422 0.134 -0.975 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 10.000 10.000 10.000 11.000 10.000 11.000 
Family 
Board 
Member 
Mean 1.040 1.050 1.100 1.200 1.170 1.120 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard deviation 1.654 1.569 1.593 1.625 1.585 1.598 
Skewness 1.866 1.733 1.616 1.428 1.381 1.562 
Kurtosis 2.689 2.289 1.825 1.267 1.060 1.608 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
Board Sub-
Committees 
Mean 0.246 0.31 0.382 0.544 0.611 0.434 
Median 0.000 0 0 1 1 0 
Standard deviation 0.434 0.465 0.488 0.500 0.489 0.496 
Skewness 1.175 0.819 0.481 -1.178 -0.458 0.264 
Kurtosis 2.382 1.672 1.231 1.032 1.209 1.069 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Royal 
Family 
Board 
Members 
Mean 0.232 0.218 0.202 0.188 0.194 0.205 
Median 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 0.425 0.415 0.403 0.392 0.397 0.404 
Skewness 1.263 1.363 1.483 1.596 1.546 1.459 
Kurtosis 2.597 2.858 3.2 3.547 3.390 3.130 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Mean 9.10935 9.65509 9.69410 9.53056 9.87167 9.597 
Median 1.31000 1.37000 1.74450 2.08000 1.87300 1.664 
Standard deviation 15.47642 16.74956 16.58953 16.18805 15.74195 16.101 
Skewness 2.41300 2.83200 2.77500 2.78700 2.61800 2.675 
Kurtosis 5.98500 9.28900 9.12000 9.42700 9.09400 8.424 
Minimum 0.00005 0.00008 0.00000 0.00130 0.00100 0.000 
Maximum 70.00000 94.00000 95.06000 95.84000 95.86000 95.860 
Family or 
Individual 
Ownership 
Mean 10.261 11.388 10.808 11.677 11.340 11.142 
Median 0.000 5.000 0.333 5.300 5.670 0.333 
Standard deviation 15.870 17.598 17.144 17.511 16.735 16.959 
Skewness 2.012 2.340 2.426 2.134 2.233 2.220 
Kurtosis 4.138 6.471 7.145 5.437 6.401 5.811 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 67.500 94.000 95.000 95.000 95.000 95.000 
Institutional 
Government 
Ownership 
Mean 9.353 8.964 9.012 7.977 8.499 8.714 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard deviation 18.905 18.412 18.336 16.697 17.977 17.941 
Skewness 2.485 2.522 2.526 2.582 2.696 2.541 
Kurtosis 5.803 5.927 5.959 6.403 6.936 5.962 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 67.500 83.300 83.600 75.100 83.600 83.600 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Mean 0.986 1.497 1.545 1.566 1.670 1.480 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Standard deviation 4.503 6.289 6.219 6.048 5.994 5.881 
Skewness 5.275 4.466 4.351 4.392 4.141 4.415 
Kurtosis 28.151 19.596 18.854 19.571 17.958 19.416 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 28.800 37.500 37.500 37.500 37.500 37.500 
Financial 
Firm 
Ownership 
Mean 1.392 0.429 0.441 0.477 0.480 0.607 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard deviation 9.132 1.819 1.786 1.801 2.064 4.023 
Skewness 8.126 4.434 4.328 3.754 4.797 15.446 
Kurtosis 67.841 19.942 19.399 13.281 25.136 286.110 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 77.000 11.310 11.310 9.900 14.600 77.000 
Non-
Financial 
Firm 
Ownership 
Mean 11.693 14.071 14.891 16.288 15.722 14.721 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard deviation 18.634 19.681 20.303 21.643 20.814 20.322 
Skewness 1.616 1.205 1.138 1.105 1.127 1.195 
Kurtosis 1.514 0.137 -0.062 -0.052 0.119 0.165 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 66.500 66.500 66.500 80.200 80.200 80.200 
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7.3 DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS FOR ORDINARY LEAST 
SQUARES (OLS)  
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) is attributed to Carl Friedrich Gauss, a German 
mathematician (Gujarati and Porter 2009). According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), this 
method has very attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most popular and 
powerful methods of regression analysis because the OLS formulas are built into virtually all 
spreadsheet and statistical software packages (such as SPSS, STATA, others). This makes the 
OLS easier to use and its results are easy to read and analyse (Stock and Watson 2007). The 
OLS is a very famous approach analysis to test any relationship in the social sciences (Al-
Saidi 2010). Most literature uses this method to examine the relationships between dependent 
and independents variables, especially in corporate governance studies (e.g., Baysinger and 
Bulter 1985; McConnell and Servaes 1990; Mehran 1995; Cho 1998; Short and Keasy 1999; 
Berger et al. 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; King and Santor 2008; and Omran et al. 2008). 
This research tested the assumptions of OLS to determine which techniques would be 
appropriate for examining the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm 
performance. These assumptions include normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and outliers (Dinga et al. 2009; Al-Saidi 2010). Firstly, we 
provide the assumptions of the classical linear regression model, which is the cornerstone of 
most econometrics theories, as these assumptions underlie the OLS method (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). According to Brooks (2008) and Gujarati and Porter (2009), there are some 
assumptions regarding the classic linear regression model (CLRM) that should be applied to 
assess the data: 
1. The regression model is linear in the parameters for which the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables is linear. 
2. Zero mean value of disturbance ui: The average value of the errors is equal to zero, 
and the errors should be in a normal distribution. 
3. Homoscedasticity, or constant variance of ui, means the variance of the errors is 
constant. 
4. No autocorrelation between the disturbance: The covariance between the error terms 
over time is zero, assuming that the errors are uncorrelated with one another. 
5. No high relationships among the independent variables (multicollinearity). 
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6. No outliers in the values of X variables, which means values that are are very large 
(or small) in relation to the rest of the observations. 
Secondly, we discuss in detail the assumption of the OLS to determine which technique will 
be appropriate for examining the relationships among corporate governance variables and 
firm performance. These assumptions include normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and outliers (Dinga et al. 2009; Al-Saidi 2010). These 
assumptions as follows: 
1. Assumption of Normality 
The data with a normal distribution has the familiar bell-shaped probability density (Stock 
and Watson 2007) within standard skewness of ± 1.96 and standard kurtosis of ± 3 to be 
normal (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Most of the variables used in this study do not meet this 
assumption. In addition, this study tested the normality of each variable by graphical and 
numerical methods. The graphical methods such as scatter plots, P-P plot for the standard 
normal probability, and Q-Q plot were found to be sensitive to non-normality. In addition, 
this study also applied the numerical method to test normality, and the Shapiro-Wilk and 
skewness/kurtosis tests were used to test normality for the null hypothesis of no normal 
distribution and found it significant which indicates the non-normality.  
2. Assumption of Linearity 
The second assumption is that there is a linear relationship between dependent and 
independent variables (Al-Saidi 2010). This study checked the linearity between the 
predictors and outcome variables by histograms and plotting graphs, and it found some 
patterns of a linear relationship. However, with regard to some independent variables, it is 
difficult to establish linear relationships among corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. Theoretically, some of the corporate governance mechanisms are non-linearly 
related with firm performance (Dinga et al., 2009) 
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3. Assumption of Homoscedasticity 
The third assumption is the variance of error is constant, which is referred to as 
homoscedasticity (Verbeek, 2004; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Stock and Watson (2007,p. 
160) defined homoscedasticity (homoskedasticity) as '' the error term ui is homoskedastic if 
the variance of conditional distribution of ui Xi is constant for i = 1, ......, n and in particular 
does not depend on Xi. Otherwise, the error term is heteroskedastic''. Hill et al. (2008) 
documented that if the case is heteroskedasticity in the regression model and the research 
used the least square technique to estimate the unknown coefficient, then: 
 The least square estimator is still a linear and unbiased estimator, but it is no longer 
the best linear unbiased estimator (B.L.U.E.). 
 The standard errors usually computed for the least squares estimators are incorrect. 
To detect homoscedasticity, the researcher applied the Breusch-Pagan test (Dinga et al. 
2009). The Breusch-Pagan test shows the significant probability for the chi-square test, 
thus indicating a constant variance. This implies that homoscedasticity is not a problem in 
the data. 
4. Assumption of Multicollinearity 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), multicollinearity indicates the existence of a linear 
relationship among some or all independent variables of a regression model. Furthermore, the 
time series data are one of the reasons that may lead to multicollinearity (Gujarati and Porter 
2009). Multicollinearity problems may lead to unreliable estimates with high standard errors 
and unexpected signs or magnitude (Verbeek 2004). The problem of multicollinearity occurs 
when the correlation between two independent variables exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati and Porter 
2009; Al-Saidi 2010). Thus, in this study, managerial ownership and family or individual 
ownership may change over time at more or less the same rate, leading to multicollinearity 
between these two variables. For example, in family-dominated firms, managers are likely to 
be family members so there is a big overlap between family and managerial ownership, and 
because the share capital of a company remains more or less constant over time, increases in 
one type of ownership are likely to be associated with reductions in other types of ownership. 
Hence, the various ownership variables are not independent of each other. 
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To detect this problem, the Pearson correlation matrix is used to test the multicollinearity 
problem (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Furthermore, this study assessed the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to check the level of multicollinearity (Dinga et al. 2009). The VIF of this study 
is more than 0.10 (1/1.78 = 0.56), indicating the existence of the multicollinearity problem 
(Dinga et al. 2009) between managerial ownership and family or individual ownership. 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), when the problem of multicollinearity exists, the 
researchers have two solutions. The first solution is to do nothing, as promoted by Blanchard 
(1967). Blanchard (1967, p. 449-451) stated, "Multicollinearity is God’s will, not a problem 
with OLS or statistical technique in general" (as cited in Gujarati and Porter 2009). The 
second solution applies one of the Rule-of-Thumb procedures, which is dropping one of the 
variables (Gujarati and Porter 2009). This study applied OLS with three types of regression: 
do nothing with multicollinearity, drop managerial ownership, and in the last regression, drop 
family or individual ownership. 
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Table ‎7-2 Correlation Matrix 
Var.  
ROA  
Tobin's 
Q  BSIZE  NEXE  FBD  MANOWN  FAMOWN  GOVOWN  FOROWN  FINOWN  NFINOWN  
ROA  1.000                                
Tobin's Q  0.251  1.000                             
BSIZE  0.091  -0.166  1.000                          
NEXE  
-
0.092  -0.155  0.253  1.000                       
FBM  0.210  0.039  0.051  -0.121  1.000                    
MANOWN  0.101  0.038  0.047  -0.140  0.560  1.000                 
FAMOWN  0.041  0.038  -0.019  -0.195  0.529  0.861  1.000              
GOVOWN  0.117  -0.012  0.104  0.092  
-
0.249  -0.211  -0.178  1.000           
FOROWN  
-
0.153  -0.087  0.157  0.173  
-
0.150  -0.094  -0.143  -0.071  1.000        
FINOWN  0.053  0.035  -0.009  -0.059  0.076  0.168  0.191  -0.038  -0.013  1.000     
NFINOWN  0.077  -0.009  -0.027  0.127  0.017  -0.074  -0.120  -0.252  0.076  -0.093  1.000  
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Table ‎7-3 Variance Inflation Factor 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
MANOWN 4.53 0.220711 
FAMOWN 4.27 0.234267 
FSIZE 2.20 0.45555 
GOVOWN 1.97 0.507494 
FBD 1.83 0.545912 
IND1 1.47 0.679379 
FOROWN 1.36 0.737939 
NFINOWN 1.31 0.765179 
IND1 1.28 0.783667 
IND2 1.27 0.785980 
BSIZE 1.67 0.792585 
NEXE 1.23 0.815537 
IND3 1.18 0.845661 
RFBM 1.17 0.851250 
FINOWN 1.10 0.909237 
BCOM 1.09 0.915535 
Variance Inflation Factor: Mean of VIF is 1.78  
5. Assumption of Autocorrelation 
Kendall and Buckland (1971, P.8) defined the term of autocorrelation as ''correlation between 
members of series observations order in time [as in time series data] or space [as in cross-
sectional data]'' (as cited in Gujarati and Porter 2009). In the panel data values (observations 
for the same firm over several consecutive periods) that come from the same variables among 
various times and may be the errors of different observations are likely to be highly 
correlated (Dinga et al.; 2009). There are various tests to detect the problem of 
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autocorrelation such as Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). According to Verbeek (2004), when a value of Durbin-Watson (DW) is much smaller 
than 2, this indicate a positive autocorrelation. The DW of this study is lower 2 (0.675), 
which shows that there is evidence of a positive autocorrelation. The DW lower and upper 
values for our data are 1.654 and 1.885, respectively. The DW value is 0.675, which is below 
1.654 (lower value) and is evidence that there is a positive autocorrelation at a 5% significant 
level. 
6. Assumption of Outliers 
An outlying observation or outlier is an observation that is very unlike the observations in the 
sample (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). In addition, Gujarati and Porter (2009) defined an outlier 
as an observation with a large residual. Outliers can make the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
results misleading (Stock and Watson, 2007). The presence of outliers cause the problem of 
non-linearity (Ntim, 2009). In this research, outliers were inspected and we tried to overcome 
the problem of outlying observations by winsorising, which is a process of replacing the 
outlier observations with the mean plus (or minus) three standard deviations (Abdullah, 
2007). This helps to minimise potential serious violations of OLS regression assumptions 
such as normality and linearity, upon which the regression analysis will be based (Ntim, 
2009).   
As mentioned above, OLS regression offers three types of solutions for the multicollinearity 
problem: do nothing with multicollinearity, drop managerial ownership, and in the last 
regression, drop family or individual ownership. All of these regressions have been applied 
after winsorising. In terms of the six problems of OLS mentioned above, this study addressed 
multicollinearity by omitting correlated variables, and it has addressed outliers by 
winsorising. However, our data still have the problems of non-normality and non-linearity of 
some variables and we tried to solve these problems by winsorising. However, theoretically, 
some of the corporate governance mechanisms related non-linearly with firm performance. 
This research has a potential problem with autocorrelation. The OLS results provide a first 
view and direction of the relationships between independent and dependent variables, but 
statistical methods that mitigate the shortcomings of OLS are worth using. Hence, this study 
uses various other methods. 
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7.4 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE (OLS) RESULTS 
The first regression technique used in this study was the ordinary least square (OLS), 
considering the performance measures as dependent variables and the corporate governance 
mechanisms and control variables as independent variables. This section is divided into two 
subsections: the first presents the OLS regression results of ROA regarding the corporate 
governance mechanisms; the second presents the OLS regression results of Tobin's Q with 
the corporate governance mechanisms.  
This study divided the OLS technique into three models to overcome the problem of 
multicollinearity. Because of the multicollinearity between managerial ownership and family 
or individual ownership, in the second model, this study dropped the family or individual 
ownership and applied the OLS again to see if there was any effect. In the third model, this 
study dropped the managerial ownership from the regression and applied the OLS to see what 
changed.  
7.4.1 RESULTS BASED ON THE RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 
Table 1 presents the results of OLS regression of ROA on the corporate governance variables 
and control variables. The first column presents the first model of the OLS, which includes 
all corporate governance variables with control variables as independent variables. The 
second and third columns discuss the results without family or individual ownership; and 
without managerial ownership, respectively. The first model shows that the F value of 8.05 
for all 5 years is significant at the 1 percent level. The adjusted R
2
 is about 20% for the entire 
sample, which mean the proportion of the total sample variation in ROA that is explained by 
the independent variables.  
The coefficient on the percentage of board size, family board member and royal family board 
member are statistically positive significant with ROA at 5%, 1%, and 5%, respectively, 
whereas the coefficient on the non-executive board member and board committees are 
negative but not significant. Regarding the ownership structure, this study finds the 
coefficient on managerial ownership, government ownership, and non-financial firms’ 
ownership are statistically positive significant: 5%, 1%, and 1%, respectively. By contrast, 
family or individual ownership and foreign ownership have statistically negative effects on 
the ROA.  
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To start with, the coefficient on board size (BSIZE) is positively significant over the entire 
sample period. There is a statistical significance at a level of 5% and a positive relationship 
between board size and ROA. This result supports some of the previous studies (Loderer and 
Peyer, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). For instance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported a 
statically significant and positive relationship between board size and ROA among 347 listed 
companies in Kuala Lumpur for the period 1996 to 2000. This study grew out of research by 
Zahra and Pearce (1989). They suggested that large board size related positively to company 
financial performance: they found a positive relationship and assumed a large board size to 
have directors with diverse backgrounds, skills, and experience.  
Non-executive board member (NEXE) has an insignificant relationship with ROA. It 
supports some previous corporate governance studies that focused on the non-executive 
member (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Mehran, 1985; Klein, 1998; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). This result supports the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who found the non-
executive member not to be significantly related with ROA. This study expected that the non-
executive member’s ownership in general would not be significant enough to give them an 
incentive to monitor the firm (Mehran, 1995). In Saudi Arabia, some non-executive members 
(who do not represent family ownership) are required to own at least 1,000 shares in the 
company (1000*10 = SR 10000 market value); this small amount does not give the non-
executive too much power to monitor the company.  
This study found a statistically significant and positive coefficient between the presence of a 
family board member (FBM) on the firm’s performance. A number of Saudi listed companies 
have elected family members to sit on the board as executives (CEO) or non-executives. It 
supports some previous studies, such as Maury (2006) and Sanda et al. (2005), which 
indicated a positive relationship between a family board member and firm performance. This 
positive relationship occurs because these families have power as well as good access to 
company information, which leads to improved firm performance (Al-Saidi, 2010).  
The results suggested the presence of a royal family board member (RFBM) on the board of 
directors is statistically positively related to ROA. The existence of a royal family board 
member might increase the firm’s performance because they tend to own large numbers of 
shares in companies. In addition, they expose the firm to a competitive environment, which 
leads to improved firm performance (Aghamdi, 2012).  
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This study also found a statistically insignificant relationship between board committees 
(BCOM) and ROA. The current study result is consistent with the findings of Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), who studied this relationship among 250 firms in the UK in 1994. They 
concluded that these committees did not have a significant effect on firm performance. Our 
results indicate that the majority of the board members in the board sub-committees are non-
executives; they did not have much knowledge or experience related to the function of the 
sub-committees. For example, an audit sub-committee needs members with accounting 
backgrounds. This study suggests including sub-committees with insider members 
(executive) who have good backgrounds related to the sub-committee’s purpose and also 
have information about the company. Klein (1998) suggested that inside directors can be 
valuable board members in sub-committees. 
The results suggested that managerial ownership (MANOWN) is a highly significant statistic 
with ROA. This result is consistent with Owusu-Ansah (1998), Mangena and Tauringana 
(2008), and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), who found a positive relationship between 
ROA and managerial ownership. Theoretically, the positive coefficient can be explained by 
the convergence of interests. This hypothesis states that managers who own large shares have 
additional incentives to monitor managerial actions that help to reduce agency costs and 
enhance firm performance (Ntim, 2009).  
The current study found a highly negative significant relationship between family or 
individual ownership (FAMOWN) and ROA, at a 1% level. This result indicated poor legal 
investor protection in some developing countries (Omran et al., 2008). Omran et al. (2008) 
found that family or individual ownership had a negative and significant impact on firm 
performance. This result indicates that family ownership interest appears to expropriate the 
minority, which means the family looks after its own interests to such an extent that residual 
profits available for minority shareholders are limited (La Porta et al., 1999; Shyu, 2011).  
This study also found a highly significant positive relationship between government 
ownership (GOVOWN) and ROA, at a 1% level. Our result is supported by the findings of 
Sun et al. (2002) and Omran et al. (2008), who examined the relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance and found a positive relationship. In addition, 
the Saudi government supports and funds the Saudi Stock market to get better performance 
by owning a substantial portion of the listed companies in the Saudi capital market. This may 
explain the strong positive relationship between firm performance and government 
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ownership. In addition, the existence of the board member who represents any government 
agency that owns shares in a company has the incentive and power to monitor and control 
management and also plays a significant role in corporate governance (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
Foreign ownership (FOROWN) had a highly negative significant on the ROA, at a level of 
1%. Empirically, it supports the results of Lehmann and Weigand (2000). They found a 
negative relationship between foreign ownership and ROA among 361 German corporations 
for the period 1991-1996. Also, Al-Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) found a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and ROA in one of the Arab countries (Jordan). 
This study found a statistically insignificant relationship between financial firm ownership 
(FINOWN) and ROA. The reason is the majority of the financial firms own shares in banking 
and insurance corporations, and our data contains all companies listed in the Saudi Stock 
market, excluding banking and insurance corporations. Moreover, financial firm ownership 
has a strong effect on banking and insurance corporations.  
Non-financial firm ownership (NFINOWN) is found to be positively significantly related to 
ROA. This finding is similar to those of several previous studies (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; 
Morck et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2005). Gorton and Schmid (2006) argued that outside 
block shareholders played a vital role in monitoring management. They reasoned that the 
large size of the portion of stock share of outside shareholders gave them more incentive to 
oversee management and enhance firm performance and work quality. 
This study found a negative effect with respect to the control variables: firm size (FSZIE) and 
industry types (IND). The negative coefficient on firm size offers empirical support to past 
evidence that suggested a negative relationship between firm size and ROA (e.g.; Mehran, 
1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bai et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005). In addition, the 
coefficient of all industry types had a negative effect on firm performance.  
Because of the problem of the multicollinearity between managerial ownership and family or 
individual ownership, the second model examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms (without family or individual ownership) on ROA. The second 
model found the approximately the same results of the first model, with some differences 
regarding managerial ownership, which is found insignificantly related with ROA. Also, the 
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third model (without managerial ownership) did not find differences from the first model, 
except family or individual ownership, which is insignificantly related with ROA. 
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Table ‎7-4 OLS Regression of ROA on Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Ind. Var.  1  2  3  
Constant  11.19 **  11.37 **  10.56 **  
BSIZE  0.578 **  0.629 *  0.623 ** 
NEXE  -0.150  -0.111  -0.141  
FBD  1.28 ***  1.18 ***  1.52 ***  
BCOM  -0.4  -0.395  -0.569  
MANOWN  0.139 **  0.034  -  
FAMOWN  -0.126 ***  -  -0.038  
GOVOWN  0.152 ***  0.154 ***  0.144 ***  
FOROWN  -0.22 **  -0.190 *  -0.209 *  
FINOWN  0.133  0.046  0.128  
NFINOWN  0.006 ***  0.070 ***  0.066 ***  
RFBM  2.51 **  2.64 **  3.09 ***  
IND1  -3.47 ***  -3.66 ***  -3.548 ***  
IND2  -3.75 ***  -4.36 ***  -4.119 ***  
IND3  -6.26 ***  -6.38 ***  -6.154 ***  
IND4  -1.10  -1.36  -0.753  
FSIZE  -1.73 **  -1.89 **  -1.687 **  
R
2
  0.226  0.214  0.215  
Adj. R
2
  0.198  0.187  0.188  
F-value  8.05  8.02  8.07  
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7.4.2 RESULTS BASED ON TOBIN'S Q 
Table 2 contains OLS regression results for the corporate governance mechanisms based on 
Tobin's Q. Similarly, the variables investigated in this model are eleven variables of corporate 
governance and two control variables. The first model presents the OLS technique, which 
includes all corporate governance variables with control variables as independent variables. 
The second and third models discuss the results of without family or individual ownership, 
and without managerial ownership, respectively. The first model shows that the F value of 
9.12 for all 5 years is significant, at the 1 percent level. The adjusted R
2
 is about 22% for the 
entire sample. 
To begin with, various board structure variables (board size, non-executive members, family 
board members, royal family board members, board committees) are not significant in the 
Tobin's Q regression. There may not be much variation in practice in the independent 
variables. This could be the case if Saudi listed companies comply in form with the corporate 
governance codes, and their board structures are more or less the same (little variation in 
board size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family board members, 
board committees). However, these are probably not convincing reasons, because a lack of 
variation in board structure variables would also lead to insignificance as regards ROA.  
Return on assets (ROA) is backward-looking, while Tobin's Q is forward-looking and is 
based on investors’ expectations. It is quite consistent for investors to believe that board 
structure does not matter to future performance, perhaps because the investors think that the 
board of directors are not an important aspect of corporate decision-making governance, 
while in practice it does make a difference to performance. The actual effect on performance 
would show up in ROA, but the investors' belief that board structure is irrelevant would lead 
to no statistical significance in Tobin's Q. 
To conclude, there are two possible explanations. The first is that investors are correct in their 
beliefs for the future, even though in practice they were incorrect in the past. As board 
structures become less varied and converge on the corporate governance code's model, board 
structure variables will have less impact on ROA. The second is that investors are incorrect in 
their beliefs for the future, and board structures could potentially add value. In that case, we 
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would expect board structure variables to become statistically significant for Tobin's Q if the 
analysis were replicated in a few years’ time. 
In contrast to the ROA, the coefficient on the managerial ownership (MANOWN) and family 
or individual ownership (FAMOWN) are insignificant over the entire sample period with 
Tobin's Q. Our result is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999), who found insignificant relationships between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q. 
This result suggests that both managerial ownership and family or individual ownership do 
not create or destroy firm value (Faccio Lasfer, 1999).  
Similar to the results of the ROA, the government ownership (GOVOWN) is highly 
significant with a positive effect on Tobin's Q. This finding is in line with the results of Sun 
et al. (2002). Also, our result is consistent with Omran et al. (2008), who investigated the 
relationship between Tobin's Q and government ownership in different Arab countries; they 
found a positive relationship. This result is supported by Shleifer and Vinshny’s hypothesis 
(1986) that large shareholders may help to reduce the free-rider problem of the minority 
shareholders, which leads to increased firm value. Tobin's Q measure reflects the market's 
valuation of the firm's assets relative to book value and it is used a proxy for a firm's future 
growth opportunities (King and Santor, 2008). This indicates government ownership leads to 
increased firm value in the future by supporting listed companies with more funds, allowing 
greater investments and increasing the number of employees in the company. A number of 
studies have documented that government ownership has had a political objective, such as 
excess employment, rather than profit maximization (Xu and Wang, 1999). This argument is 
true, but when the listed companies employ more employees, this can lead to increased profit 
per work hour and value added to the company (Xu and Wang, 1999).  
In contrast to the ROA, the coefficient on the foreign ownership (FOROWN) is statistically 
positively significant with Tobin's Q. In an emerging market such as Saudi Arabia, listed 
companies need to enhance firm value by additional assistance from foreign investors to 
reach good future firm value. This finding is in line with the results of several previous 
studies (Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Bai et al., 2004; Douma et al., 2006; Sulong and Nor, 
2010). Tobin's Q indicates that expected higher foreign ownership gives the company 
advanced technology and experience and enhances firm value in the future (Dimelis and 
Louri, 2002). The impact of foreign ownership on the Tobin's Q is positive because they 
Chapter Seven 
190 | P a g e  
Secondary Data Results and Discussion 
provide good resources and capabilities that lead to increased future growth opportunities 
(Douma et al., 2006).  
The result of the financial firms ownership (FINOWN) is insignificantly related with Tobin's 
Q. This result indicated the same reason as the ROA: because the majority of the financial 
firms own shares in the banking and insurance corporations and our data contains all 
companies listed in the Saudi stock market, excluding banking and insurance corporations. 
Moreover, financial firm ownership has a strong effect on banking and insurance 
corporations. In addition, Tobin's Q seems to be insignificant in the future with financial 
firms’ ownership, which means that the financial firms will not have any plan to invest 
money in non-financial listed companies and will continue to focus on the banking and 
insurance sectors in the Saudi capital market. 
Similar to the results of the ROA, the non-financial firms ownership (NFINOWN) is highly 
significant with a positive effect on Tobin's Q. This result is consistent with La Porta et al. 
(1998), who stated that large blockholders seek to solve agency problems and received a 
good return on investment. This finding is also supported by Morck et al. (2000), who found 
a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and non-financial ownership. Moreover, large 
shareholders such as corporations can reap large benefits for themselves and other 
shareholders by becoming informed and possibly by influencing corporate outcomes because 
they hold a block of voting right power (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990).   
With respect to the control variables, firm size (FSIZE) is statistically significant with a 
negative effect on Tobin's Q. This is supported by some of the previous studies (e.g., Mehran, 
1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Cho, 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). In addition, 
industry types are included as a control variable. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found firm 
performance depended on the sensitivity of certain industries to changes in macroeconomic 
factors. The manufacturing and food industries have negative effects on Tobin's Q.  
Because of the problem of the multicollinearity between managerial ownership (MANOWN) 
and family or individual ownership (FAMOWN), this study applied the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms without family or individual ownership in the second 
model, and without managerial ownership in the third model. This two models found exactly 
the same results of the first model, except that a royal family board member (RFBM) is 
significant at the 10% level with a positive effect on Tobin's Q in the third model (without 
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managerial ownership). This indicates that when the company reduces the shares owned by 
managers, the royal family board member has a positive effect on Tobin's Q in the future.
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Table ‎7-5 OLS Regression of Tobin's Q on Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Ind. Var.  1  2  3  
Constant  5.745 ***  5.757 ***  5.719 ***  
BSIZE  -0.0165  -0.015  -0.014  
NEXE  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  
FAMBD  0.010  0.009  0.020  
BCOM  -0.107  -0.107  -0.113  
MANOWN  0.005  0.004  -  
FAMOWN  -0.001  -  0.002  
GOVOWN  0.017 ***  0.0177 ***  0.017 ***  
FOROWN  0.028 ***  0.029 ***  0.029 ***  
FINOWN  0.012  0.011  0.011  
NONFIN  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  
ROYALFBM  0.154  0.156  0.177 *  
IND1  -0.29 ***  -0.302 ***  -0.302 ***  
IND2  -0.028  -0.035  -0.042  
IND3  -0.455 ***  -0.456 ***  -0.450 ***  
IND4  0.111  0.108  0.125  
FSIZE  -0.644 ***  -6.466 ***  -0.642  
R
2
  0.248  0.248  0.246  
Adj. R
2
  0.221  0.223  0.221  
F-value  9.12  9.74  9.65  
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7.5 THE METHODOLOGY OF TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARES (2SLS) 
The two stages least squares (2SLS) developed by Henri Theil and Robert Basmann (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009). The main idea of the 2SLS regression is that the OLS will run twice for 
each independent variable. In the first stage, the corporate governance variables are assumed 
to be endogenous variables. Each endogenous variable is taken up as dependent variable and 
regressed against its lagged value for one year for the same variable with other corporate 
governance variables and control variables (Abdullah, 2007). The first OLS regression is: 
Endogenous variables (independent variables) = indepn-1 + other corporate 
governance variables + control variables 
The above regression is run to obtain the predicted value of each endogenous variable 
(independent variables). Then, the predicted value of each independent variable is used to 
replace the original independent value and regressed again, using the equation below: 
Firm performance = predicted value of each independent variable + control variables. 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) discussed some features of 2SLS: 
 It can be applied to an individual equation in the system without directly taking into 
account any other equations in the system. For example, the SPSS software applied 
2SLS in one equation. 
 It provides only one estimate per parameter. 
 It is easy to apply because all one needs to know is the total number of exogenous 
variables in the system without knowing any other variables in the system. 
7.6 RESULTS OF TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES (2SLS) REGRESSION 
This study discusses the results of the 2SLS regression of the relationship between firm 
performance (ROA and Tobin's Q) and corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors 
and ownership structure). The following table reports the results of the 2SLS that examined 
the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance variables. This study 
utilized two measures of firm performance (ROA and Tobin's Q) as dependent variables, and 
corporate governance mechanisms (board and ownership structure variables) as independent 
variables.  
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Table  7-6 2SLS Regressions of ROA and Tobin's Q on Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Independent 
variables  
Dependent variables  
ROA  Tobin’s Q  
Constant  2.458  5.418 ***  
BSIZE  0.806 *  -0.002  
NEXE  -0.490 *  -0.014  
FBM  1.064 **  0.017  
BCOM  -1.106  0.008  
MANOWN  0.164 *  -0.005  
FAMOWN  -0.147  0.007  
GOVOWN  0.117 ***  0.017 ***  
FOROWN  -0.126  0.024 ***  
FINOWN  -0.213  -0.003  
NFINOWN  0.052 *  0.007 ***  
RFBM  3.537 ***  0.241 **  
IND1  -4.551 ***  -0.367 ***  
IND2  -3.775 **  0.093  
IND3  -5.415 ***  -0.388 ***  
IND4  -0.319  0.339 *  
FSIZE  -0.147  -0.280 ***  
R
2
  0.194  0.282  
Adj. R
2
  0.156  0.249  
F-value  5.11 ***  8.34 ***  
 
The table above (7-6) displays the results of the ROA and Tobin's Q, which regressed against 
the board of directors and the ownership structure using two stage least square regression 
(2SLS). According to the ROA, this study found some results such as government ownership 
(GOVOWN) and royal family board members (RFBM) that are highly significant and 
positively related to ROA. The main point of these two variables is to provide and fund some 
of the listed companies, specifically petrochemical and service companies, with high 
resources to assist and support the infrastructure of the country.  
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The royal family board members are one of the aristocratic classes in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia that have good power and responsibility for the renaissance of the country. 
Unfortunately, not many studies examine the relationship between royal family board 
members and firm performance. Alghamdi (2012) commented that the presence of a royal 
family member on the board might increase the firm’s value because the royal family has an 
informal network of relatives and associates whose presence leads to improved performance. 
In terms of royal family board members, the results from the 2SLS indicate a positive and 
significance at 1% level with ROA and a significance at 5% with Tobin's Q, which leads me 
to conclude that the presence of the royal family on the board of directors increases firm 
performance and market valuation. 
Regarding government ownership (GOVOWN), this study found highly positive significant 
effects of government ownership on the ROA at 1 % level. Most of the government 
ownership in Saudi Arabia is distributed in the utility and services sector (Alghamdi, 2012). 
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between firm performance and 
government ownership. This results are consistent with Xu and Wang (1999) who found a 
positive relationship between firm performance (ROA) and government ownership. In 
addition, Firth et al. (2002) examined the relationship between government ownership and 
ROA in the China Stock Market for the period of 1998 to 2000 and used the 2SLS method to 
examine this relationship. They found a positive relationship between government ownership 
and ROA.  
In terms of board size (BSIZE), the results demonstrate a positive relationship with ROA at 
the 10% level. De Andres et al. (2005) examined the relationship between ROA and board 
size in 10 OECD countries, and they found a positive relationship between board size and 
ROA by utilizing an instrumental variables method. These results indicated that board size 
increases firm performance by enabling the firm to obtain easy environmental linkage, 
providing more resources, and increasing the possibility for interlocking directorates among 
board members and other firms (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Abdullah, 2007). 
These findings demonstrate that the percentage of non-executive directors (NEXE) is 
significant at the 10% level with a negative effect on ROA. Indeed, these results are 
supported by stewardship theory, which suggests that non-executive directors are more often 
less knowledgeable about the business and find it more difficult to understand the 
complexities of the firm (Ntim, 2009). Abdullah (2007) used 2SLS to examine the 
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relationship between independent board members and ROA for a sample period of six years 
(1999 to 2004). For FTSE 350 non-financial companies, Abdullah's study found a negative 
relationship between board independence and ROA.  
In terms of managerial ownership (MANOWN), the 2SLS analysis revealed that the 
coefficient on managerial ownership is positive and significant at 10%. This result suggests 
that the existence of managerial ownership leads to an increase in ROA depending on 
convergence of interest. Ntim (2009) argued that when directors own a number of shares in 
the company it can lead to reducing the agency cost and to enhancing firm performance. Our 
results related to managerial ownership are roughly consistent with Beiner et al. (2006), 
where they found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance under the problem of endogeneity. In addition, Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) 
concluded that insider ownership had a positive effect on firm performance when they 
applied 2SLS regression to 648 firm observations for the years of 1998 and 2003 in Germany. 
The case of managerial ownership in Germany is very similar to that in Saudi Arabia, 
because managerial ownership in Germany is strongly related to family ownership (Kaserer 
and Moldenhauer, 2008). 
Regarding foreign ownership (FOROWN) and financial firm ownership (FINOWN), this 
study did not observe any significant effect on ROA. Both of these two types of ownership 
have a negative effect on ROA. Financial ownership had a insignificant effect on ROA but 
this does not matter because the sample focused on the non-financial listed companies in the 
Saudi Capital market. Most financial firm ownership in the Saudi capital market is distributed 
in bank and insurance companies, and this study excluded these two sectors from the sample. 
In addition, foreign ownership has a negative effect on ROA. The main reason behind this 
insignificant is that foreign investors are not allowed to trade on the Saudi Stock Market in 
the first stage, and only Saudi nations are permitted to trade in the Saudi capital market 
(Albarrak, 2011). According to Albarrak (2011), only three firms had foreign owners during 
January of 2012, and none of them had more than 10% of total shares. Our data analysis 
statically found that the mean of foreign ownership in this study was 1.480%; this percentage 
is very low because the Saudi capital market is still new in reference to worldwide investment 
which consistent with Albarrak (2011). Currently, the Saudi capital market is one of the 
attractive capital markets in the developing countries, which leads to increases in the foreign 
investment in the future and enhances firm performance.  
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The 2SLS found a positive and significant at 5 % level for family board members (FBM) on 
the ROA. Barontini and Caprio (2006) found a positive correlation between family board 
members and ROA based on 2SLS. Firms with family board members are more efficient than 
other firms, carry less debt, and have better performance (McConaugby et al., 2001).  
In terms of non-financial firm ownership (NFINOWN), the researcher found that non-
financial firm ownership has a positive effect on ROA with significant at 10 % level. Gorton 
and Schmid (2000) argued that outside block shareholders play a vital role in monitoring 
management because the large size of the portion of stock share of outside shareholders gave 
them more incentive to oversee management and enhance firm performance and work 
quality. This result is inconsistent with some of previous studies that use the 2SLS. Ntim 
(2009) found a negative relationship between ROA and block shareholding when he used a 
sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006. In contrast, our results are 
consistent with Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) who found that the relationship between outside 
blockholders and firm performance was positive and significant at a 1% level of a sample of 
327 Canadian firms for the period 1998-2002. Our results are consistent with Filatotchev et 
al. (2005) who found a positive relationship between corporate ownership and ROA among 
228 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange based on the 2SLS regression. 
According to Tobin's Q, this study did not find any significant relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance. Because the Saudi capital market is an emerging 
market, this leads to insignificant results for the board structure with the firm valuation 
(Tobin's Q), and improvement of board structure mechanisms are needed in order to generate 
good, significant results that may have a positive effect on governance and market value. 
Various board structure variables (board size, non-executive members, family board 
members, royal family board members, board committees) are not significant in the Tobin's 
Q regression. There may not be much variation in practice in the independent variables. This 
could be the case if Saudi listed companies comply in form with the corporate governance 
codes, and their board structures are more or less the same (little variation in board size, non-
executive members, family board members, royal family board members, board committees). 
However, this is probably not convincing reason, because lack of variation in board structure 
variables would also lead to insignificant as regard ROA.  
Return on assets (ROA) is backward-looking, while Tobin's Q is forward-looking and is 
based on investors' expectations. It is quite consistent for investors to believe that board 
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structure does not matter to future performance maybe because the investors think that the 
board of directors are not an important aspect of corporate decision-making governance, 
while in practice it does make a different to performance. The actual effect on performance 
would show up in ROA, but the investors' belief that board structure is irrelevant would lead 
to no statistically significant in Tobin's Q. 
In terms of government ownership (GOVOWN), for the results like the ROA, the coefficient 
on the Tobin's Q is positive and statically significant at 1%. This means that firms with a high 
percentage of government ownership will receive a high market value. This result is 
inconsistent with Mak and Li (2001). They found that the relationship between government 
ownership and firm value is negative. In addition, Wei and Varela (2003) found a negative 
relationship between government ownership and Tobin's Q in China; however, when the 
researchers took the square of government ownership, they found a positive relationship with 
Tobin's Q.  
Regarding foreign ownership (FOROWN), this study found a highly positive, significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and Tobin's Q. The existence of foreign ownership in 
Saudi listed companies leads to an increase market valuation (Tobin's Q). With this type of 
ownership, firm value is improved by inviting some of foreign members to sit on the board of 
directors to increase efficiency and improve the market valuation of the Saudi capital market, 
especially if this member is from a developed country. Moreover, foreign investors often play 
more of a role in prompting changes in corporate governance practices than domestic 
investors (Baert and Vennet, 2009). 
With reference to the results for non-financial firm ownership (NFINOWN), the analysis 
suggests that a higher percentage of non-financial firm ownership leads to increased firm 
value (Tobin's Q). This study found the relationship between non-financial firm ownership 
and Tobin's Q to be positively significant at a 1% level. Filatotchev et al. (2005) found a 
positive relationship between corporate ownership and firm performance among 228 firms 
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange based on the 2SLS regression.  
7.7 THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS BETWEEN 
EACH OTHER USING TWO STAGES LEAST SQUARE (2SLS) 
This study considers the causality issue between all corporate governance mechanisms and 
uses firm performance as independent variables. This study not only focuses on the effect of 
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the mechanisms of corporate governance on firm performance, but also seeks to examine the 
impact of firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) on corporate governance mechanisms. The 
following tables report the results of the 2SLS that examined the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms with each other and with firm performance.   
According to ROA, the regression of the board size (BSIZE), the 2SLS found that the firm 
performance of ROA has a positive significant effect on board size at 5%, which means the 
same effect on the board size and on the ROA (positive effect on both sides). The researcher 
found the non-executive board member, family board member, and royal family board 
member have a positive effect on the board size with a significance of 1%, 5%, and 5%, 
respectively, which means that a larger board size is associated with more members of other 
types of board members such as non-executive, family, and royal family board members. In 
addition, the relationship between board size and the managerial ownership is positive at the 
10% level. However, the 2SLS suggested that board size is statistically significant with a 
lower percentage of family ownership and government ownership. In addition, this study 
found that the smaller board is associated with a higher percentage of non-financial firm 
ownership. Firm size is found to be highly positively significant with board size (p ˃ 0.01).  
For the number of the non-executive members (NEXE), the 2SLS found the ROA has an 
insignificant effect on the number of the non-executive members. Both financial ownership 
and non-financial firm ownership are statistically significant and positively associated with 
the number of the non-executive members. The results showed that the number of non-
executive members increases with increasing financial and non-financial firm ownership, 
larger board size, and lower family ownership. Firm size is found to have a highly positively 
significant effect on the non-executive members. The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient between the industry types and non-executives indicates that the industry types 
have a significant influence on selecting the number and the quality of the non-executives 
who have specific knowledge and experience in the business activities.  
This study found that the statistically significant positive effect of the ROA on the family 
board members (FBM) was 1%. That means firms with more family board members do not 
only enhance ROA, but there is a reverse relationship, which mean firms with a high ROA 
effect have good family members who have experience and more responsibility about the 
firms. The results showed that both the board size and board committees are statistically 
significant and positively related with family board members at 1% level. With regard to 
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ownership structure, this study found that family board members increase with increasing 
managerial ownership and non-financial firms’ ownership and decreasing government 
ownership and foreign ownership. These findings are related to the ownership structure and 
indicate that government ownership and foreign ownership prefer to appoint members from 
outside the family, whereas the majority of managerial ownership and the number of non-
financial firm ownership (block ownership) are representative of family or individual 
companies in Saudi Arabia. Royal family board members are positively related with family 
board members at the 1% level. This study found that one of the industry types (IND 4) in the 
investment industry has a significant positive effect on the family board members.  
With regard to the findings for board committees (BCOM), the results showed that the 
coefficient of the ROA is zero, which means there is no relationship between board 
committees and ROA, and firm performance does not have any effect on the board 
committees. However, the results indicated that family board members and royal family 
board members are statistically significant and positively associated with board committees. 
In contrast, the 2SLS found an insignificant relationship between board committees and 
ownership structure, except for financial firms’ ownership, which is high positive 
significance on the board committees.  
With reference to the results for managerial ownership (MANOWN), they showed that a 
higher ROA led to a higher percentage of managerial ownership. This result suggests that 
more profitable firms need to be dominated and monitored by managerial ownership. In 
addition, a greater family ownership and increasing number of family board members and 
royal family board members are statistically significant and associated with managerial 
ownership. In contrast, government ownership and financial firm ownership have a negative 
effect on managerial ownership.  
The findings for family or individual ownership (FAMOWN) indicated that the non-
executive board members are highly significant with negative signs on the family or 
individual ownership, which means that a high number of non-executive board members is 
associated with lower family ownership of the firms. There is a statistically significant and 
positive reverse association between managerial ownership and family or individual 
ownership. The unexpected result was that the firm performance (ROA) has a negative effect 
on family or individual ownership. Foreign ownership is statistically significant and 
negatively related to the family or individual ownership. However, financial firm ownership 
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was found to be highly positively significant (1% level) with family or individual ownership. 
This result indicates that there is a complementarily relationship between family ownership 
and financial firms’ ownership. There is a positive relationship with high statistical 
significance between manufacturing industries and family or individual ownership.  
This study found that the positive effect of the ROA on the government ownership 
(GOVOWN) was statistically significant at 1%. There is a reverse relationship between ROA 
and government ownership. However, the 2SLS found that government ownership increases 
with decreasing managerial ownership, foreign ownership and non-financial firms’ ownership 
with smaller numbers of board members and smaller numbers of family members sitting on 
the board. Firm size is found to be highly positively significant with government ownership 
(p ˃ 0.01), and this finding indicated that government ownership concerned the larger firms. 
This study found a highly positive significance between manufacturing firms and government 
ownership.  
The findings for foreign ownership (FOROWN) indicated that the family board members are 
highly significant with negative signs on foreign ownership, which means that the existence 
of family board members leads to a decrease in the foreign ownership of the firms. In 
addition, foreign ownership increases with decreasing family ownership and government 
ownership. Firm size has a  high positive significance with foreign ownership at 1% level. 
This finding indicated that foreign ownership prefers to invest in the larger firms. This study 
also found a highly positive significance between manufacturing firms and investment firms 
listed in the Saudi capital markets with foreign ownership. This finding indicates that the 
foreign ownership seeks to invest money into manufacturing (petrochemical companies) and 
investment firms listed on the Saudi capital markets.  
With regard to the findings for financial firm ownership (FINOWN), the ROA has an 
insignificant effect on the financial firm ownership. Increasing the non-executive members on 
the board leads to an increase in the percentage of the financial firm ownership. Financial 
firm ownership increases with decreasing managerial ownership and non-financial firm 
ownership and increasing family or individual ownership. Board committees have a positive 
significant effect on the financial firm ownership, which means there is a reverse relationship 
between financial firm ownership and board committees. The industry types have a 
significant negative effect on the financial firm ownership.  
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The findings for non-financial firm ownership (NFINOWN) were statistically significant at 
10% and positive for non-financial firm ownership-ROA relationship, and there is a reverse 
association between the ROA and non-financial firm ownership. Non-financial firm 
ownership increases with a decreasing board size and the board size becomes more focussed 
on the non-executive members. There is an opposite relationship between government 
ownership and financial ownership with non-financial firm ownership. Firm size is found to 
be highly positively significant with non-financial firm ownership at 1% level. This finding 
indicated that non-financial firm ownership prefers to invest in the larger firms.  
This study found that the positive effect of the ROA on the royal family board members 
(RFBM) was statistically significant at 1%. Royal family board members increase with an 
increasing board size and board size becomes less focussed on the family board members. 
The managerial ownership has a positively significant effect on the family board members. 
Royal family board members and managerial ownership seem to be complements. Royal 
family board members increase with decreasing family or individual ownership. 
According to Tobin’s Q, the regression of the board size (BSIZE), the 2SLS found the 
Tobin’s Q has an insignificant effect on board size. The researcher found the non-executive 
board members, family board members, and royal family board members have a positive 
effect on the board size and are significant at 1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively, which means 
that larger board size is associated with more members of different types such as non-
executive, family, and royal family board members. Board size increases with increasing 
managerial ownership and decreasing family ownership and non-financial firms’ ownership. 
Firm size is found to be highly positively significant with board size at 1% level.  
Regarding non-executive members (NEXE), the direction of the relationship between non-
executive members and board size is positive, and the board size has a highly positive and 
significant effect on the non-executive members. The results suggested a lower percentage of 
family or individual ownership, but greater financial and non-financial firm ownership is 
statistically significant with non-executive board members. The statistically significant and 
positive coefficient between the industry types and non-executive members indicate that the 
industry types have a significant influence on selecting the expertise of non-executive 
members who have specific knowledge and experience in the business activities. Also, firm 
size has positive significance at a 5% effect on the non-executive members.  
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The findings for family board members (FBM) suggested that family board members increase 
with increasing managerial ownership and non-financial firms ownership and decreasing 
foreign ownership. These findings indicated that most of the managerial ownership is 
representative of a family business in which they owned shares in the firms and nominated 
board members to sit on the board of directors of the firms. In contrast, government 
ownership and foreign ownership seek to prevent family members from sitting on the board 
of directors. The result suggested that royal family board members are statistically significant 
at 1% level with a negative sign effect on the family board members. 
With regard to the findings for board committees (BCOM), the results indicated that family 
board members and royal family board members are statistically significant and positively 
associated with board committees at 1%. In contrast, the 2SLS found an insignificant 
relationship between board committees and ownership structure except for financial firm 
ownership, and it has highly positive significance on the board committees. 
With reference to the results for managerial ownership (MANOWN), increasing family 
ownership led to increased managerial ownership. However, managerial ownership increases 
with decreasing government ownership and financial firms’ ownership. Both family board 
members and royal family board members have a positive effect on the managerial 
ownership.  
The findings for family or individual ownership (FAMOWN) indicated that the non-
executive board members have a highly significant effect with a negative sign on the family 
or individual ownership, which means that an increase in the non-executive board members 
leads to a decrease in the family ownership in the firms and family ownership prefers to 
decrease the number of the non-executive members and nominate family members to the 
boards. There is a statistically significant and positive reverse association between managerial 
ownership and family or individual ownership. There is a highly significant at 1% level with 
positive effect of financial firms ownership on the family or individual ownership. This 
implies that family ownership is more like to invest in firms with a high percentage of the 
financial firms’ ownership to receive more funds. In contrast, foreign ownership has a highly 
statistically negative effect on family or individual ownership. 
With respect to the findings for government ownership (GOVOWN), this study found that the 
statistically significant positive effect of Tobin’s Q on the government ownership at 1%. 
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Relating to the government ownership, the direction of the most relationship is negative 
between other ownership structures and board of directors with the government ownership. 
For example, the non-financial firm ownership and foreign ownership have a highly negative 
statistic with 1% on the government ownership. The 2SLS found that the managerial 
ownership has a negative effect on the government ownership at the 10% level, which means 
these three types of the ownership are working to prevent and reduce the government 
ownership in the firms.  
As for the findings for foreign ownership (FOROWN), this study found that the statistically 
significant positive effect of Tobin’s Q on the foreign ownership at 1%. Family or individual 
ownership and government ownership work together to reduce and prevent the foreign 
ownership from owning shares in the Saudi capital market. The control variables (firm size 
and industry types) have a positive effect on the foreign ownership. Foreign ownership 
increases with increasing financial firms’ ownership (significant at 10%) and decreasing 
royal family board members and non-financial firm ownership but it is not significant. High 
Tobin's Q attracts investors which leads to high Tobin's Q in future. Also, high Tobin's Q 
implying good growth performance so attracts foreign ownership, but this has effect on share 
price leading to bigger market value and higher Tobin's Q. 
With regard to the findings for financial firm ownership (FINOWN), the Tobin’s Q has an 
insignificant effect on the financial firm ownership. Increasing the non-executive members on 
the board increases the percentage of the financial firm ownership. Financial firm ownership 
increases with decreasing managerial ownership and non-financial firm ownership and 
increasing family or individual ownership. Board committees have a positive significant 
effect on the financial firm ownership, which mean there is a reverse relationship between 
financial firm ownership and board committees. The industry types (manufacturing, services, 
food and investment) have a significant negative effect on the financial firm ownership. 
The findings for non-financial firm ownership (NFINOWN) are statistically significant at 1% 
and positive for the non-financial firm ownership-Tobin’s Q relationship. There is a reverse 
association between the Tobin’s Q and non-financial firm ownership. Non-financial firm 
ownership increases with a decreasing board size and non-financial firm ownership prefers 
that the board size becomes more focussed on the non-executive members, which means the 
non-financial firm ownership prefers a smaller board size and that the majority of the board 
member become non-executive members. There is an opposite relationship between 
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government ownership and financial ownership with non-financial firm ownership, and these 
two types of the ownership seek to reduce the non-financial firm ownership in the firms. Firm 
size is found to have a highly positive significance with non-financial firm ownership at 1% 
level. This finding indicated that non-financial firm ownership prefers to invest in the larger 
firms. 
This study found that the statistically significant positive effect of the Tobin’s Q on the royal 
family board members (RFBM) was 10%. Royal family board members increase with an 
increasing board size and with less focus on the family board members. Royal family board 
members increase with an increasing managerial ownership and decreasing family or 
individual ownership. Royal family board members and managerial ownership seem to be 
complements. 
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Table ‎7-7 2SLS Regression Using Corporate Governance Mechanisms as Dependent Variables with ROA 
Indep. 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
BSIZE NEXE FBM BCOM MANOWN FAMOWN GOVOWN FOROWN FINOWN NFINOWN RFBM 
Constant 3.591 
*** 
-4.560 
*** 
-1.061 0.018 -6.895 -0.604 -72.9 *** -24.03 *** 0.850 -15.843 0.129 
BSIZE  0.519 
*** 
0.136 *** 0.004 0.409 -0.445 -1.117 * 0.123 0.004 -2.261 *** 0.037 ** 
NEXE 0.197 
*** 
 -0.035 -0.017 0.113 -0.564 *** 0.044 0.004 0.137 *** 1.621 *** -0.007 
FBM 0.179 ** -0.106  0.085 *** 0.682 ** 0.182 -1.369 ** -0.723 *** 0.018 1.562 * -0.076 *** 
BCOM 0.085  -0.621 0.730 ***  -1.637 * -0.993 -1.308 0.373 0.942 *** 1.041 0.236 *** 
MANOWN 0.024 * 0.031 0.039 *** -0.006  0.927 *** -0.328 ** 0.081 -0.066 *** 0.022 0.018 *** 
FAMOWN -0.028 ** -0.063 ** 0.007 -0.002 0.852 ***  0.096 -0.129 ** 0.085 *** -0.124 -0.007 * 
GOVOWN -0.098 * 0.001 -0.009 ** -0.001 -0.064 ** 0.017  -0.133 *** -0.005 -0.519 *** 0.002 
FOROWN 0.004  -0.004 -0.033 
*** 
0.001 0.091  -0.217 *** -0.835 ***  0.019 -0.144 0.001 
FINOWN 0.090 0.532 
*** 
0.108 0.147 *** -1.203 *** 2.571 *** -0.837 0.503 *  -5.71 *** -0.026 
NFINOWN -0.010 ** 0.024 
*** 
0.006 * 0.001 -0.006 0.013 -0.3 *** -0.013 -0.017 ***  -0.001 
RFBM 0.361 * -0.131 -0.608 
*** 
0.226 *** 3.441 *** -1.127 2.232 0.237 -0.135 -3.37  
ROA 0.018 ** -0.021 0.017 *** 0 0.099 ** -0.073 * 0.250 *** -0.041 0.006 0.187 * 0.005 ** 
IND1 0.398 1.564 
*** 
0.092 0.133 -1.092 3.4 *** 8.295 *** 3.453 *** -1.026 *** -5.578 * 0.015 
IND2 -0.063 1.184 ** 0.215 0.045 -4.175 *** 6.32 0.834 1.522 -1.251 *** -9.451 *** 0.075 
IND3 0.027 1.665 
*** 
0.080 0.214 ** 0.880 2.18 * -0.339 1.339 -1.157 *** -12.849 *** -0.114 * 
IND4 -0.685 * 1.449 ** 1.538 *** -0.068 1.587 1.62 4.718 4.257 *** -0.853 * -15.857 *** -0.231 ** 
FSIZE 0.252 
*** 
0.296 ** 0.015 0.022 0.223 0.487 6.677 *** 1.772 *** -0.071 3.617 *** -0.022 
R
2
 0.282 0.249 0.513 0.163 0.845 0.834 0.523 0.286 0.206 0.344 0.223 
Adj. R
2 0.249 0.213 0.490 0.123 0.837 0.826 0.5 0.252 0.169 0.313 0.186 
F-value 8.33 *** 7.02 *** 22.27 *** 4.13 *** 115.26 *** 106.28 *** 23.17 *** 8.48 *** 5.51 *** 11.08 *** 6.08 *** 
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Table ‎7-8 2SLS Regression Using Corporate Governance Mechanisms as Dependent Variables with Tobin's Q 
Indep. 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
BSIZE NEXE FBM BCOM MANOWN FAMOWN GOVOWN FOROWN FINOWN NFINOWN RFBM 
Constant 3.79 *** -3.844 ** -1.188 0.099 -6.937 -1.723 -94.735 *** -29.567 
*** 
0.429 -35.85 *** -0.138 
BSIZE  0.506 
*** 
0.154 *** 0.004 0.495 -0.508 -0.853 0.09 0.01 -2.054 *** 0.042 ** 
NEXE 0.191 
*** 
 -0.044 0.018 0.067 -0.529 *** -0.002 0.039 0.135 *** 1.554 *** -0.01  
FBM 0.203 
*** 
-0.127   0.084 *** 0.802 ** 0.104 -1.69 * -0.768 *** 0.024 1.672 * -0.071 *** 
BCOM 0.067 -0.599 0.725 ***  -1.775 * -0.915 -1.1524 0.397 0.933 *** 0.768 0.231 *** 
MANOWN 0.027 ** 0.027 0.043 *** -0.006   0.924 *** -0.244 * 0.078 -0.065 *** 0.068 0.019 *** 
FAMOWN -0.031 ** -0.059 ** 0.005 -0.002 0.851 ***  0.019 -0.127 ** 0.083 *** -0.174 -0.008 ** 
GOVOWN -0.007 0.001  -0.008 -0.001 -0.054 * 0.005  -0.155 *** -0.006 -0.555 *** 0.001 
FOROWN 0.002 0.002 -0.037 
*** 
0.001 0.079 -0.213 *** -0.937 ***  0.016 -0.255 -0.001 
FINOWN 0.086 0.538 
*** 
0.105 0.147 *** -1.239 *** 2.603 *** -0.823 0.504 *  -5.627 *** -0.027 
NFINOWN -0.009 ** 0.024 
*** 
0.007 * 0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.308 *** -0.023 -0.017 ***  -0.001 
RFBM 0.439 ** -0.173 -0.562 
*** 
0.230 *** 3.845 *** -1.44 1.741 -0.173 -0.13 -3.566  
Tobin's Q -0.018 -0.149 0.027 -0.014 0.036 0.174 4.953 *** 1.098 *** 0.08 3.846 *** 0.052 * 
IND1 0.0309 1.62 *** 0.019 0.128 -1.557 3.855 *** 8.539 *** 3.966 *** -1.026 *** -4.9 * 0.01 
IND2 -0.136 1.287 
*** 
0.146 0.046 -4.627 *** 6.637 *** -0.57 1.538 * -1.283 *** -10.326 *** 0.05 
IND3 -0.083 1.737 
*** 
-0.007 0.208 ** 0.363 2.660 ** 0.331 1.961 ** -1.16 *** -12.088 *** -0.125 * 
IND4 -0.697 ** 1.517 ** 1.551 *** -0.063 1.569 1.589 2.68 3.805 *** -0.881 ** -16.914 *** -0.253 *** 
FSIZE 0.248 
*** 
0.260 ** 0.020 0.018 0.221 0.551 7.627 *** 2.047 *** -0.048 4.587 *** -0.008 
R
2
 0.272 0.246 0.503 0.164 0.842 0.832 0.55 0.301 0.206 0.357 0.217 
Adj. R
2 0.237 0.210 0.479 0.124 0.834 0.824 0.52 0.268 0.169 0.326 0.180 
F-value 7.89 *** 6.90 *** 21.39 *** 4.14 *** 112.65 *** 105.18 *** 25.83 *** 9.11 *** 5.51 *** 11.73 *** 5.87 *** 
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7.8 THE DYNAMIC GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM) 
This approach was proposed by Lars Peter Hansen in 1982 (Verbeek, 2004). The GMM 
procedure is a nonparametric approach to estimating model parameters (Schultz et al., 2010). 
This model was first introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), and Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and extended in further papers by Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) (Bond et al., 2001; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). The model is 
common in economic and financial studies in which the relation is naturally dynamic 
between dependent and independent variables, such as modelling paths of convergence for 
economic growth (Caselli et al., 1996), estimating a labour-demand model (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998), modelling the relationship between financial-intermediary development and 
economic growth (Beck et al., 2000), and corporate-governance studies such as corporate 
governance and likelihood of firm failure (Schultz et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). To 
overcome problems of bias, and inconsistent and inefficient estimators using OLS for panel 
data, it is recommended that a dynamic-GMM-panel model be used to examine the 
relationship between corporate-governance mechanisms and firm performance (Wintoki et 
al., 2012), which leads to more reasonable results in this relationship (Bond et al., 2001).  
The dynamic-GMM model explores endogeneity usually inherent in independent variables in 
many economic and finance models, especially in the relationship between corporate-
governance mechanisms and firm performance (Schultz et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Wintoki et al. (2010) (as cited in Schultz et al., 2010) classify three sources of potential 
endogeneity in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance: 
1. Dynamic endogeneity: This is present when the current value of a variable is 
influenced by its value in the preceding time period. This occurs in our study when 
the current governance structure, control characteristics, and performance of the firm 
are determined by the firm’s past performance.  
2. Simultaneity: This is when two variables are co-determined such that each variable 
may affect the other simultaneously. In the governance-performance relation, the 
corporate governance variables and control variables may be determined concurrently 
with the firm’s performance. 
3. Unobserved heterogeneity: This situation is present when a relation between two or 
more variables is affected by unobservable factor. In the governance-performance 
relationship, firm-specific characteristics—the firm-fixed effect—may affect a firm’s 
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governance structure, control characteristics, and performance, but may be 
unobservable to the researcher and therefore difficult to quantify.  
According to Bond et al., (2001) the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) has important 
advantages over simple regression and other estimation methods for the dynamic-panel-data 
models, as a follows: 
1. Estimates will no longer be biased by omitted variables that are constant over time. 
2. The use of instrumental variables allows parameters to be estimated consistently in 
models that include endogenous right-hand-side variables. 
3. The use of instruments potentially allows consistent estimation even in the presence 
of measurement error.  
The basic idea of the dynamic-GMM approach is to write the regression equation as a 
dynamic panel data model and take the first differences to remove unobserved time-
invariance and country-specific effects (unobserved heterogeneity) (Bond et al., 2001). After 
that, estimate GMM using lagged values of independent variables as instruments for the 
included independent variables in the model (Wintoki et al., 2012). Thus, the past value of 
corporate-governance mechanisms, control variables used in our case as instruments for the 
present changes, can be concluded here so that the model actually uses the firm’s history as 
instruments for the model’s included independent variables. The relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance is estimated in functional form, as 
given in the model developed by Wintoki et al. (2012): 
      ∑                                                (1) 
where  ,   and   represent firm performance, corporate governance variables, and firm 
specific attributes, while   is the unobserved firm’s specific attributes resulting in the model’s 
estimation having problems not possible to counter using traditional methods like ordinary 
least square and fixed effects regression for panel data. The above regression is conditioned 
on firm heterogeneity. In the above model,     is a random-error term and   is the effect of 
corporate governance variables on the firm’s performance. The model is actually estimated in 
two steps. It can be written in the following dynamic model equation (2): 
          ∑                                               (2) 
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The first difference is that the above equation (2) will eliminate any bias potentially available 
due to the unobserved heterogeneity. The important aspect of the dynamic model estimator is 
its use of the of the firm’s history as instruments for our independent variables (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). Estimating equation (1) using the first-difference transformation to equation (2), 
the instruments used in the model are a set of the lagged value of dependent or independent 
variables.  
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the instrument’s validity is tested using two criteria, as 
follows: 
First, the instruments should provide a source of variation for the present values of the 
independent variables (corporate governance variables).  
Second, the lagged value should also provide an extraneous source of variation in the 
corporate governance variables as included in the list of independent variables in the model. 
The assumption when including these lagged values in dynamic GMM models is to have a 
zero-correlation coefficient between the lagged independent variables and the error terms of 
the equations of dependent variables such as firm performance. 
Corporate governance variables for organizations observed in this study usually trade off pros 
and cons of specific corporate governance systems; the change in the firm’s performance was 
unanticipated at the time the corporate governance system was taken into account (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). Hence, the system shows information from a firm’s past, observed in its 
performance within a specific time period, say “p” time period. The inclusion of p lags 
behind the dependent variables (firm performance) in the model, it will sufficiently capture 
the effects of the firm’s history. The lags confirm the dynamic completeness of the system as 
defined in equation 1. Keeping this in mind, it is assumed that any piece of information from 
the history of the specific firm has no effect on its present performance following the current 
corporate governance and the firm’s specific determinates, hence t-p lags behind time history 
and can be considered as exogenous as it has no contribution to changes in the current or 
future time periods (Wintoki et al., 2012). This is usually confirmed following validity 
testing. 
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According to Wintoki et al. (2012), if the above assumptions related to the exogeneity of the 
instruments’ validity holds, the condition on the orthogonality of the system can be written 
as: 
 (        )   (        )   (        )                                  (3) 
Equation 2 is estimated using GMM given the orthogonality conditions listed above, despite 
three limitations identified in the following lines. But due to its econometrics appeal, this 
approach is highly appreciated in empirical literature (Wintoki et al., 2012). As cited in 
Wintoki et al. (2012), Beck et al.,  (2000) point out that if the model under consideration is in 
level, the difference will produce a lower power for the testing. Secondly, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) argue that level variables are weak instruments to use in a differenced-system 
of equations. Lastly, Griliches and Hausman (1986) conclude that differencing increases the 
effect of measurement errors on the dependent variables. However, Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), improved the system of GMM by including level 
equations in estimating techniques so the instruments can be defined from the first 
differences and included in equations in levels as a stacked system that contains equations in 
both levels and differences (as cited in Schultz et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
In the above, the system GMM estimation model involves the following: 
[
   
    
]     [
     
      
]   [
   
    
]   [
   
    
]         (4) 
The above system contains levels that further contain unobserved heterogeneity. It can be 
assumed that corporate governance and control variables might be related to the unobserved 
effects, but will remain constant over the sample time period, which is considerably smaller 
(Schultz et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012). It further leads to orthogonality conditions given 
by:  
 [      (      )]   [      (      )]   [      (      )]                (5) 
As in the above conditions, the GMM provides efficient estimates while controlling the 
unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic endogeneity, and simultaneity and the dynamic 
relationships (Wintoki et al. 2012) between the present values of the independent variables 
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(corporate governance mechanisms) and the past values of the dependent variables (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q).  
Using panel data and GMM estimation under the assumptions of the orthogonality conditions 
(3) and (5) assuming no serial correlations in the residuals of the regression model,   
(Wintoki et al. 2012). Conditions (3) and (5) imply using, respectively, the lagged levels as 
instruments for the system of differenced equations, and lagged differences as instruments for 
the system of level equations. Afterwards, the assumptions of orthogonality conditions are 
tested rigorously alongside the instruments’ strength, based on the assumptions above. 
The main assumptions of the exogeneity are that the firm’s performance in the past, and other 
attributes, are exogenous as related to the deviations and impulses in the performance in the 
present. Wintoki et al. (2012) report that there are two main test procedures suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991): 
 The first test is based on testing a serial correlation at the second order, mainly due to 
concerns related to including enough lags into the model. If such lags are included, 
then any lag above that length will be exogenous and can be included as a valid 
instrument exogenous to the impulses in the firm’s performance. In setting up the 
GMM estimation, the validity of specification assumptions gives the residuals their 
first differences and will be correlated at the second order. 
 The second is related to testing of over identification and is commonly known in the 
literature as the Hansen test or Hansen J-statistic. In case of panel-dynamic GMM, 
when multiple lags are used as instruments it is commonly the case that the system 
becomes over identified. The J-statistic is a    under the null of validity for the 
instruments. 
7.9 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS BASED ON GMM 
In this section, we proceed to apply the Dynamic GMM model to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. According to Wintoki et 
al. (2012), it is important to understand how many lags of dependent variables (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q) are needed to capture all information from the past performance. This is important 
for two reasons: first, failure to capture all influences of the previous performance on the 
current could still mean that is mis-specified, which may cause an omitted variable bias; 
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second, it can be argued that all older lags are exogenous with respect to the residuals of the 
present, which can be used as instruments. A number of previous studiese.g., Glen et al. 
(2001), Gshwandtner (2005), and Wintoki et al. (2012)suggest that using two lags of 
dependent variables is more effective in capturing the persistence of profitability. In the 
presence of endogeneity, the OLS estimation will produce biased and inappropriate parameter 
estimates, while this study uses the Dynamic GMM approach to get more accurate and 
consistent outcomes. The Dynamic GMM approach examines the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance, including the past performance, to control the 
problem of time-invariant and unobserved heterogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Table (7-9) 
below contains Dynamic GMM regression results based on the return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin's Q. 
7.9.1 RESULTS OF THE DYNAMIC GMM BASED ON ROA 
This study provides the results of two models for each performance indicatorthe first 
model with a one-year lag of performance and the second model with a two-year lag of 
performance. With reference to the board size (BSIZE), the coefficient is positively 
significant with two models (lag 1 and lag 2 of ROA). This result is in contrast with that of 
Conyon and Peck (1998), who used dynamic GMM estimation and found that board size 
appears inversely related to firm performance. Schultz et al. (2010) used the Dynamic GMM 
estimation and found a positive relationship between board size and firm performance, but it 
was insignificant. However, our finding is associated with those of Sanda et al. (2005) and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). In addition, Kama and Chuku (2009) used Dynamic GMM and 
found a positive relationship between board size and ROA. Our result in the same line of the 
OLS and 2SLS showed the coefficient on board size is significantly positive (OLS = 0.578 
***, 2SLS =  0.806 *). In addition, this result of the Dynamic GMM does not change with the 
past ROA for one year or two years, indicating that the dynamic is associated with the static 
model.  
With regard to a non-executive board member (NEXE), the GMM suggested that there is a 
negative relationship between a non-executive and ROA. Wintoki et al. (2012) applied the 
Dynamic GMM and found a negative relationship between board independence (non-
executive) and ROA, but it was insignificant. Ntim (2009) found a negative relationship 
between a non-executive and ROA when he lagged the financial performance; he found the 
same result for the non-executive members as we did. Hermalin and Weisbash (1998) 
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explained this situation by suggesting that managers who have a strong ability of monitoring 
have less intently by shareholders, which leads to less independence (as cited in Wintoki et 
al., 2012) and to a negative effect on ROA. This result is supported by stewardship theory, 
which indicates that non-executive members have less knowledge and experience, which 
leads to poor performance (Weir and Laing, 2000; Ntim, 2009). This result indicated a 
negative relationship even when the past performance was controlled.  
A statistically significant positive relationship between family board member (FBM) and 
ROA was found with two models. This result was in the same line as those of OLS and 2SLS, 
which find a positive relationship with ROA. This result is associated with previous studies 
(McConaugby et al., 2001; Maury, 2006; Sandra et al., 2008; Amran and Ahmad, 2010). 
Miller et al. (2013) argued that firms run by family board members (executives or non-
executives) who often associated with their business closely had useful information and 
knowledge about their businesses, which led to enhanced firm performance compared to 
firms that do not have family board members. In contrast, royal family board members were 
found to be negatively significant on the ROA with two-year lags.  
Regarding board sub-committees (BCOM), the Dynamic GMM found a positive highly 
significant relationship between board sub-committees and ROA when controlling for the 
lags of ROA. However, the static OLS estimate found an insignificant negative relationship 
between board sub-committees and ROA. The sign flip (from negative to positive) with 
respect to the effect of board sub-committees on ROA is interesting and explains the bias that 
may arise from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity and dynamic related with past 
performance. This study result is associated with that of Laing and Weir (1999), who found a 
positive relationship between board sub-committees and ROA. 
The Dynamic GMM found a statistically significant and positive effect of managerial 
ownership (MANOWN) on ROA. Our result is consistent with convergence-of-interest. 
Miguel et al. (2004) found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance with Dynamic GMM estimation. This result is consistent with those of Owusu-
Ansah (1998), Mangena and Tauringana (2008), and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), who 
found a positive relationship between ROA and managerial ownership. Also, our result was 
along the same line as that of Park and Jang (2010), who examined the relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership using various techniques such as OLS, 2SLS, 
and GMM, and found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
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performance. Our study found a strong relationship between managerial ownership and ROA 
under the control of endogeneity with one and two previous performances.  
On the other hand, the results based on the Dynamic GMM suggested that the family or 
individual ownership (FAMOWN) has a highly significant effect on ROA.  This result did 
not change with the Dynamic GMM and with control endogeneity with lags of ROA. This 
finding indicated poor legal investor protection in some developing countries (Omran et al., 
2008). Omran et al. (2008) found that the family or individual ownership has a negative and 
significant impact on firm performance. This result indicates that family ownership interest 
appears to expropriate the minority shareholders, which means the family looks after its own 
interests to such an extent that residual profits available for minority shareholders are limited 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Shyu, 2011). Kowalewski et al. (2010) took into account the 
endogeneity of family ownership and found a positive relationship between family ownership 
and ROA under the Dynamic GMM estimation.  
With respect to government ownership (GOVOWN), the Dynamic GMM found the same 
result as that of OLS. The results show that the government ownership has a highly positive 
significant effect on ROA. This finding is along the same line as those of Sun et al. (2002) 
and Omran et al. (2008), who examined the relationship between government ownership and 
firm performance and found a positive relationship.  
Foreign ownership (FOROWN) was found to be highly negative and significant on the ROA. 
Empirically, this result supports the result of Lehmann and Weigand (2000) and OLS results, 
even with controlled endogeneity. Also, Al-Shiab and Abu-Tapanjeh (2005) found a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and ROA among one of the Arab countries (Jordan). 
Our results indicated that the Saudi Arabian stock market does not seem ready to receive 
foreign investment. Moreover, this result indicates that Saudi companies seek to get support 
from government to contribute to the infrastructure, and after that in the next stage seek to 
attract foreign investment.  
With respect to financial firms ownership (FINOWN), the Dynamic GMM found a 
statistically negative relationship between financial firms ownership and ROA. Interestingly, 
when we estimate the static OLS, we find an insignificant effect; however, in the dynamic 
GMM the relationship between financial firms ownership and ROA is highly significant. This 
situation illustrates the bias that may arise from ignoring the dynamic relationship between 
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financial firms ownership and past ROA and unobserved heterogeneity. This finding is along 
the same line as the finding of Morck et al. (2000) and Lin et al. (2009), who found that the 
bank ownership hurt firm performance. Actually, our results support the argument of Lin et 
al. (2009), who argued that financial firms ownership (bank) destroys company performance 
due to inefficient borrowing and investment policies.  
In addition, the results based on the dynamic GMM show that the non-financial firms 
ownership (NFINOWN) has a statistically significant effect with negative sign on ROA. 
Interestingly, when we estimated the static OLS, we found a highly positive significant 
effect; however, in the dynamic GMM the relationship between non-financial firms 
ownership and ROA is highly negative and significant. This dramatic sign flip illustrates the 
bias that may arise from ignoring the dynamic relationship between financial firms ownership 
and past ROA and unobserved heterogeneity. Pham et al. (2011) used GMM and found a 
negative relationship between firm performance and non-financial firms ownership, but it 
was insignificant. Other literature has found a negative relationship between large ownership 
and firm performance, such as Lasfer (2002) and Davies et al. (2005). Moreover, Mura 
(2007) used GMM as a methodology permitting simultaneous control for endogeneity of the 
independent variable, and he found a negative relationship between non-financial ownership 
and firm performance. 
With regard to royal family board members (RFBM), the dynamic GMM was found to be 
insignificant with one lag; however, Glen et al. (2001) and Gschwandtner (2005) suggest that 
two lags is the standard for capturing the persistence of profitability (as cited in Wintoki et 
al., 2012). For that purpose, the current study applied two lags, and we found the coefficient 
on the royal family board members to be negative with significance at 5%. The reason behind 
the dramatic sign flip (from positive to negative) on the coefficient on the royal family board 
members is an interesting one and illustrates the bias that may arise from ignoring both 
unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between royal family board 
members and past firm performance.  
With respect to the control variables—firm size and industry types—this study found, after 
controlling for endogeneity with the dynamic GMM, a positive and significant relationship 
between firm size and ROA. Interestingly, the static OLS estimate found a negative 
relationship between firm size and ROA. The sign flip (from negative to positive) with 
respect to the effect of firm size on ROA is interesting and explains the bias that may arise 
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from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic related to past performance. 
The current study is consistent with Wintoki et al. (2012), who found a highly positive 
significant relationship between firm size and performance under the GMM technique. 
However, the industry types were found to be negative, except the investments industry, 
which was found to be positively related to ROA.  
7.9.2 RESULTS OF THE DYNAMIC GMM BASED ON TOBIN'S Q 
This study provides the results of two models for market value indicator (Tobin's Q)the 
first model with a one-year lag of performance and the second model with a two-year lag of 
Tobin's Q. With regard to board size (BSIZE), the dynamic GMM found the coefficient on 
the board size to be very weak and to have an insignificant effect on Tobin's Q. This result is 
consistent with OLS, and this insignificant result indicates that the investors believed that the 
board size does not matter for future performance, possibly because the investors think that 
board size is not an important aspect of corporate decision-making governance, and their 
concern is for the quality not quantity, while in practice it does make a difference for 
performance. The actual effect on performance would show up in ROA, but the investors' 
belief that board size is irrelevant would lead to no statistical significance in Tobin's Q. To 
conclude: Either investors are correct in their belief about the future, even though in practice 
they have been incorrect in the past; as board size become less varied and converges with the 
corporate governance code's model, board size will have less of an impact on ROA. Or 
investors are incorrect in their belief about the future, and board size could potentially add 
value. In that case, we would expect board size to become statistically significant for Tobin's 
Q if the analysis were replicated, for example, in five years' time, or if more lags (three or 
four) were applied. It also supports past evidence that documents an insignificant relationship 
between board size and firm performance, such as Pham et al. (2011) and Wintoki et al. 
(2012), who found an insignificant relationship between board size and performance under 
the GMM technique. 
In contrast to ROA, the coefficient on the non-executive members (NEXE) is positive, but the 
coefficient of the non-executive members with one lag is insignificant and very weakly 
related to Tobin's Q. However, after controlling for endogeneity with two lags of past 
performance, the result indicates a highly positive significant relationship between non-
executive members and Tobin's Q, and it indicates that the dynamic GMM was not consistent 
with OLS results, which means that the static sign flip (from negative to positive) on the 
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coefficient on non-executive members is explained by the bias that may arise from ignoring 
both unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between non-executive 
members and past firm performance. The positive and significant results of the relationship 
between non-executive members and Tobin's Q under the dynamic GMM and with control 
for two lags is consistent with and supported by Andres and Vallelado (2008). They found a 
highly significant positive relationship between non-executive members and Tobin's Q with 
the GMM. Our result supports the agency theory argument, which states that adding non-
executive directors with more experience and knowledge to the board of directors will 
enhance firm performance by reducing agency costs and conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
Again, in contrast to ROA, the coefficient on the family board members (FBM) is negative, 
but the coefficient on the family board members with one lag is insignificant. However, after 
controlling for endogeneity with two lags of past performance, the result indicates a highly 
negative significant relationship between family board members and Tobin's Q. The dynamic 
GMM was not consistent with OLS results, which means the static sign flip (from positive to 
negative with high significance at 1%) on the coefficient on family board members is 
explained by the bias that may arise from ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity and the 
dynamic relationship between family board members and past firm performance. The 
negative and significant results reveal that if a company appoints a new family board member 
to the board of directors, the new member may be expected to exploit the minority 
shareholders; also, when the family board members grow the board of directors, it may be to 
seek to remove the good CEO and appoint a CEO from the same family, which may lead to 
the destruction of the firm performance. 
Similar to the results of ROA, the coefficient on the royal family board members (RFBM) is 
negative with high significance at the 1% level. The dynamic GMM was not consistent with 
OLS results, which means the static sign flip on the coefficient on royal family board 
members is explained by the bias that may arise from ignoring both unobservable 
heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between royal family board members and past 
firm performance. The negative and significant results reveal that if a company appoints a 
new royal family board member to the board of directors, the new member may be expected 
to exploit the minority shareholders and may seek to remove the good CEO and appoint a 
CEO from the same family or same related, which may lead to the destruction of the firm 
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performance. Also, the royal family board member may not have enough experience and 
knowledge to run the company in the best way, and he may make some wrong decisions, 
leading to stagnated or decreased firm performance.  
In contrast to ROA, the coefficient on the board sub-committee (BCOM) is negative with 
high significance at 1% for Tobin's Q. Also, similar to ROA, the static OLS estimate found 
an insignificant relationship between board sub-committees and Tobin's. The static flip (from 
insignificant to significant) with respect to the effect of board sub-committees on Tobin's Q is 
interesting and explains the bias that may arise from ignoring unobservable heterogeneity and 
the dynamic related to past performance. Our result indicates that the establishment of board 
sub-committees may impose extra costs that are held by companies and boards of directors; 
also, excessive managerial supervision may be produced, duplicating the duties and 
responsibilities of the board of directors and board sub-committees (Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas 1999; Ntim, 2009). Our result is consistent with that of Vafeas 
(1999), who noted a negative relationship between board sub-committees and firm value.  
Managerial ownership (MANOWN) is found to have a positive significant effect on Tobin's 
Q after controlling for one lag of performance under the dynamic GMM. Furthermore, when 
taking two lags of performance, the sign flips from positive to negative, which indicates that 
there is unobservable heterogeneity and a dynamic related to past performance; our results 
indicate that controlling for more lags of Tobin's Q leads to a non-linear relationship. 
However, both models of the dynamic GMM—with one lag and two lags—have a very weak 
coefficient which may indicate a non-existent relationship.  
Similar to ROA, the results based on the dynamic GMM suggest that family or individual 
ownership (FAMOWN) has a highly significant negative effect on Tobin's Q with a very 
weak coefficient related to Tobin's Q. However, the static OLS was found to be insignificant; 
controlling for endogeneity and solving the problem of unobservable heterogeneity led to 
finding high significance with a negative sign on Tobin's Q. This finding indicates poor legal 
investor protection in some developing countries, which corresponds to the findings of 
Omran et al. (2008), who also found that family or individual ownership has a negative and 
significant impact on firm performance. This result indicates that family ownership interest 
appears to expropriate minority shareholders, which means that the family looks after its own 
interests to such an extent that residual profits available for minority shareholders are limited 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Shyu, 2011).  
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Similar to ROA, the dynamic GMM found a positive and highly significant relationship 
between government ownership (GOVOWN) and Tobin's Q. The results reveal that 
government ownership has a highly positive significant effect on Tobin's Q, even when 
controlling for past performance. This finding is along the same line as those of Sun et al. 
(2002) and Omran et al. (2008), who examined government ownership and firm performance 
and found a positive relationship between the two. In addition, the Saudi government 
supports and funds the Saudi stock market to get better performance by owning a substantial 
portion of the listed companies and giving some of the listed companies debt with less 
interest to enhance infrastructure. This argument explains the strong positive relationship 
between firm performance and government ownership. In addition, a board member who acts 
as a representative of any government agencies that own some shares in the company has the 
incentive and power to monitor and control management, and also plays a significant role in 
corporate governance (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
In contrast to the ROA, the dynamic GMM found the coefficient on the foreign ownership 
(FOROWN) to be statistically positively significant for Tobin's Q when controlling for 
endogeneity and controlling for one lag, but found a very weak coefficient that explained the 
relationship between foreign ownership and Tobin's Q. However, with two lags, the current 
study found no relationship between foreign ownership and Tobin's Q. In emerging markets 
such as Saudi Arabia, listed companies need additional assistance from foreign investors to 
reach enhanced future firm value. This finding is in line with the results of Dimelis and Louri 
(2002), Bai et al. (2004), Douma et al. (2006) and Sulong and Nor (2010). Tobin's Q 
indicates that expected higher foreign ownership gives the company advanced technology, 
experience and enhanced firm value in the future (Dimelis and Louri, 2002). The impact of 
foreign ownership on Tobin's Q is positive because foreign investors provide good resources 
and capabilities that lead to increased future growth opportunities (Douma et al., 2006).  
The result of the financial firms ownership (FINOWN) is positively significantly related with 
to Tobin's Q. This result is inconsistent with static OLS. The intuition behind the dramatic 
static flip (from insignificant to significant) on the coefficient on the financial firms 
ownership is an interesting one and illustrates the bias that may arise from ignoring both 
unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between financial firms ownership 
and past firm performance. Ang et al. (2000) highlighted that banks and financial institutions 
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have skills and knowledge which lead to good monitoring. Our result is consistent with 
Prowse (1992), Nickell et al. (1997) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000). 
In contrast to ROA, the dynamic GMM found the non-financial firms ownership 
(NFINOWN) highly significant with a positive effect on Tobin's Q. This finding is supported 
by Morck et al. (2000), who found a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and non-
financial ownership. Moreover, large shareholders such as corporations can reap large 
benefits for themselves and other shareholders by becoming informed and possibly by 
influencing corporate outcomes because they hold a block of voting right power (Zeckhauser 
and Pound, 1990).   
With respect to the control variables—firm size (FSIZE) and industry types (IND) —this 
study found, after controlling for endogeneity with the dynamic GMM, a negative and 
significant relationship between firm size and Tobin's Q. This result is supported by Andres 
and Vallelado (2008), who found a negative relationship between firm size and Tobin's Q 
under the GMM technique. Similar to ROA, the industry types were found to be negative, 
except the investments industry, which was found to be positively related to Tobin's Q.
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Table ‎7-9 GMM Results 
Ind. Var.  Dep. Var – ROA  Dep. Var Tobin’s Q  
1  2  1  2  
Constant  -11.862 ***  -21.713 ***  6.519 ***  3.944 ***  
L1  0.139 ***  0.32 ***  -0.0719 ***  0.297 ***  
L2   0.146 ***   0.13 ***  
BSIZE  0.386 ***  0.312 ***  0.006  -0.005  
NEXE  -0.243 ***  -0.111 *  0.007  0.01 ***  
FBM  1.039 ***  1.066 ***  -0.017  -0.058 ***  
BCOM  2.738 ***  3.458 ***  -0.09 ***  -0.157 ***  
MANOWN  0.235 ***  0.245 ***  0.002 ***  -0.003 **  
FAMOWN  -0.260 ***  -0.236 ***  -0.004 ***  -0.003 ***  
GOVOWN  0.084 ***  0.011 *  0.031 ***  0.013 ***  
FOROWN  -0.4 ***  -0.397 ***  0.008 ***  0  
FINOWN  -0.203 **  -0.177 **  0.067 ***  0.05 ***  
NFINOWN  -0.151 ***  -0.159 ***  0.018 ***  0.01 ***  
RFBM  -0.613  -1.777 **  -0.33 ***  -0.134 ***  
IND1  -6.111 ***  -3.119 ***  -1.485 ***  -0.759 ***  
IND2  -0.864  2.011  -0.122  -0.035  
IND3  -10.178 ***  -3.135 ***  -0.921 ***  -0.672 ***  
IND4  3.321 ***  2.680 **  0.225 **  0.364 ***  
FSIZE  1.247 ***  1.529 ***  -0.356 ***  -0.199 ***  
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Years 3  -1.86 ***   0.196 ***  -0.042 ***  
Years 4  -1.396 ***  1.504 ***  0.203 ***   
Years 5  -2.054 ***  0.676 ***  0.404 ***  0.22 ***  
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7.10 SUMMARY 
This study examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance using three types of regression techniques: OLS, 2SLS, and GMM. This study 
used two variables to measure firm performance, ROA and Tobin's Q, and used various 
corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables.  
The first regression model is ordinary least square (OLS) and, given the problem of 
multicollinearity, OLS regression offers three potential solutions: do nothing with 
multicollinearity, drop managerial ownership and, in the last regression, drop family or 
individual ownership. All of these regressions will be applied after winsorising. Ultimately, 
all three models produced similar results. Based on the ROA, most corporate governance 
variables have a significant relationship with ROA, except for, non-executive board 
members, board sub-committees, and financial firms ownership.  
All board structure variables were insignificant with respect to Tobin's Q, as there may not be 
much variation in the board structure variables in Saudi Arabia, with little variation in board 
size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family board members, and board 
committees. Such an explanation, however, is less convincing given that this lack of variation 
in the board structure variables would also lead to insignificant results with regard to ROA. 
For more explanation, Tobin's Q is forward-looking and is based on investors' expectations. It 
is quite consistent for investors to believe that board structure does not matter for future 
performance, perhaps because investors think that the size of the board of directors is not an 
important aspect of corporate decision making governance, such as board size which concern 
on quality not quantity, while in practice it does make a different to performance. The actual 
effect on performance would show up in ROA, but the investors' belief that board structure is 
irrelevant would lead to no statistical significance in Tobin's Q. On the other hand, the OLS 
found a significant relationship with just three types of ownership structure, namely, 
government ownership, foreign ownership, and non-financial firms ownership.  
The second regression is 2SLS and, along with the OLS results, most variables similarly 
affected firm performance, albeit to different extents and levels of significance. The 2SLS 
found a negative effect of non-executive member on the ROA, while the OLS found no 
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significant relationship between them. Based on Tobin's Q, there is no longer significance 
with board of directors structure variables, except for the presence of royal family board 
members, which was found to be significantly and highly positively related to Tobin’s Q.  
For the third regression, this study applied GMM to examine potential endogeneity problems, 
detect unobserved heterogeneity, and examine the dynamic relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and past performance. This study applied the dynamic GMM with 
both one lag and two lags. All the corporate governance variables were found to be 
significant, and the dynamic GMM detected some of the unobserved heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity. The intuition behind the dramatic sign or statically flip on the 
coefficients of several corporate governance variables is the bias that might arise from 
ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between corporate 
governance variables and past firm performance. For example, board sub-committees, non-
executive members, and financial firms ownership are highly significant after detecting 
unobserved heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity.  
Chapter nine will present the general discussion and conclusions of all three regression 
models. It will also provide a comparison of the models, while linking the results of the two 
methodological approaches used in this study, both quantitative and qualitative. Next chapter 
will present the analysis of the semi-structured interviews in detail.  
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the results of semi-structured interviews conducted with 17 participants 
representing different stakeholders (see Table 8.1). Each participant has specific views about 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The main objective of this chapter is to explore in 
more detail the corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia, focusing on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Interviews 
were conducted in Arabic and lasted between 45 and 70 minutes. Some participants agreed to 
have their interviews recorded, while others only agreed to note taking. 
Of the 17 participants, there were two non-executives with broad experience in Saudi joint-
stock companies, three shareholders with a 5% or higher stake in joint-stock companies, two 
board secretaries responsible for preparing board-meeting agendas, one Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) regulator, one government representative from the board of directors of 
joint-stock companies, and two auditors. In addition, semi-structured were interviews 
conducted with two academics that have research interests in corporate governance and the 
Saudi capital market. Furthermore, there were two interviews conducted with CEOs who 
have Masters Degrees, and two with chairmen. One of the chairmen has more than eight 
years’ experience as a chairman in joint companies listed on the Saudi stock market, and the 
other comes from background in accounting and auditing, holds a PhD degree, and has 
worked as an external auditor for many years. Thus, all respondents were qualified, 
knowledgeable experts with experience in corporate governance and the Saudi capital market.  
The interview questions cover three main areas. The first area examines the understanding of 
corporate governance concepts among different stakeholders in Saudi Arabia, focusing on the 
definition and importance of corporate governance in the Saudi stock market. The second 
area deals with evaluating, developing, and improving current corporate governance 
regulations, and discussing difficulties companies listed in the capital market have with 
corporate governance practices. The third area focuses on examining the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms (boards of directors and ownership structures) and firm 
performance. 
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Table ‎8-1 Respondents' Profiles 
NO Position Code Sector 
1 Shareholder SH1 Petrochemical Industries and Real Estate 
Development 
2 Shareholder SH2 Cement , Petrochemical Industries and 
Retail 
3 Shareholder SH3 Multi-Investment, Cement, Building and 
Construction, Agricultural and Food    
4 Chief- Executive Officer  CEO1 Building and Construction 
5 Chief- Executive Officer  CEO2 Industrial Investment 
6 Chairman CH1 Petrochemical Industries 
7 Chairman CH2 Hotel and Tourism 
8 Regulator R1 Capital Market Authority 
9 Academic AC1 King Faisal University 
10 Academic AC2 King Faisal University 
11 Board Secretary SEC1 Petrochemical Industries 
12 Board Secretary SEC2 Building and Construction 
13 Auditor AU1 Saudi Accounting 
14 Auditor AU2 Saudi Accounting 
15 Government Representative 
member 
GOV1 Public Pension Agency 
16 Non-executive NEXE1 Multi-Investment, Hotel and Tourism and 
Petrochemical Industries 
17 Non-executive NEXE2 Building and Construction, Banking and 
Insurance Industries and Energy and 
Utilities  
 
8.2 THE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCEPTS IN 
THE SAUDI ARABIAN ENVIRONMENT 
In order to examine the understanding of corporate governance concepts among different 
stakeholders in Saudi Arabia, this section focused on the definition of corporate governance. 
Also, this section discussed the important of corporate governance. 
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8.2.1 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Most interviewees stated that corporate governance is a system governing how the company 
is managed and controlled via the board of directors in order to adhere to investors’ interests. 
However, the definition of corporate governance differed depending on which stakeholder 
group the interviewee was a member and therefore their interests.  
One of the more experienced investors in the Saudi Capital Market, who owned more than 
5% of a joint stock company, said (SH1): 
In 2005, the investors did not care about the corporate governance concepts, and did 
not ask for any information about the structure of the board of directors. … The main 
thing the investors are looking for is high profit …. After the big crash in 2006 the 
Capital Market Authority issued the codes of corporate governance to protect 
investors. When the regulators issued these codes, most of the investors did not have a 
lot of knowledge about corporate governance and what its main function is. Now, I 
feel more comfortable with implementing the corporate governance codes to save my 
investments. 
Furthermore, another shareholder in a joint stock company stated (SH2): 
Most shareholders lack knowledge of the concepts and definition of corporate 
governance. … We need some training courses and lectures from the Capital Market 
Authority to explain the concepts and the main functions of corporate governance, as 
well as to explain the theories related to corporate governance such as agency theory. 
A further shareholder agreed with SH2’s view; this person, SH3, argued:  
The concept of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still new, and the Capital 
Market Authority in Saudi Arabia just provides us with guidelines without any details. 
… Actually, we need more and more background information, as well as explanations 
of these current codes in more detail and in easily understood language. 
A non-executive director who is a new member of the board of directors of a joint stock 
company in Saudi Arabia stated (NEXE1): 
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To my knowledge, the new corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia are 
impossible to apply because of the lack of details. … The Capital Market Authority 
gave the listed companies in the market three years to prepare their companies to 
implement these regulations, and is going step by step to achieve the best practices. 
The chief executive officer of one of the manufacturing joint stock companies defined 
corporate governance as (CEO1): 
A system and rules that control the work of the company. This system ensures the 
interests of shareholders, board of directors, and other stakeholders such as 
employees. … I see the corporate governance system as a manual to guide the board 
of directors in how to manage the company in the right way.     
The chairman of the one of the petrochemical companies (who comes from a background in 
accounting and auditing, and who is also a non-executive director of two other Saudi 
companies) defined ‘corporate governance’ using a comprehensive definition that included 
all stakeholders related to the company. He said (CH1): 
The group of rules, regulations, policies, and principles of managing companies using 
the best practices ensures the protection of all stakeholders that have interests in the 
company. In addition, these best practices control the relationship between 
shareholders and the board of directors, as well as between the board of directors 
and the executive department of the company, to achieve accountability and 
responsibility. 
A regulator who is responsible for regulating and supervising corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia defined corporate governance from a wide stakeholders’ perspective. He stated (R1): 
Corporate governance is a group of procedures, policies, and regulations that 
concern the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors, as well as 
between the board of directors and executive management and other stakeholders 
such as banks, employees, clients, and suppliers. I mean, here the board of directors 
reflects the interests of shareholders and also other stakeholders. We have three 
dimensions (shareholders, boards of directors, and other stakeholders); the main 
responsibility of the board of directors is to ensure the protection of all 
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stakeholders—not just shareholders or minority shareholders—and also to ensure 
that there is no conflict between these three dimensions. 
One of the academic members of Saudi University who has some interest in the corporate 
governance environment in Saudi Arabia has a specific view of corporate governance (AC1): 
In my opinion, corporate governance in Arabic is aledarh alrasheedah, which means a 
comprehensive system that has many aspects to achieve; this comprehensive system 
guides us on how to manage, control, and direct the company in the best practices to 
protect stakeholders’ rights, achieve accountability and fairness, and promote 
disclosure and transparency in the board of directors’ reports, thereby reducing the 
risk of corruption and protecting the firm from conflicts of interests. 
In summary, the definition of corporate governance reflects various views that depend on the 
position of the participants. Some of the participants look at corporate governance as a 
narrow path. This narrow view is consistent with Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992, p. 7), who 
defined corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled,” which means this group of participants focused on the internal process of 
corporate governance and were concerned about the responsibilities of the board of directors 
to manage the company using the best practices to protect the shareholders’ interests. Other 
participants have broader views of the definition of corporate governance. This view is 
consistent with Solomon (2010, p.6), who defined the corporate governance as “the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in 
all area of their business activity.”  
8.2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS 
All participants in the interviews agreed that corporate governance has a positive impact in 
terms of organizing the work of the companies. In addition, almost all of the participants 
stated that the corporate governance system is essential to providing more comfort for all 
stakeholders. This section discusses the importance of these codes in one of the largest stock 
markets among developing countries. 
A non-executive member of a board of directors stated (NEXE2): 
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I do agree that the corporate governance system is comprised of very important rules 
to establish the joint stock company. Moreover, it helps to achieve fairness between 
stakeholders to get the information that they need to make the investments decision. 
Another academic researcher on corporate governance in Saudi Arabia mentioned (AC2): 
I feel that the corporate governance is very important factor to increase and get best 
performance and also, to improve the company to have high level in the capital 
market with good internal control. 
In addition, some participants agreed with La Porta et al. (1997,1998, 1999 and 2000), who 
indicated that the separation of management from ownership is one of the biggest advantages 
of corporate governance. A board secretary in a joint stock company in Saudi Arabia stated 
(SEC1): 
I think that the separation of ownership and control is one of the most important 
aspects of corporate governance; it will lead to many advantages for all stakeholders. 
Such an increase in a firm’s valuation in the capital market will invite qualified non-
executive members who have more experience in specialties the company need, as 
well as, in the present, corporate governance—or let me say good corporate 
governance practices—can increase the investments in the company by attracting 
foreign investors and enhancing equitability treatment for all stakeholders. 
One of the chairmen stated (CH2): 
Before 2006, there was no requirement for disclosure and transparency of the 
information related to non-financial (operating), which helps in making good 
investment decisions, but now, with the implementation of corporate governance, we 
can get a full picture of the company that gives the shareholders more confidence in 
their investments and obtaining fairness for all parties. 
Furthermore, the corporate governance system has a vital role in enhancing the 
macroeconomics of the country and building a sound picture of a trustworthy capital market. 
Also, good corporate governance leads to a deceased investment risk and lower levels of 
company corruption. The regulator stated (R1): 
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There is no doubt … that corporate governance decreased the severity of the crash of 
the capital market and reduced the capital market crisis. Implementing the 
regulations of corporate governance makes our capital market more trustworthy, and 
the existence of corporate governance enhances economic improvement; in contrast, 
weak corporate governance leads to cheating, corruption, and fraud. 
There is a number of participants suggested that the existence of good regulations of 
corporate governance have a vital role to attract both of foreign and local investors to invest 
in the Saudi capital market. A chairman (CH1) of one of the joint stock company stated that: 
Absolutely, it is true, good practices of corporate governance lead to many important 
advantages, one of these advantages is attracting investments for both local and 
foreign investors. To be honest with you, there is a number of Saudi investors invested 
their money in the developed country especially before 2006, and after the corporate 
governance existence in the Saudi listed companies, most of the local investors 
returned to the Saudi capital market. In addition, nowadays, some of the foreign 
investors invest some of their money in the Saudi capital market as one of the largest 
capital market in the MENA. 
Another interviewee (CEO 1) mentioned that: 
Because of globalization and privatization, this leading to pay attention to attract 
foreign investors to invest in the Saudi Arabia which lead to have a good access of 
capital and funds to the listed companies.... honestly, the attracting of the foreign 
investors are very important not just for the listed companies but also, for the enhance 
the economic growth and good for infrastructure. 
Overall, the participants agreed that corporate governance regulations are essential, both for 
companies themselves and to build a good reputation for the Saudi capital market. Corporate 
governance is important for all stakeholders. Some participants took an agency perspective 
regarding shareholder protection; others, seeing corporate governance as a stakeholder 
perspective, noted the need to protect interests of the stakeholders and establish fair and 
equitable relationships among shareholders, boards of directors, and executive managers. 
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8.3 THE EVALUATION OF CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGULATIONS 
This section focuses on the interviewees’ opinion of current corporate-governance regulations 
in Saudi Arabia. The interviewees were asked to evaluate the current codes, focusing on 
whether or not the codes need to evolve. Also, this section discusses regulation issues that 
interfere with corporate-governance practices for companies listed in the capital market. 
Most participants mentioned that the current corporate governance regulations give the listed 
companies guidelines without providing in-depth details. They suggested that to apply and 
implement the corporate governance regulations the companies need more information. They 
also mentioned that explaining the codes in easy-to-understand language would help the 
companies implement them correctly and achieve corporate governance goals. Thus, on the 
subject on the need to keep the regulations up-to-date one chairman stated: 
A chairman stated that (CH1): 
The current regulations of the corporate governance are in a manual that should be 
used by the company to manage the firm in the best practices. In my opinion these 
regulations are, in general, good as a first draft of the corporate governance codes in 
the Kingdom. But, these regulations are still new, as well as the economy in Saudi 
Arabia is growing rapidly, which mean these regulations need to be updated. 
A shareholder said (SH3): 
I own a number of shares in a number of listed companies. I think the existence of the 
corporate governance is very important in our economy, but I demand the Capital 
Market Authority issues the manual for more details and explain to the investors … in 
easy language for us ... I mean by [us], the investors like me who are old [LAUGH] 
and don’t have any qualification in any area in businesses. 
A number of participants agreed that some of the listed companies have not complied with 
corporate-governance regulations in the past. However, all companies listed in the capital 
market now meet the mandatory codes and apply the principle of ‘comply or explain’ in their 
reporting. 
An auditor (AU1) stated: 
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I would like to indicate to something. From 2007 until 2009, there was a lack of 
compliance, and the annual reports were also lacking disclosure about the 
information related to the board of directors. The board of directors just mentioned 
the financial statements and external audit reports. However, in the present, all 
companies listed in the capital market implement the regulations and apply the 
concept of “comply or explain.” Now, the annual reports issued by the company 
disclose the information about the board of directors such as the names of the board 
members, the classification of the board members, the shares owned by the board 
members, the large of the ownership who owned 5% and more of the company shares, 
operation process and products, and also, the financial statements. This is 
information that is really what the investors need to make decisions.  
Another external auditor for joint-stock companies in Saudi Arabia approved of the idea that 
petrochemical companies listed in the capital market should have higher levels of compliance 
with all corporate governance regulations, not just the mandatory codes. An external auditor 
stated (AU2): 
I would like to point out something. The compliance of the corporate governance 
among the joint-stock companies differs from one company to another, and most of 
the petrochemical … companies have strong compliance with all corporate-
governance regulations. To be honest with you, the compliance of the corporate 
governance regulations, you find in the companies have a strong board of directors 
members, also, in the other sectors, not just with petrochemical companies..... But I 
said that because I had more experience with the petrochemical companies. 
Surprisingly, some companies listed in the capital market set up their own corporate-
governance regulations derived from the OECD principles of the corporate governance. 
These companies applied the principles of corporate governance unofficially before the 
Capital Market Authority issued its codes in the end of the 2006, which give them more 
ability to apply the regulations. A regulator (R1) noted that: 
When we issued the regulations of corporate governance, we found some companies 
applied their own codes … derived from the OECD. These companies applied these 
codes unofficially to build a good reputation in the capital market. Also, when the 
Capital Market Authority issued these regulations, these types of companies had a 
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good ability to apply all codes before become mandatory by the Capital Market 
Authority. 
Most participants considered disclosure, transparency, and an active board of directors to be 
elements that require to be developed in the Saudi stock market. According to Al-harkan 
(2005), the Ministry of the Commerce and Industry (MOCI) in Saudi Arabia approves the 
sufficiency of all information and data related to financial statements and operations in order 
to help shareholders assess firms’ performance and make good investment decisions. Thus 
one shareholder stated: 
A shareholder stated (SH2): 
Disclosure is one of the very important elements of the regulations of corporate 
governance. As you know, disclosure is a demanded element from the Ministry of the 
Commerce and Industry before the Capital Market Authority. That gives this element 
a very important and vital role in making decisions. Now, the current regulations of 
corporate governance focus on disclosure and transparency related to all information 
that they think and expect to lead to the right decisions …. But, unfortunately, some 
companies hide some important information, which leads to a deficient disclosure 
system leading to wrong investment decisions. Therefore, I agree that an improved 
disclosure and transparency system can be achieved by the corporate governance 
system.     
A number of participants suggested that the CMA needs to improve the corporate governance 
regulations by inviting foreign members from international bodies, such as the OECD, to 
develop the current regulations. The expertise of foreign members would provide the CMA 
with the knowledge and experience necessary to improve regulations in relation to appointing 
non-executive members, setting the functions and establishing the membership of sub-
committees, and setting salaries and bonus levels for executives, particularly those in family 
businesses. Thus, one CEO stated (CEO1): 
There is no doubt the current regulations of corporate governance need to improve to 
get more best practices. Unfortunately, the current regulations lack  regulations 
related to the nonexecutive members and how they are appointed. Also, the current 
regulations concerning the audit sub-committees don't mention the remuneration and 
nomination of sub-committees. We suggest the Capital Market Authority give the 
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remuneration and nomination sub-committees a more vital role to bring good 
members to the board of directors, and also to set the rules and standards for salaries 
and bonuses of the executive members.  
Furthermore, some interviewees considered the need to improve internal control systems in 
companies.  
As one board secretary mentioned (SEC2): 
OK, corporate governance regulations are important and helpful for increasing the 
investment opportunities in the firms and making the investors more comfortable for 
their shares in … companies that have a good corporate governance system. But, to 
be honest with you, the corporate governance I think doesn’t [do] enough. The 
company needs clear internal-control system regulations issued by the Capital Market 
Authority to complete the work of corporate governance. I suggest the Capital Market 
Authority establish a specific chapter in the corporate-governance regulations that 
deals with the internal-control systems. 
Other participants highlighted difficulties that can interfere with corporate governance 
practices in the companies. One of these difficulties is the lack of awareness by stakeholders. 
This obstacle arises from the misunderstanding of the objectives of the corporate governance 
regulations. One non-executive member stated: 
A nonexecutive member (NEXE1) stated: 
In my opinion, the society [stakeholders] must ask the Capital Market Authority to 
hold seminars to introduce the benefits of corporate governance. Actually, there is a 
lack of awareness about the definitions and importance of corporate governance for 
all stakeholders, not just for investment decisions, but also for raising the level of 
awareness and increasing the education of the stakeholders. 
Another participant stated (AC1): 
It is very important to discuss and explain the important of corporate governance 
regulations for raising the awareness of all stakeholders that have interests in the 
company. For example, the stakeholders need to know what exactly happens to some 
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companies that abandon … corporate governance, such as Enron and WorldCom, 
and [the results of doing so]! I think when the stakeholders listen carefully to some 
stories about fraud, corruption, and scandals, that will enhance their awareness …. 
Another difficulty arises from the corporate-governance regulations being costly and lengthy 
to implement. One participant stated (CH2): 
When I became the chairman of this company, the main goal that I wanted to achieve 
was building a good corporate governance system. It took me and my team meeting 
many times to establish the requirement of the corporate-governance regulations .... 
Actually, this problem, to be honest with you, arises from us because we don’t have 
more experience and knowledge regarding corporate governance functions! 
Furthermore, I think in my view the corporate governance is a costly system, because 
it needs to obtain some advice from specialists and … sometimes we invite foreign 
members who have experience to help us to build a good corporate governance 
system. 
In summary, most participants suggested that the current corporate governance regulations 
were in reality a first draft. They also agreed that stakeholders need more detail in order to 
implement the current codes correctly. The most important idea is to develop disclosure and 
transparency, particularly in reports by boards of directors. A lack of information and the cost 
of the implementing corporate governance systems are the issues most directly related to 
successfully applying a corporate governance system in the Saudi Arabian business 
environment.  
8.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
This section contains two dimensions—board of directors and ownership structure—that are 
consistent with the main objective of this study. The researcher asked several questions about 
the mechanisms of the board of directors and ownership structure in the Saudi listed 
companies, and how these mechanisms affect firm performance. The researcher used this 
qualitative approach to support the main results of the quantitative approach (the results from 
the regression analysis). Chapter Nine links the results of these two methods with the main 
findings and conclusions. 
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The majority of interviewees indicated that best practises of corporate governance lead to 
good firm performance and a good valuation of the Saudi capital market. A CEO argued that 
(CEO1) 
The good mechanisms of internal corporate governance codes would be lead to 
improved firm performance... Actually, this is a positive relationship between 
good corporate governance and firm performance. A good corporate 
governance system improves the internal control system and enhances 
disclosure and transparency  
Another interviewee agreed but stressed that it must be best practice: 
Of course good corporate governance mechanisms positively affect firm performance. 
Let me say something, not all corporate governance assures good performance, 
sometimes there is weak corporate governance mechanisms and they maybe do not 
have any effect on firm performance. I mean here, corporate governance should 
contains a good practises to enhance firm performance with for example concern on 
mechanisms of board of directors structures and comply with these good practises to 
ensure best performance. 
8.4.1 BOARD OF DIRECTOR STRUCTURE 
8.4.1.1 BOARD SIZE 
Some participants agreed that board size does not matter in determining firm performance. 
Furthermore, several participants stated that the quality of the board members is more 
important than the size of the board. Thus one chairman of a joint-stock company in Saudi 
Arabia stated: (CH1) 
Let me honest with you: there is no clear relationship between board size and 
firm performance. In my opinion, it depends on the quality of the board’s 
members, such as experience of the members..., when we look at the listed 
companies in the capital market, we see that some companies have small board 
size and have achieved high performance, and also, we can see large board size 
with high performance ... I would like to focus on the quality more than 
quantity. 
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Moreover, one of the non-executive members suggested: (NEXE2) 
I think the size of the board of directors does not have any effect on firm 
performance. The main issue of the board relates to the requirement of 
appointing the board members ... I am a non-executive member on two boards, 
and we have tried to invite persons who have a qualification or expertise in a 
specific field that the company needed. 
However, one academic member with a research interest in corporate governance and capital 
markets in Saudi Arabia argued that the relationship between board size and firm 
performance in the Saudi listed companies is unknown. He stated (AC2) 
I have some interest in research on the dynamic of the corporate governance 
mechanisms in the developing countries in general with a greater focus on 
Saudi Arabia; in my observations of the some joint stock companies in Saudi 
Arabia, the curve that describes the relationship of the board size and firm 
performance doesn’t reflect a clear relationship; sometimes it seems to be 
negative and sometimes positive. 
In contrast, a number of participants stated that board size was positively related to firm 
performance and also suggested that the size depends on several factors such as capital 
structure and firm size. These participants take the view that more board members, which 
entails more experience and qualifications, lead to better performance. Thus, one non-
executive member said (NEXE1) 
I strongly agree that the board of directors is a very important element in 
determining firm performance, and the board of director size depends on many 
factors such as the capital structure, total assets and don't forget the industry 
type. Based on my experience with 10 years acting as a board member with 
various industries, large board size with diverse qualifications leads to more 
knowledge and develops the firm performance in the future. 
The CEO of another company suggested one advantage of a large board is that it increases 
the number of cross-linked members who are on other boards and assists them in sharing 
experiences and solving problems encountered in other companies. He stated (CEO2) 
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Let me say something about the board size. I attended a conference about the 
mechanisms of corporate governance, and saw some seminars about the board 
of directors structure. Most of these seminars concluded that the relationship 
between board size and firm performance is negative, especially in the 
developed economies. But, I think in the case of Saudi Arabia, we need large 
boards in the first stage to improve the board quality with sharing experiences 
between firms among interlocking members, which leads to getting more skills 
and different opinions. For, example, the board of directors of our company has 
ten members with various backgrounds; we have an accountant, banker, 
marketing researcher, lawyer, and petrochemical engineer. This team works 
together to build a good plan and enhance the firm value in the capital market. 
However, the majority of the participants suggested that the ideal board size is eight to ten 
members with various backgrounds. One CEO of a joint-stock company stated (CEO1) 
The average size of the board of directors that is suitable with the Saudi 
Arabian listed companies is between eight and ten; also, I have no doubt that a 
small board is more active and easy to monitor; add to that, the small board 
given to me as a CEO has more ability to discuss and listen carefully to other 
members, which leads to quick decisions. But my view is the size of the board of 
directors is about eight or nine with various backgrounds and knowledge. I 
mean here, I support the large board with some cases when the company needs 
more experience and particular fields and qualifications, and, the large board 
can easily establish the environmental linkage and collect more resources, 
which leads to high performance. 
In conclusion, this study has two important views about board size. The first view is that 
board size does not matter in the case of Saudi Arabia at the present time, but the concern 
should be about the quality of the board members rather than quantity. A contrasting view is 
that a large board is more suitable for the Saudi listed companies but should not consist of 
more than ten members all of whom should diverse backgrounds in order to establish a good 
quality board of directors and increase and enhance firm performance. Most of those who 
support the second view agreed that it might be advisable to establish a large board in the first 
stage to develop the company, and later, when the company is more mature, the number of 
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members can be reduced to a size that is more suitable to the firm size while maintaining the 
quality of the board members.  
8.4.1.2 NON-EXECUTIVE MEMBERS 
The second variable in the structure of boards of directors is the number of the non-executive 
members. The researcher asked four main questions related to the non-executive members. 
All participants agreed that the board of directors has four main officers, including the CEO, 
who should be an executive member, non-executive members, a chairman, and other 
executive members. The majority of the board of directors are non-executive with the 
exception of the CEO and perhaps one or two more executives. However, there are a number 
of companies that have a lower percentage of non-executive than executive members. Most 
participants stated that the non-executive directors must have good experience, good 
qualifications, and a good external relationship with the environment and society. In addition, 
some companies appoint non-executive members because of their wealth or their holding of 
investments in the company. According to Al-harkan (2005), Saudi listed companies appoint 
non-executive members to provide check and balance mechanisms and to control 
management performance. One of the requirements for appointing non-executive members in 
Saudi listed companies is that they own at least 1,000 shares of the company stock.  
Thus most participants highlighted that the non-executive members have an important and 
vital role on the board especially when they are carefully selected. They argued that the most 
important role of the non-executive members is assisting in making crucial decisions. In 
addition, they should reflect the opinions of the shareholders. Therefore, one CEO stated 
(CEO2): 
Successful boards of directors should have a mix of expertise in non-executive 
members with different backgrounds and qualifications to reach good decisions 
and approve good plans and strategies for the company. Also, they have to work 
with the CEO to manage and control the company with best practices. 
However, one of the chairmen was critical (CH1) 
.... honestly, the non-executive members do not necessarily have the  
qualifications to become board members... they may just have wealth and power 
that the company needed; however, the CEO of the company seeks to invite 
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some of the non-executive members that the company actually needs to fill the 
gap and improve the performance of the firm. 
In addition, one shareholders had a bad experience with non-executive members. The 
company had appointed a non-executive who was a wealthy person who had a good 
relationship with large shareholders but who had little if any experience or knowledge. The 
shareholder claimed (SH3) 
I owned shares in various companies with different industry types... the 
petrochemical companies select the non-executive members very carefully and 
select members who have knowledge and experience in the petrochemical 
operation. In contrast, a number of companies appoint non-executives because 
they have relative relationships with the large shareholders or may be friends 
with them. 
Another shareholder concurred (SH2) 
I would like to say something that I think is very important when the company 
appoints non-executive members, which is the culture of social life. The Saudi 
environment cares about social relationships between the CEO and non-
executive members ... some of the CEOs invite their friends or relatives to 
become a non-executive; to be honest with you, some companies use this 
criteria but the majority of the listed companies are looking for the experience 
and qualifications to enhance firm performance. 
When asked about the requirements for appointing non-executive members the majority of 
participants stated that there are no clear requirements. They demanded that the Saudi CMA 
set requirements as a guideline to appointing non-executive members so as to make 
shareholders more comfortable, safeguard their investments, and attract additional local and 
foreign investment. Thus, one CEO stated (CEO1) 
There is no clear requirement for appointing non-executive members, but let me 
tell you something important: at present, most of the listed companies seek to 
increase efficiency, productivity and attract foreign investment to build an 
international brand name in the world; all of these objectives will not come true 
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without inviting expertise and foreign non-executive members who have loyalty 
and responsibility to increase the firm value to become one of the leading 
companies in the market. 
Furthermore, the absence of the power, experience, skills, and qualifications of non-executive 
members may give the executive members the power to use their responsibilities 
irresponsibly to achieve personal interests that may conflict with shareholders’ interests. This 
conflict may destroy the value of the company. As one chairman asserted (CH2) 
I strongly agree, the absence of skills, knowledge and experience in the non-
executive members may be lead to weakness in the company and also give the 
executive members on the board more chance and possibility to achieve their 
interests and personal ambitions. Also, the absence of the power of non-
executive members gives the executives freedom to withdraw loans from the 
company account without any limit or terms. These bad practices lead to a 
weakness in the firm’s value in the capital market and the investors withdraw 
their investment and money from this company. This case occurred exactly in 
two or three listed companies. Because of that, the company must choose their 
non-executive members very carefully, and choose the members who reflect the 
desire of the shareholders and also minority shareholders. 
An auditor agreed (AU1) 
It is an easy mathematical equation: when the company appoints non-executive 
members who have poor experience and knowledge this will lead for sure to bad 
performance and decreases the foreign investment, and in the contrast, the 
existence of the non-executive members with high qualifications and more 
experience leads to developing and improving the national growth with the firm 
value and makes the Saudi capital market one of the leading markets in the 
emerging economies. 
Another auditor also supported the argument (AU2) 
I think the non-executive members in one company that I audited have a 
negative impact on firm performance. I tell you that because the procedure of 
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the membership in this company is very poor. Ok, I will be become more honest 
with you, a number of the non-executive members appointed on the board 
depend on favouritism and they don’t have any experience or knowledge. Also, 
let us draw a clear picture, we have large shareholders who own 10% or more 
of the company shares, and these large shareholders and founders of the 
company are controlling the company and appoint the non-executives... maybe 
they bring members with specialties in a specific field whom they need. But keep 
in your mind, I think they bring the member that is comfortable to work with. 
In sum, the majority of participants stated that non-executive members should have 
knowledge and experience that helps to improve firm performance. The participants 
mentioned that there are no requirements for appointing non-executive board members. In 
addition, the participants considered that non-executive members play a very vital and 
important role if they are selected carefully. 
8.4.1.3 FAMILY BOARD MEMBERS 
In this section, the researcher asked questions about the role of family board members and 
whether or not there is any relationship between the presence of family board members and a 
firm’s performance. Most participants claimed that family board members have a vital role in 
the board of directors, especially in a family business, as well as in companies where the 
family owns a large stake in the shares. Thus, one chairman of a joint-stock company stated 
(CH1) 
I strongly agree that the presence of the family member on the board of 
directors has a significant vital role in monitoring and managing the company 
to the best practices and also to make good decisions that serve the company 
and investors. … This member represents the large family investment in that 
company; add to this point, the family member cares about the family’s 
reputation, which gives the family board member more responsibility. 
In addition, a number of interviewees mentioned that the name of the family makes investors 
and shareholders more comfortable. Furthermore, a family’s reputation attracts more 
investors, which encourages the CEO to maintain his family’s reputation and play a 
Chapter Eight 
246 | P a g e  
Interview Data Results and Discussion 
significant role on the board. In this context, one shareholder who own shares in one of the 
biggest family companies in the stock market explained (SH1): 
For most of the family businesses listed in the capital market, the CEO is from 
the same family, and I think that is good, because this give the CEO more 
responsibility about the family investment and concern about building a 
company brand globally to attract foreign investment. Add to that, the CEO 
from the same family seeks to protect the family reputation. 
A further benefit of family board members according to the respondents is that monitoring 
and managing a company through the family member is not only advantageous for the family 
business but also for all companies in which the family owns shares and are nominated as 
board members. This advantage is derived from the ownership of the large number of shares 
in the company, giving the family board members more ability to monitor the company and 
remove the CEO if he is unable to manage the company. One chairman of one of the joint-
stock companies argued (CH2) 
The family board members have a very important role not [only] in the family 
business but in all companies [in which] the family own shares. Because the 
family board members have a view seeking to save and care [for] their 
investment and money in the company … and they have a positive impact on the 
company work by removing a bad CEO who has no power or ability to manage 
the company. Also, they may have a negative [impact] by control [of] the 
company and destruction of minority interests. … They may remove a good 
CEO because he is not from the same family or a relative. 
However, some shareholders are aware of the lack of qualifications and experience of a 
family member and, therefore, consider that the family member does not have ability to 
manage a company. In addition, the other shareholders do not trust the board of directors’ 
decisions. As one shareholder declared (SH1) 
There is one point in my mind: What happens when family board members don’t 
have any skills or experience? … I think he will make wrong or random 
decisions; these decisions will be a detriment to the company in the long term. 
Also, in my opinion, he may be the third generation of the family who does not 
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feel any responsibilities toward the company. … In the family business, the 
family board members take large salaries and big bonuses because they hold 
the same name as the company (SH1).  
Arguing against this, one government representative, who is also on a board of directors, 
argued (GOV1) 
I have good news. I am a board member of one of the family businesses. The 
majority of the second and third generations were educated in the UK and the 
US to prepare themselves to manage their business in the future. 
Most participants perceived there to be a positive relationship between a family board 
member and the firm’s performance. This positive relationship occurs when the family board 
member cares about the family’s investment and reputation. This loyalty enhances and 
increases the firm’s performance. This one regulator of the Saudi capital market stated (R1) 
I think the relationship between a family board member and firm performance is 
positively related. My view is supported by the family member caring about the 
family business reputation in the market. … This gives the family board member 
more energy and power to attract local and foreign investment to his company, 
which leads to improved firm performance. 
One academic respondent supported the view of the regulator (AC2) 
The family board members have a positive effect on the firm performance … 
simply because his family own the largest shares in the company, which gives 
him more responsibility towards the company’s assets. Also, when a family 
member becomes the CEO of the company, it gives him a close relationship with 
the family members, which leads to confidence of the family and increasing the 
firm’s performance in the long-term. 
In summary, the majority of participants felt that the relationship between the family board 
member and firm performance is positive. Some supported this view because a family 
member would be more careful about family investments and have a desire to increase the 
firm’s performance. In addition, in family businesses, a CEO from the same family has the 
ability to be a good leader and understand the business’s activities. 
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8.4.1.4 BOARD OF DIRECTORS SUB-COMMITTEES 
In this section, the researcher asked questions related to the board sub-committees. The 
majority of participants believed that the board of directors needs to delegate certain duties to 
sub-committees in order to assist in the financial auditing process (the audit sub-committee) 
and to appoint, encourage, and obtain suitable members with specific experience and 
qualifications for the board of directors (the nomination and remuneration sub-committee). 
The participants mentioned that Saudi listed companies mostly had the audit, and nomination 
and remuneration sub-committees. However, a number of companies have additional sub-
committees such as risk, investment and finance, sharia, and corporate governance sub-
committees. Each has particular duties and responsibilities; for example, the investment and 
finance sub-committee assists the board of directors in making good feasibility investment 
decisions, while the sharia sub-committee evaluates the financial transactions from an 
Islamic perspective. 
Most of the interviewees considered the audit sub-committee as very important and that the 
members of this sub-committee should be non-executives and have a background in 
accounting and auditing. The nomination and remuneration sub-committee and the executive 
sub-committee were considered to less important than the audit sub-committee. One 
chairman of a listed company stated (CH1) 
The most important sub-committee is the Audit sub-committee, which has a vital 
and important role to check the financial reporting in accordance the 
accounting standards. … Also, in our company, I head the Audit sub-committee, 
and I have a background in accounting and auditing. … The Audit committee is 
required by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry before the existence of the 
regulation of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
One non-executive member concurred (NEXE2) 
I think it is a good sub-committee [Audit Subcommittee]. [It is] dependent on 
some conditions such as … needing members who have a background in 
accounting, finance, and auditing, and giving the members full authority and 
responsibility to work with and check financial reporting. Also, in my opinion, 
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why not invite an external auditor to work with us as a non-executive member to 
take his experience and knowledge in the auditing process. 
In addition, a number of interviewees mentioned that members should be non-executive for 
the audit, and nomination and remuneration sub-committees and that there should be at least 
one executive member on the executive sub-committee. Furthermore, the background of the 
members of the sub-committees is very important regarding putting the right member in the 
right sub-committee. One non-executive member claimed (NEXE2) 
When we talk about increasing the firm performance of the company, the sub-
committees must be filled with suitable members who have backgrounds in the 
particular field such as accountants in the Audit sub-committee, human 
resources in Nomination and Remuneration. These criteria are very important 
to fill the position with the right person. I am sure when we put the right person 
in the right place, then we get positive performance. 
Another view of the participants is that sub-committees have clear roles and definitions to act 
according to best practice and mitigate conflict among members. Furthermore, to ensure high 
quality sub-committee performance, the board of directors should appoint just one or two 
members in the each sub-committee to reduce conflict among members and enable good 
decision-making. As one shareholder said (SH2) 
I think that the company just needs one person with an accounting and auditing 
background to act in the role of the Audit committee. No more because just we 
need the right person give the board of directors the right opinion about 
accurate financial reporting. We need two people to fill positions in the 
Nomination and Remuneration sub-committee. I suggest this to get positive 
performance of the company and reduce conflict among members inside the 
sub-committees. 
The CEO of one of the listed companies added (CEO1) 
I think the subcommittees of Audit and Nomination and Remuneration are 
critical and reflect the firm’s performance. The Nomination and Remuneration 
sub-committee reviews the structure of the board of directors, providing the 
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board of directors with skills that they need, and determining the strong and 
weak points of the board members. ... For these reasons, I think Nomination and 
Remuneration has a critical role which leads to increasing firm performance. 
Also, the Audit sub-committee has an important role to review the internal audit 
report and accounting standards used in the financial reports, allowing 
disclosure of high-quality financial information to attract investment to the 
company (CEO1). 
In summary, the participants suggest that all the listed companies have three kinds of sub-
committees: audit, and nomination and remuneration, and executive committee. The 
interviewees mentioned that the majority of the sub-committee members must be non-
executive and have backgrounds related to the function of the sub-committee, which means 
appointing specialized members in order for performance to be of high quality. 
8.4.1.5 ROYAL FAMILY BOARD MEMBERS 
The researcher investigated this variable in order to examine its effect on how the 
organization operated work and how it can affect firm performance. Having a board member 
from the royal family is a regular feature of corporate life in monarchical countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. There are a number of companies listed in the capital 
market with royal family members—some as chairman and others as non-executive members. 
As one shareholder maintained (SH3) 
I think the existence of the royal family member on the board of directors gives 
the company a good reputation and attracts investment to the company. I am 
one of the investors who invested my money in a company with a royal family 
member. 
A board secretary of a joint-stock company concurred (SEC1) 
I would like to say something will be surprising: Some companies invite board 
members from the royal family just for his name, no more, to attract more 
investment and build the brand name in the market. 
However, a number of the participants believed that royal family board members play a 
significant role because they have large investments in the companies and are very careful 
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about their shares. Furthermore, the royal family member may monitor and control the 
management more carefully. The existence of a royal family member on the board of 
directors gives the company a good reputation, pushes the company to a competitive market, 
and attracts local and foreign investment in the company. Thus, one chairman claimed (CH1) 
I strongly agree. The existence of a royal family member on the board of 
directors motivates us to give the company maximum effort, because this 
member has a large portion of the company shares. Honestly, the existence of 
this kind of member leads to increased firm performance because, simply, if he 
doesn’t see any dividends or advantages of this company, he will withdraw his 
investment from this company. 
However, one non-executive member put forward a more nuanced argument (NEXE2) 
This is a very difficult question. I think there are many factors, such as the skill 
and experience of the royal family board member, which may affect positively 
or negatively. Add to this point, does the royal family member have a large 
number of shares or is he just a non-executive member? If the family board 
member acts as a non-executive member and also owns a large portion, in my 
view, I think he has a positive effect on firm performance. In contrast, if the 
royal family member acts as a non-executive without owning significant shares, 
it may lead to bad performance because maybe this member doesn’t have any 
skills or experience to give the company more reputation. 
In short, the participants did not perceive that all royal family members play a vital role on 
the board of directors. The interviewees mentioned that only royal family members who hold 
large shares have a vital role and the power to increase investment in the company, leading to 
better performance. Other kinds of royal family members—those who act as non-executives 
just to give more attention to a particular company—do not guarantee a good performance.  
8.4.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
This section focuses on the ownership structure in Saudi listed companies. The researcher 
asked questions about majority ownership in listed companies and how these ownerships 
affect firm performance. The results reveal that the ownership structure in the listed 
companies depends on the industry sector; for example, most service companies are owned 
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by the government. The majority of shares in a family business are owned by the family. 
Furthermore, the majority of participants indicated that a large or concentrated ownership—
whether managerial, family, government, foreign, financial firm, non-financial firm or 
distributed ownership—leads to a good corporate governance system in the company. For 
example, one chairman argued (CH2) 
The good corporate governance system in the company leads to attracting more 
large investments, whether from family or firms or any kind of the large 
ownership. This is because this large ownership will get greater protection with 
the good corporate governance system; also, the small shareholders will join 
this company because it has a good governance system that separates between 
ownership and management. 
The interview data shows that the majority of large shareholders are non-financial firms’, 
family and the government. The participants believed that the three types of large owners 
have strong roles in increasing firm value and can affect firm performance in a positive way. 
Thus, one regulator stated (R1) 
Most of the large majority ownership in the Saudi capital market is government 
and family ownership. I think it is good, because this give the company more 
motivation to implement a good corporate governance system, and the good 
corporate governance system means good performance. Also, I can confirm that 
most companies that have these types of the large shareholders have less 
irregularities and implement the regulations of the corporate governance that 
are issued by the Capital Market Authority … that is what I mean by a good 
corporate governance system. 
Another view of participants is more pessimistic. Those interviewed suggested that not all 
large shareholders play a good role in the company. Some large shareholders are believed to 
be opportunists and, unfortunately, Saudi Arabia does not have a system that protects 
minority shareholders. As one shareholder stated (SH3) 
In my opinion, any company dominated by groups of shareholders, particularly 
families or any groups of friends, gives me a pessimistic view about this 
company, and I think this company is under risk because this type of large 
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shareholder includes more opportunists and just thinking about their interests 
and use the firm’s assets in the wrong way and to their benefit. Also, 
unfortunately, we don’t have a system to protect the minority shareholders, 
which leads to these groups to act as managers and shareholders, no 
separation, and they just look at their interests. 
In addition, the existence of the government ownership in a company indicates that this firm 
has a good long-term plan, good feasibility studies, and also a good corporate governance 
system. The existence of this kind of ownership attracts more investors and reassures 
minority shareholders. One government representative on a board of directors in a listed 
company argued (GOV1) 
Trust with full confidence … the government invests money in the good 
companies which have a good long-term plan, good feasibility studies and, also, 
they haven’t any irregularities with the Capital Market Authority. Moreover, the 
government seeks to improve infrastructure and increase welfare of the citizen, 
which lead to improve firm value. 
Furthermore, one CEO of a joint-stock company explained (CEO1) 
In our company, the government own more than 12 percent of our shares and 
also, we have one of the government institutions sitting on our board of 
directors. I would be very honest with you, the existence of the government 
ownership in any company draws the attention of minority shareholders, and is 
useful for the shareholders look at the long-term investment to invest their 
money in this type of company and to get dividends at the end of every year. 
In relation to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, the data 
shows that participants have mixed views. Some participants stated that the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance is positive, while others thought it is 
negative, and a large group of participants stated that the relationship between ownership and 
performance depends on the type of ownership. As one non-executive stated (NEXE1) 
I think it may be take two impacts depending on the type of the large 
shareholders, industry type, and the period of the investment (short-term or 
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long-term). In my opinion, it depends on the type of the large ownership. If the 
large ownership is government, family or individual, I think the impact will be 
positive, because the government bodies act as a support for these companies to 
enhance the firm performance which leads to improving the capital market. 
Also, add to your mind the family or individual ownership just put their money 
in the good companies that have a good and clear corporate governance 
system, which separate[s] between ownership and management to ensure that 
their investment is safe. On the other side, I think the non-financial firms’ 
ownership has a negative impact on firm performance, because they want to 
control the company for their interests. 
Furthermore, some interviewees believed that large shareholders have a negative impact on 
firm performance. These participants felt that large shareholders destroy a firm’s value and 
performance by receiving expensive gifts, such as tickets and travel packages. One academic 
researcher asserted (AC1) 
I would like to say something secret: There is one of the company in Saudi 
Arabia that has no competitor and just this company provides this service 
[LAUGH]. I think you know which company I mean. This company pays 
dividends in fixed amount for three or four years to the shareholders—is this 
logical! … add to this, this company pay large salaries to the executive 
management and also, provides significant gifts and packages to the large 
shareholders and non-executive members. Now, I will ask you, what do you 
think about this company performance!!! Let me answer … absolutely, this 
company has a negative performance. 
More input came from an auditor who, stated (AU1) 
In the Saudi capital market, we have five types of the large ownership: 
government, family, financial firms, non-financial firms, and foreign ownership. 
All of these are concentrated in specific companies. Some companies have 
positive [effects] and others have negative [effects]. For example, the 
government ownership may be found in some companies as a positive impact on 
firm performance and on other companies as a negative impact; actually, there 
are no clear roles. However, in my experience, the family and government 
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ownership have a positive impact in general; and the foreign ownership, there 
is no impact until this time because there are not many foreign owners in the 
Saudi capital market, but, I think, in the near future, it will be a positive impact 
on the firm value and performance. 
Overall, the relationship between large owners and firm performance is ambiguous. 
Sometimes, large ownership is believed to have a positive impact on firm performance and 
other times a negative impact. Furthermore, in some cases, large ownership may have no 
impact at all. In addition, the participants stated that the nature of the relationship depends on 
industry type, the portion of the large shareholders, and the type of large shareholder. The 
majority of the study’s participants agreed that family or individual ownership has a positive 
impact on firm performance. In addition, government ownership is also believed to have a 
positive impact on firm value, enhances the economy of the nation, and leads to better service 
for customers.  
8.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the results obtained from the second research method, semi-structured 
interviews which were conducted with 17 participants who were members of boards of 
directors, shareholders, regulators, auditors, academics, and government representatives. The 
main objective of the interviews was to explore the current corporate governance regulations 
in Saudi Arabia. The researcher used semi-structured interviews to support the results of the 
annual reports (a quantitative approach) and examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. The objective was to gain a deeper 
understanding about this relationship by obtaining opinions from various stakeholders. The 
main subjects covered in these interviews were: understanding corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia; evaluating the current corporate governance regulations; examining the relationships 
in corporate governance mechanisms by focusing boards of directors, ownership structure, 
and firm performance as variables.  
The research analyses two corporate governance issues: the definition of corporate 
governance, and the importance of the corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia. In 
defining corporate governance, interviewees were divided into two main groups. The first 
group focused on the internal process of corporate governance with an eye to the boards of 
directors as the people who protect shareholders’ interests. The second group looked at 
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corporate governance as an issue of social responsibility for all stakeholders. However, all 
interviewees agreed that corporate governance has an important role in the business 
environment. Its importance was reflected in the emphasis on protecting shareholders and 
other stakeholders, achieving fairness and equitability, and attracting foreign investment. All 
these objectives result in improved firm performance and a stronger national economy.  
Most participants agreed the first draft of the corporate governance regulations is generally 
good. However, these regulations need more detailed explanation in order to facilitate 
comprehension. Participants noted that the regulations need to be taken more seriously by the 
boards of directors, and also pointed out the need for disclosure and transparency to help 
investors make good decisions. There were a number of participants who suggested that the 
CMA issue new regulations and codes dealing with non-executive members and internal 
control systems, which would also give investors greater confidence. The participants 
mentioned difficulties applying corporate governance practices due to a lack of awareness on 
the part of investors and other stakeholders, and also noted the costs and time of 
implementing the regulations. 
The researcher asked questions related to quantitative data on corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Important variables considered in this study are the size 
of the boards of directors, non-executive members, family board members, boards of 
directors’ sub-committees, royal family board members, and ownership structures. Regarding 
the size of the boards of directors, interviewees recommended considering quality over 
quantity, though a number of participants suggested that boards should have between eight 
and ten members of various backgrounds and experience. There is no requirement to appoint 
non-executive members; however, the majority of participants suggested that non-executive 
members should have experience and knowledge related to the industry type. Most 
participants felt comfortable with family members joining boards of directors because they 
have a responsibility to maintain company performance and therefore family investment. The 
sub-committees were felt to play a vital role in assisting the boards of directors by delegating 
functions. The members of sub-committees should be non-executive, qualified members 
related to the main function of the sub-committee. The participants believed that a royal 
board member would have a vital role if he had a large share in the company.  
There are many ownership types in the Saudi stock market, including family ownership, non-
financial ownership, financial ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership. The 
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type of ownership is closely related to the industry type. For example, the majority of 
financial and insurance businesses are owned by banks and other financial firms and the 
majority of service sector businesses are owned by the government. The relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance depends on the type of the ownership, and the type 
of industry. In some cases the relationship has a positive effect, but in other cases it has a 
negative effect and sometimes the relationship between ownership and firm performance has 
no effect. The majority of participants agreed that family, government, and non-financial 
ownership have a positive effect on firm performance. In addition, a number of participants 
suggested that financial firms play a vital role and have a positive impact on firm 
performance for bank and insurance companies listed on the Saudi Capital Market.  
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to integrate the quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
explain the findings of this study. This study uses qualitative data to support the quantitative 
(secondary) data and also to cover points not covered by the quantitative data. This chapter 
combines the results of the two approaches to describe the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance, which is the focus of the main research 
question. 
9.2 DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Before 2006 there was no attention paid to corporate governance and to the protection of 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia (Falgi, 2009; Alshehri, 2012). Most shareholders were fully 
satisfied with the Saudi stock market because they made significant profits in a bull market 
with the share index peaking at over 20,000 in February 2006 (Alshehri, 2012). In this 
situation, the stakeholders (particularly shareholders) were not giving any attention to 
investor protection and the importance of corporate governance; they also had the view that 
the market ‘did not need corporate governance because we reap profits!!’ Unfortunately, the 
investors had forgotten the financial crisis that happened in Kuwait—the Al-Manak crisis of 
the late 1970s—because of the absence of regulations and the lack of legal protection for the 
shareholders (Al-Saidi, 2010). After the Saudi stock market crash in February 2006, known 
locally as Black February (Falgi, 2009), investors, academics and other stakeholders 
demanded that regulations be issued to protect the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders, such as banks, suppliers and employees. 
The concept of ‘corporate governance’ was not understood in the Saudi business environment 
in the event of the crashing of the Saudi capital market, and the Arabic terms Hawkamat 
Alsharekat and Aledarh Alrasheedah were more generally used in the Saudi media (Alshehri, 
2012). This study discovers that the Corporate Governance Unit in the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) officially uses the term Hawkamat Alsharekat, which is in line with Falgi 
(2009), who concludes that the official term used by the CMA is Hawkama—this term was 
chosen by stakeholders as the most appropriate Arabic term for referring to ‘corporate 
governance’. Falgi (2009) argues that using Hawkama helps to increase awareness of 
corporate governance, is easy to communicate, and produces greater understanding among 
various stakeholders, which leads to increased accountability. 
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Because of this confusion of terms, there is no agreement on the meaning of corporate 
governance in Saudi between among the various stakeholders, whether they are board of 
directors, shareholders, or other stakeholders such as bankers, suppliers or regulators. Thus, 
each stakeholder holds a different view of the definition of corporate governance; for 
example, the definition may differ among the board members, depending on the types of role 
(executive or non-executive), and also among the shareholders (majority and minority). Each 
group of stakeholders looks at corporate governance through its own lens; stakeholders are 
interested in the advantages that they can gain from corporate governance. However, in 
general the definitions can be divided into two, a narrow and a broad view.  
A number of interviewees in this study defined corporate governance as a system governing 
how the company is managed and controlled via the board of directors in order to support 
investors’ interests. This definition is a narrow one, which concerns only two stakeholders—
the board of directors and shareholders—while ignoring others stakeholders and other 
functions and benefits of corporate governance. This view of corporate governance is in line 
with Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992, p. 7), who defines corporate governance as “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled”. This definition, which is based on an agency 
perspective, focuses on the internal process of corporate governance and is concerned with 
the responsibilities of the board of directors to manage the company using the best practices 
to protect the shareholders’ interest, which is based on agency perspective. 
On the other hand, a number of participants viewed corporate governance more broadly, with 
greater emphasis on all internal and external stakeholders in the company and their level of 
accountability. This view is consistent with Solomon, who defines corporate governance as 
“the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure 
that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all area of their business activity” (2010, p.6). This view is a broader 
perspective based on stakeholders’ perspectives and the accountability of a wide variety of 
internal or external groups related to the company.  
Thus, both views are correct and true. Both views’ groups try to define the term ‘corporate 
governance’ from their own positions and interests. However, both of these groups agree with 
Hussain and Mallin (2002), who stated that the definition of corporate governance reflects the 
following ideas: 
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 Provides a system of controls within the company. 
 Sets the relationship between board of directors/shareholders/other stakeholders. 
 Means the company is being managed in the interests of both shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
9.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS 
According to Claessens (2006), there are a number of factors that have resulted in corporate 
governance gaining greater attention in developing economy: 
1. Privatization. 
2. Liberalization and opening up of financial market. 
3. An increasing number of listed companies and a growing number of institutional 
investors in many countries. 
4. Deregulation and reform reshaping the local and global financial landscape. 
5. Increasing international financial integration and investment. 
All these factors are present in Saudi Arabia, which highlights the importance of corporate 
governance regulations in the Saudi business environment. The participants in the study 
suggested that the existence of corporate governance regulations give the shareholders a 
greater level of comfort about their investment. This is because of the perception that the 
existence of good corporate governance regulations ensures a decrease in investment risk and 
lower levels of company corruption. Arguably, if corporate governance regulations had 
existed during the Black February crisis the level of the investment risk and company 
corruption might have been lower. Investment risk will also be helped by the fact that a good 
corporate governance system should lead to enhanced firm performance and efficiency. Good 
firm performance will not be achieved without applying good codes and standards of 
corporate governance.  
Furthermore, there are a number of families, individuals and large corporations that own a 
significant number of shares in many listed companies in the Saudi capital market. These 
types of owners tend to be look for their own interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders. For that reason, the separation of ownership and control is one of the most 
important aspects of corporate governance, in order to ensure the protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests.  
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Furthermore, the Saudi stock market is one of the more active markets in developing 
countries, which attracts foreign investors; therefore, the existence of good corporate 
governance regulations becomes even more important. In addition, the existence of corporate 
governance regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should lead to enhancing the 
macroeconomic environment and building a strong picture of a trustworthy capital market.  
9.4 THE EVALUATION OF CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGULATIONS 
One of the research objectives of this study is to evaluate the current corporate governance 
regulations. The current corporate governance regulations give the listed companies’ 
guidelines without providing in-depth details. Most of the participants agreed that the current 
regulations just provided outlines without details, and participants need more explanation and 
details about the codes and regulations to apply them in the right way and to avoid 
irregularities. The majority of interviewees demanded that the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority issue the manual written in the simplest language to understand the current 
regulations for all stakeholders. In addition, most of the participants asked that the Saudi 
Capital Market Authority establish some courses and seminars to explain these regulations in 
many cities of the Kingdom to increase the awareness and knowledge among different 
stakeholders. Furthermore, most of the participants suggested that the Capital Market 
Authority should be following the United Kingdom to issue some regulations that discuss 
special elements, such as the Higgs Report, which regulates non-executive directors in the 
UK, or the Turnbull Report, for internal control.  
Most participants considered disclosure and transparency to be some of the elements most 
needed to be improved and developed. These two elements are very important and have a 
vital role in increasing investments in the company, attracting foreign investors and 
improving the reputation of the Saudi capital market. Most of the local or foreign investors 
focus on these two elements when they need to make a decision about investing in the 
company. Disclosure and transparency were mandatory requirement from the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MOCI) before the Capital Market Authority was established. 
According to Al-harkan (2005), the MOCI in Saudi Arabia confirmed the sufficiency of all 
information and data related to financial statements and operations in order to help 
shareholders assess firms’ performance and make good investment decisions. Nowadays, 
when increasing the number of companies listed in the Saudi capital market, because most of 
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the listed companies have a website, they need to improve disclosure and transparency among 
their online services. The participants suggested that there is a lack of disclosure related to the 
board of directors’ mechanisms, such as the requirements for appointing non-executive 
members. The Saudi listed companies need to disclose clearly how well appoint these 
members. Also, the Capital Market Authority needs to be stricter with listed companies 
regarding board sub-committees, such as the audit, remuneration and nomination committees, 
because some listed companies just establish these committees and mention them in the board 
of directors’ reports to meet the mandatory Capital Market Authority guidelines, without any 
disclosure about what type of functions they perform. The most important idea is to develop 
disclosure and transparency, particularly in reports by boards of directors. A lack of 
information and the cost of implementing corporate governance systems are the issues most 
directly related to successfully applying a corporate governance system in the Saudi Arabian 
business environment.  
There is good news: a number of the listed companies have set up their own corporate 
governance regulations derived from the OECD principles of corporate governance. These 
companies applied the principles of corporate governance unofficially before the Capital 
Market Authority issued its codes at the end of 2006, which gave them more ability to apply 
the regulations to comply with all codes when the Saudi regulations were issued in 2006. 
These companies use the Saudi regulations as their main codes and regulations, and modify 
some regulations in more detail, such as the internal control report, non-executive director 
report and audit committee report, to facilitate the organizational work in order to provide the 
investors a greater level of comfort with their investments.  
In addition, a number of the participants stated that to improve the current regulations of 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Capital Market Authority should invite 
foreign members from international bodies, such as the OECD, UK and US agencies, to 
develop the current regulations to reach the best practices. The expertise of foreign members 
would provide the Capital Market Authority the knowledge and experience necessary to 
improve regulations in regards to appointing nonexecutive members, setting the functions and 
establishing the membership of sub-committees, and setting salaries and bonus levels for 
executives, particularly those in family businesses—as well as to create some regulations 
related to the large bodies of ownership, such as families, individuals and corporations. 
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The majority of the participants mentioned some difficulties and obstacles that interfere with 
corporate governance practices in the companies. One of these difficulties is stakeholders’ 
lack of awareness. This obstacle arises from misunderstanding the objectives of the corporate 
governance regulations. Another difficulty arises from the corporate governance regulations 
being costly and lengthy to implement. Currently, the Saudi Capital Market Authority has 
committed the listed companies to establishing their own corporate governance regulations 
based on the main regulations from the Capital Market Authority. Actually, this obligation 
will be costly and will take more time, which demands that the listed companies invite 
experts to help establish the regulations of the company; this expertise also will be expensive 
and will take more time.  
9.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance in the companies listed in the Saudi Capital 
Market. To achieve this objective, this study started by providing an overview and 
understanding of the corporate governance concepts and evaluating the current regulations as 
a prelude to studying the main objective of this research which is an examination of the effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms on  firm performance. To achieve the main objective, 
this study used secondary data from the annual reports of the companies listed in the Saudi 
capital market. The researcher applied three regression techniques; namely, OLS, 2SLS, and 
GMM. After that, the researcher used semi-structured interviews to support the results of the 
secondary data and gain a better understanding of the nature of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance from various stakeholders such as 
board members (executive, non-executive and chairman), regulators, auditors, academics, 
shareholders, and representative members of government. The researcher asked several 
questions about the mechanisms of the board of directors and ownership structure in the listed 
Saudi companies and how these mechanisms affect firm performance. 
This section will compare the results of quantitative data (secondary data) and qualitative 
data (semi-structured interview data). In this study, corporate governance mechanisms were 
divided into two main variables. The first variable is board structure, which consists of board 
size, non-executive members, family board members, royal family board members and board 
committees. The second variable is ownership structure, which consists of managerial 
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ownership, family or individual ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, 
financial ownership, and non-financial ownership.  
9.5.1 Board of directors’ structure 
9.5.1.1 Board size 
A large body of research examines the structure and effect of board size on firm performance. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between board size and firm performance have 
produced mixed results. Much of the literature on board size has called for small boards 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Coles et al., 2008). These arguments are based on 
the notion that small boards are more cohesive, more productive and are better able to 
monitor the firm more effectively. The literature reveals that larger boards produced a 
number of problems such as social loafing and higher co-ordination costs (Coles et al., 2008).  
However, some scholars preferred the larger board. Dalton et al. (1999) summarized the 
advantage of the larger boards, which provide a firm with larger internal budgets, external 
budgets, and leverage (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Provan, 1980). In addition research on board 
interlock prefers larger boards for their ability to produce more information and their higher 
levels of experience and, therefore, ability to achieve positive corporate outcomes (Bazerman 
and Schoorman, 1983; Burt, 1980).  
The average number of board members in the companies listed in the Saudi capital market is 
eight, which is consistent with Jensen (1993). According to Jensen (1993), the optimal size of 
a board of directors is seven or eight members and, when a board is larger than this number, it 
is less likely to function effectively as well as easier for the CEO to control. Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) studied the relationship between board structure and firm performance in 
250 publicly traded firms in the UK; the mean board size of their study was 8.07, which is the 
same mean as the Saudi companies listed in the Capital Market.  
Regarding the three regression techniques, the current study found a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance based on the ROA. However, after controlling for 
the endogeneity problem, the relationship is still positive with high significance. This result 
supports some of the previous studies (Loderer and Peyer, 2002; De Andres et al, 2005; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). For instance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between board size and ROA among 347 companies 
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listed in Kuala Lumpur for the period 1996 to 2000. This study grew out of research by Zahra 
and Pearce (1989), who suggested that large board size related positively to company 
financial performance: they found a positive relationship and assumed a large board size to 
have directors with diverse backgrounds, skills and experience.  
Our result is inconsistent with agency theory, which states that the relationship between board 
size and firm performance is negative; see Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998). 
However, this study result is consistent with resource dependence theory. This theory is 
based on Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who stated that “when an organization appoints an 
individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will 
concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it” (p.  
163, as cited in Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (1987) and Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) stated that the resource dependence theory prefers larger board for some 
benefits such as advice and counsel, channel for communicating information between 
external organization and firm, and preferential access to commitments or support from 
important elements outside the firm. 
On the other hand, the present study found an insignificant negative relationship between 
board size and Tobin’s Q. The main reason for this result is consistent with investors’ belief 
that board size does not matter for future performance, perhaps because investors think that 
the board size is not an important aspect of corporate decision-making governance and, 
instead, focus on quantity, not quality. The actual effect on performance appears in the ROA, 
but the investors’ belief that board size is irrelevant would lead to no statistical significance 
in Tobin’s Q for the near future.  
The interview results supported the quantitative regression results that are related to the board 
size. The main findings are that board size does not matter in the Saudi Arabia at the present 
time, and this view is concerned with the quality of the board members rather than quantity, 
which is consistent with the Tobin’s Q results. The second finding is that a large board is 
more suitable for the listed Saudi companies (the resource dependence theory) but should 
nevertheless be limited to seven or eight members (the view of Jensen, 1993) with various 
backgrounds in order to establish a high-quality board of directors as well as increase and 
enhance firm performance. Most of those who support the second view agreed that it might 
be advisable to establish a large board in the first stage to develop and improve the company; 
and, afterward, when the company reaches its target, it should reduce the number to a size 
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that is more suitable for the firm’s size while maintaining the quality of the board members. 
However, the impact of board size on performance is expected to differ from some firm-
specific characteristics and may also vary between countries (Guest, 2009). 
9.5.1.2 Non-executive members 
Outside non-executive members on the board of directors serve an important function: they 
select CEOs, as well as monitor and reward or punish managers (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001). Some theories, such as agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory, explain the role of non-executive members and their effect on the firm’s performance. 
According to Walsh and Seward (1990) (as cited in Peng, 2004), to mitigate agency 
problems, outside non-executive members must be independent relative to the insiders. In 
addition, they may be able to do a better job at monitoring and controlling management, 
which leads to improve firm performance. Therefore, it is very difficult to describe family 
members who serve on the board, even if they are not employees, as fully independent in a 
family business or any listed company which a family owns significant shares. Resource 
dependence theory predicts that highly resource-rich outside directors will be placed on 
boards to help bring in needed resources, which leads to better performance. In addition, 
stewardship theory suggests that non-executive members have less knowledge about the 
business; therefore, they will have difficulty understanding the complexities of the firm (Weir 
and Laing, 2000) (as cited in Ntim, 2009). Resource dependence and stewardship theories are 
more suitable for the listed Saudi companies, because most of the non-executive board 
members are rich and wealthy people and, perhaps, are neither knowledgeable about nor 
experienced with the firm, particularly after they are first appointed to the board. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between non-executive members and firm performance 
have produced mixed results. In this study, which generated three technical regressions based 
on the ROA, we found an insignificant relationship between non-executive members and 
ROA. This result supports the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), who found non-
executive members not to be significantly related with ROA. In Saudi Arabia, for certain 
non-executive members (who do not represent a family ownership) to sit on a board of 
directors, the individual should own at least 1000 shares in the company, which does not give 
the non-executive too much power over the company. However, based on the 2SLS and 
GMM after controlling for endogeneity, we found a significant negative relationship with 
ROA that is supported by the stewardship theory. This result indicated a negative relationship 
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even when the past performance was controlled. Our result is consistent with Ntim (2009), 
who found a negative relationship between a non-executive board member and ROA when 
financial performance lagged; he found the same result for the non-executive members as we 
did. 
According to Tobin’s Q, this study did not find any significant relationship in all regression 
techniques. This result is consistent with investors’ belief that non-executive members do not 
matter to future performance because investors expect that non-executive members do not 
have enough experience or power to monitor firms’ best practices. However, with the 
dynamic GMM model, which uses two lags of the Tobin’s Q as a control factor, we found a 
highly positive significant relationship between non-executive members with Tobin’s Q, 
which indicates an interesting sign flip (from negative to positive) and explains the bias that 
may arise from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity and dynamics related to past 
performance. The dynamic GMM detected this unobservable heterogeneity. 
The interview results support exactly what happened with the regression analysis. Some of 
the participants stated that some of the listed companies appointed a non-executive who is a 
wealthy person and who has a good relationship with large shareholders but does not have 
enough experience or knowledge to monitor the company, which leads to bad corporate 
performance. In addition, the lack of clear requirements for appointing the non-executive 
members in the listed companies contributed to negative effects on firm performance.  
9.5.1.3 Family board members 
Family board members are very important elements in the Saudi business environment. A 
large number of family members sit on the boards of directors of companies listed in the 
Saudi capital market. Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 306) proposed that “family board members 
have many dimensions of exchange with one another over a long horizon and therefore have 
advantages in monitoring and disciplining related decision agents”, which means that the 
costs of monitoring are less for family board members than for other members (McConaugby 
et al., 2001). However, family board members may be dangerous: they may promote 
leadership irresponsibility, expropriate from minority shareholders, cause hubris, and take 
excessive risks (Miller and Breton-Miller, 2006). According to Al-Saidi (2010), family board 
members may produce several problems such as family instability, lack of planning, 
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problems with succession, nepotism, and favouritism that may negatively affect firm 
performance.  
In this study, the three technical regressions based on the ROA, yield a statistically significant 
and positive coefficient on the presence of a family board member on ROA. This result 
supports some previous studies, such as Maury (2006) and Sanda et al. (2005), and indicates 
a positive relationship between family board members and firm performance. This positive 
relationship shows that families have power as well as good access to corporate information, 
which leads to good firm performance (Al-Saidi, 2010). Miller et al. (2013) argued that firms 
run by family board members (executives or non-executives) who are closely associated with 
their business often had useful information and knowledge about their businesses, which led 
to enhanced firm performance compared to firms that do not have family board members.  
On the other hand, this study did not find any significant relationship in any of the regression 
techniques that examine the relationship between family board members and Tobin’s Q. The 
main reason for this result is, again, consistent with the view of investors who believe that 
family members do not matter to future performance because investors expect that the family 
members do not play a vital role in monitoring the firm’s best practices and because there 
may not be much variation in practice in the explanatory variables in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. However, dynamic GMM model, which uses two lags of the Tobin’s Q as a control 
factor, we found a highly negative significant relationship between family members with 
Tobin’s Q, which once again indicates an interesting sign flip and explains the bias that may 
arise from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity and dynamics related with past 
performance. As noted previously, the dynamic GMM detected this unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
The interview results interpreted what happened with the quantitative results. Most of the 
participants mentioned a positive relationship between a family board member and the firm’s 
performance. This positive relationship occurs when the family board member cares about 
the family’s investment and reputation. This loyalty enhances and increases the firm’s 
performance. In addition, when a CEO came from the same family that owned a large share 
in a company, it enhanced his ability to be a good leader and understand the business’s 
activities, as well as be more careful about the family investment, which led to increased 
company performance.  
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9.5.1.4 Royal family board members 
Some of the companies listed in the Saudi capital market have one or more members of the 
royal family sitting on their boards of directors. Royal members have a powerful and good 
informal network, which may help increase the firm’s performance. According to Alghamdi 
(2012, p. 58), many members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia are appointed as directors 
of boards and serve on boards as managerial members; therefore, they may monitor the 
management closely, thereby decreasing possible mismanagement and wrongdoing. 
According to Alghamdi (2012), the presence of royal members on the board might increase a 
firm’s value because most of them sit on the board as owners, which improves the firm’s 
performance.  
The author of the present study applied three regression techniques to examine the 
relationship between royal family board members and firm performance; the results found a 
positive relationship between royal family board members and firm performance. However, 
the results after controlling for endogeneity, which depends on the GMM, found a negative 
relationship between royal family board members and firm performance. The sign flip is 
interesting and explains the bias that may arise from ignoring the unobservable heterogeneity 
and dynamics related with past performance. The dynamic GMM detected this unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
The interview results partly supported the quantitative results: the majority of participants did 
not think that all royal family members play a vital role on the board of directors. The 
interviewees mentioned that only royal family members who hold large shares have a vital 
role and the power to increase investment in the company, leading to better performance. 
Other kinds of royal family members—those who act as non-executives just to bring more 
attention to a particular company and give the company a good reputation—do not guarantee 
that the company has good performance. 
9.5.1.5 Board of director sub-committees 
According to Saudi Regulations of Corporate Governance (2006), a number of suitable sub-
committees may be set up in accordance with the company’s requirements to enable the 
board of directors to effectively perform its duties. According to the Saudi Regulations of 
Corporate Governance (2006) by-laws, the board of directors may set up two main sub-
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committees—the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee—and the 
majority of the members in the sub-committees should be non-executive members.  
The relationship between board sub-committees and firm performance has not escaped the 
researcher’s notice and is still in an embryonic stage (Dalton et al., 1998; Ntim, 2009). 
According to Ntim (2009) limited studies are concerned with board sub-committees in 
developed markets, which makes this variable important to future research, especially within 
emerging markets.  
This study found an insignificant relationship between board sub-committees and firm 
performance. However, after controlling for endogeneity and applying the dynamic GMM, 
the board sub-committees took two paths. The results that depend on ROA (backward-
looking) were highly positive significant. In contrast, the Tobin’s Q (forward-looking) 
achieved highly significant negative results. These two opposite results indicated that maybe 
the Saudi capital market will be changing some of the regulations that relate to board sub-
committees in the future that lead to a negative relationship and low market valuation in the 
first stage; then, when the regulations are better understood and more reliable, they will lead 
to a positive effect on firm performance.  
The interview results mentioned that the majority of the subcommittee members must be non-
executive and have backgrounds related to the function of the sub-committee, which means 
appointing specialized members who are capable of high-quality performance. The interview 
results also mentioned that, to get high quality sub-committee performance, boards of 
directors should appoint just one or two members in the each sub-committee to reduce 
conflict among members and make good decisions. The outlook of both results (quantitative 
and qualitative) indicated that the listed companies may have appointed non-qualified 
members to their sub-committees. This suggest that some companies still regard board sub-
committees as a excercise compliance rather than as providing beneifits for companies. 
9.5.2 Ownership structure 
9.5.2.1 Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership, or internal ownership, is one of the most important ownership 
structures in a company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that, if managerial ownership 
decreases, the agency cost will be generated by divergence between the manager’s interests 
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and the interests of outside shareholders. Crutchley et al. (1999)’s agency theory suggested 
that the agency cost may be reduced if managers increase their common stock ownership of 
the firm to better align their interests with those of outside shareholders. According to Dinga 
et al. (2009), two main hypotheses describe the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance: the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The convergence of interest hypothesis proposes that the equity ownership of 
managers aligns the interests of shareholders and managers; and, when the proportion of 
equity owned by managers increases, the interests of both parties (managers and outside 
directors) align (Dinga et al., 2009; Ntim, 2009). However, another hypothesis, the 
entrenchment hypothesis, views the situation differently. According to Morck et al. (1988), a 
high level of managerial ownership may lead to entrenchment, which makes it difficult for 
outside shareholders to monitor the firm (as cited in Short & Keasey, 1999). 
A large body of work examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance and produced mixed results because of the problem of multicollinearity between 
managerial ownership and family or individual ownership. The researcher of present study 
applied OLS with three models; the first one regressed both managerial ownership and family 
or individual ownership, the second regressed just managerial ownership without family or 
individual ownership, and the third model regressed family or individual ownership without 
managerial ownership. Our results that related to managerial ownership based on ROA were 
positive and remained the same after controlling for endogeneity and using a dynamic GMM 
that controlled through both one and two lags of ROA. This positive coefficient can be 
explained by the convergence of interests hypothesis. This result is consistent with some of 
the previous studies such as Earle (1998), Claessens and Dajankov (1999), Chen et al. (2003), 
and Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008). 
On the other hand, this study did not find any significant effect that depends on Tobin’s Q. 
Our result is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999), who 
found an insignificant relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. This result 
suggests that managerial ownership does not create or destroy firm value (Faccio and Lasfer, 
1999). However, after controlling for endogeneity and applying dynamic GMM, the 
researcher found a positive effect with one lag and a negative effect with two lags of Tobin’s 
Q, for which the dynamic GMM detected this unobservable heterogeneity. However, the 
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coefficient of managerial ownership is very weak with Tobin’s Q, which indicated that the 
relationship may be non-existent. 
The interview results supported the regression results, which indicate that managerial 
ownership with large shares in the company leads to increased firm performance, because 
these managers take care of their shares and investments in the company. However, a number 
of participants suggested that managerial ownership has a negative effect upon firm 
performance and tends to destroy the firm’s value, because managerial owners receive higher 
salaries and some advantages such as travel expenses, bonuses, and tuition fees for their 
children and do not care about the performance of the company just because they own 1000 
shares (the requirement to become a board member).  
9.5.2.2 Family or individual ownership 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s agency theory argued that ownership concentration leads to 
reduced monitoring costs because large owners (family or individual) possess the incentive 
and expertise to monitor the managers (as cited in Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006). Most of the 
literature suggested that the relationship between family or individual ownership is positively 
related to firm performance. Exceptions (for example, Shyu, 2011) appear to relate to 
situations where the size of the family ownership interest is so large relative to non-family 
ownership that a situation referred to as “expropriation of the minority” (La Porta et al., 
1999) may be occurring, in which the family looks after its own interests to such an extent 
that residual profits available for minority shareholders are limited. 
Based on ROA, the current study found a highly negative significant relationship between 
family or individual ownership and ROA. This result indicated poor legal investor protection 
in some developing countries (Omran et al., 2008). Omran et al. (2008) found that family or 
individual ownership has a negative and significant impact on firm performance. This result 
indicates that family ownership interest appears to expropriate the minority, which means the 
family looks after its own interests to such an extent that residual profits available for 
minority shareholders are limited (La Porta et al., 1999; Shyu, 2011). Our results related to 
family or individual ownership based on the ROA still remain with the same sign (negative) 
after controlling for endogeneity and using a dynamic GMM that is controlled by one and 
two lags of ROA.  
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On the other hand, the current study found an insignificant relationship between family or 
individual ownership and Tobin’s Q. However, in the dynamic GMM, the relationship 
between family or individual ownership and Tobin’s is a significantly negative but weak 
coefficient. This situation illustrates the bias that may arise from ignoring the dynamic 
relationship between family or individual ownership, past ROA, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
The interview results did not support the regression analysis with regards to family or 
individual ownership. The interview data showed that family or individual ownership has a 
strong and powerful role in increasing firm value and can affect firm performance in a 
positive way. These results are inconsistent with the quantitative results; this may be because 
the family or individual is not very well qualified and lacks the expertise to control and make 
important decision in the company and, therefore, may be making wrong decisions that 
decrease the firm’s performance. 
9.5.2.3 Government ownership 
Government ownership looks at social and political policy goals rather than profit 
maximization (Sun et al., 2002). In Saudi Arabia, most of the government ownership is 
distributed in the utilities, servicing, and petrochemical sectors to enhance infrastructure and 
the welfare of the citizens. According to Sun et al. (2002), there is a conflict between the 
government’s objectives and the firm’s objectives: the government seeks to maximise welfare 
maximization, whereas firms seek to maximise profit. This conflict leads to agency problems 
and may be increase costs. Eng and Mak (2003) (as cited in Sulong and Nor, 2010) noted that 
agency costs are higher in firms that are primarily owned by the government, because they 
produce conflicts of interest between the pure profit goals of commercial firms and goals that 
are related to the national interest. 
Regarding the regression analysis, this study found a highly positive significant relationship 
between government ownership and firm performance, even after controlling for 
endogeneity. Our results are supported by the findings of Sun et al. (2002) and Omran et al. 
(2008), who examined the relationship between government ownership and firm performance 
and found a positive relationship. In addition, the Saudi government supports and funds the 
Saudi stock market to achieve better performance by owning a substantial portion of the 
companies listed in Saudi capital market, and this argument explains the strong positive 
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relationship between firm performance and government ownership. In addition, the existence 
of board members who represent any government agencies that own shares in the company 
provides the government with the incentive and power to monitor and control management as 
well as plays a significant role in corporate governance (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
The interview results interpret and support the results from the quantitative data. Many of the 
participants argued that the existence of government ownership in a company indicates that 
this firm has a good long-term plan, good feasibility studies, and also a good corporate 
governance system. This kind of ownership attracts more investors and reassures minority 
shareholders, which in turn increases firm performance for the company for the capital 
market, because the government supports and funds the capital market to make it more active 
and develop it into a market that attracts foreign and local investors. 
9.5.2.4 Foreign ownership 
Foreign investors have more of the necessary sufficient experience and governance skills to 
reduce monitoring and agency cost problems in a corporation and provide corporations with 
sufficient resources (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Djankov, 1999; Frydman et al., 1997). The 
results related to foreign ownership can be explained with two measures of firm performance. 
The first measure is ROA. The results dependent on ROA indicated that the relationship 
between ROA and foreign ownership was negative in the past (ROA is backward-looking). 
These results are acceptable, especially in the Saudi capital market, because the Saudi 
Arabian stock market does not seem ready to receive foreign investment, whereas Saudi 
companies seek infrastructural contributions from the government and, after that, seek to 
attract foreign investment. Perhaps foreign firms entered into competition with government 
agencies in a futile attempt to control some of the listed companies and lost, thus destroying 
the firm’s performance.  
The second measure is Tobin’s Q (forward-looking). The results that depend on Tobin’s Q 
reveal a highly positive significant relationship between foreign ownership and Tobin’s Q. 
After controlling for endogeneity, the dynamic GMM still found a positive relationship; 
however, the coefficient on foreign ownership that related to Tobin’s Q is very weak with one 
lag and there is no relationship at all with two lags. These results indicated that the companies 
listed in the Saudi capital market seek openness to the international markets and to attract 
foreign investment, which has a positive effect on market valuation in Saudi Arabia. The 
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interview results mentioned that foreign ownership is very important to improve and develop 
the emerging market. However, they also believed that the foreign ownership did not have 
any significant effect, for the present, in Saudi Arabia.  
9.5.2.5 Financial firms ownership 
Financial firms play an important and pivotal role in business because they are the major 
source of external funds for firms (Ang et al., 2000). In addition, external shareholders 
(financial or bank ownership) have a higher degree of control and therefore have a good 
position to enforce a high level of productivity performance (Nickell et al., 1997). In Saudi 
Arabia, financial firms own most of the shares of the banking and insurance sectors listed in 
the capital market. This study excluded the banking and insurance sectors from the data, 
which should have an insignificant effect on firm performance.  
This study revealed an insignificant relationship between financial firms ownership and firm 
performance based on both ROA and Tobin’s Q. The reason for the insignificant relationship 
between financial firms ownership and ROA is that the majority of the financial firms own 
the shares in the banking and insurance corporations and our data contains all companies 
listed in the Saudi stock market, excluding the banking and insurance corporations. 
Moreover, financial firm ownership has a strong effect on banking and insurance 
corporations. However, in the dynamic GMM, the relationship between financial firms 
ownership and ROA is highly negatively significant. This situation illustrates the bias that 
may arise from ignoring the dynamic relationship between financial firms ownership, past 
ROA, and unobserved heterogeneity. This finding is along the same line as the finding of 
Morck et al. (2000) and Lin et al. (2009), who found that bank ownership hurt firm 
performance. Actually, our results support the argument of Lin et al. (2009), who argued that 
financial firms (bank) ownership destroys company performance due to inefficient borrowing 
and investment policies. In contrast, the dynamic GMM revealed the relationship between 
financial firms ownership and ROA to be highly positive significant, which indicates that 
financial firms ownership may be have a positive effect on the market value in the near 
future. 
The interview results indicated that majority financial firm ownership produced mixed effects 
depending on the type of ownership. The majority of participants suggested that, when 
financial firms own large blocks of a company, they seek to enhance the firm performance by 
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supporting the listed companies with low-interest funds. On the other hand, some participants 
did not invest their money in companies that are primarily owned by a bank or financial firm 
because the owner may destroy the firm if it cannot repay the loan given to it by the majority-
owning bank. 
9.5.2.6 Non-financial firms ownership  
Gorton and Schmid (2000) argued that outside block shareholders played a vital role as 
monitors of management because the size of these external shareholders gave them more 
incentive to oversee management and reduce the free-rider problems experienced by small 
shareholders, which led to reduce the cost of monitoring. La Porta et al. (1998) argued that 
large blockholders in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders solved 
the agency problem and received a good return on investment. However, large blockholders 
may work toward their interests without paying any attention or concern to the minority 
shareholders.  
Empirical studies on the relationship between non-financial firms ownership and firm 
performance have produced mixed results. Some of the literature, such as Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988), Mehran (1995), and Gorton and Schmid (2000), did not find any relationship 
for the period ending in 1974. However, some of the previous studies, such as Prowse (1992) 
and Morck et al. (2000), found a positive relationship. On the other hand, some scholars, such 
as Nickell et al. (1977), found a negative relationship between non-financial firms’ ownership 
and firm performance. 
The current study found a positive relationship between non-financial firms ownership and 
ROA before controlling for endogeneity. Actually, this result, as it pertains to non-financial 
firms ownership, did not reflect the actual results. However, after controlling for endogeneity 
in the dynamic GMM, the relationship between non-financial firms ownership and ROA is 
highly negative and significant. This dramatic sign flip illustrates the bias that may arise from 
ignoring the dynamic relationship between financial firms ownership, past ROA, and 
unobserved heterogeneity. Pham et al. (2011) used GMM and found a negative relationship 
between firm performance and non-financial firms ownership, but it was insignificant. Other 
literature, such as Lasfer (2002) and Davies et al. (2005), has found a negative relationship 
between large ownership and firm performance. Moreover, Mura (2007) used GMM as a 
methodology to permit simultaneous control for endogeneity of the independent variable and, 
Chapter Nine 
278 | P a g e  
General Discussion 
as a result, found a negative relationship between non-financial ownership and firm 
performance. On the other hand, the results in regard to Tobin’s Q were positive with all 
regression techniques, even after controlling for endogeneity.  
The interview results supported the findings regarding non-financial firms ownership. A 
number of participants suggested that some of the large shareholders, such as corporations, 
have a negative impact on firm performance because they seek to maximize their interests, 
which negatively affects minority shareholders and decreases firm performance.   
9.6 SUMMARY 
This study seeks to provide an overview of corporate governance in the business environment 
in Saudi Arabia. To this end, the researcher employs both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to elicit information from participants regarding the importance of corporate 
governance, the elements most in need of being developed, and the current corporate 
governance regulations or codes most in need of revision. The researcher also asks some 
questions related to the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance to 
support the results of the quantitative analysis. On the basis of the data analysis, this study 
proposes some results regarding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance in Saudi Arabia found mixed results. For example, board size found 
positive in the Saudi Arabia with concern on the quality rather than quantity. Non-executive 
members should have knowledge and experience to improve firm performance. Family board 
members have a positive effect on firm performance. Board of directors sub-committees 
members must be non-executive with good background to enhance firm performance. Royal 
family board members have a vital role that may be lead to increase firm value. The 
relationship between large ownership and firm performance is ambiguous that depends on the 
identity ownership.  
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to summarise the main findings of this research. It 
highlights the contribution of this study through the findings from both methods that were 
used in this study. In addition, this chapter indentifies some limitations that faced the 
researcher during the PhD process, followed by a number of recommendations and 
suggestions for future research. 
10.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
The main findings of this research can be summarised in the following main points: 
 How is corporate governance understood in the Saudi Arabian environment? 
1. The definition of Corporate governance reflects the interests and positions of the 
stakeholders. The participants divided into two main groups. The first group is 
focused on the internal process of corporate governance and is concerned with the 
responsibilities of the board of directors to manage the company using best practices 
to protect the shareholders’ interests, based upon an agency perspective. The second 
group is adopted with more concern for all stakeholders related to the company. Both 
of these groups agree with Hussain and Mallin (2002), who stated that the definition 
of corporate governance implies that it provides a system of controls within the 
company, sets the relationship between the board of directors/shareholders/other 
stakeholders, and that the company is being managed according to the interests of 
both shareholders and stakeholders.  
2. The existence of corporate governance regulations provides the shareholders with a 
greater level of comfort regarding their investments, attracts foreign investors, leads 
to enhancement of the macroeconomics of the country as well as enhancement of 
trustworthy capital markets, decreases investment risks and lowers levels of company 
corruption. 
 What is the level of compliance with corporate governance provisions of Saudi 
Arabia among Saudi Arabian listed companies? 
Listed companies in the Saudi capital market are legally obliged to disclose 
compliance with the corporate governance regulations that are issued by the Capital 
Chapter Ten 
281 | P a g e  
Conclusion 
Market Authority in Saudi Arabia. However, these regulations were issued at the end 
of 2006 as guidelines and the mandatory adherence of these regulations came in many 
steps. The researcher noted that from 2007 until the end of 2009 there was a number 
of listed companies with a low level of compliance with the regulations of corporate 
governance. From 2010, most of the listed companies were in compliance with all 
mandatory regulations. Honestly, there are a few listed companies which did not 
comply with some of the regulations, which led the Capital Market Authority to 
punish these companies, and to prevent them from registering in the capital market. 
From the statistical analysis, it is apparent that there are missing data in 2007, 2008, 
and 2009. Such data would reflect that there is a number of listed companies which 
did not comply with the corporate governance regulations that were issued from the 
Capital Market Authority. 
 What are the main obstacles to corporate governance, as applied through the new 
regulations of the Saudi capital market? 
Lack of awareness, cost and time are the most frequently faced difficulties and 
obstacles that interfere with corporate governance practices in the companies. 
 What are the main elements that corporate governance regulations need to improve 
and develop?  
1. The majority of interviewees demanded that the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
issue its manuals written in the simplest language, in order to make it easier for all 
stakeholders to understand the current regulations. 
2. Most participants considered disclosure and transparency to be among the 
elements most in need of improvement and development. 
3. To improve the current regulation of corporate governance, the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority should invite foreign members from international bodies, such 
as the OECD, UK and US agencies, to develop the current regulations in a way 
that achieves best practices. 
 Is there any relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance? If so, what are its effects? 
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1. This study found a significant positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance only with ROA, which is consistent with the interviewees results, 
which indicated that there is a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance and a positive effect from concern for quality rather than quantity. 
Most of the emerging market participants found that the relationship between 
board size and performance is a positive one, which is consistent with this study, 
signifying that most emerging market participants require large board size with 
more resources, experience and skills. 
2. There is no significant relationship between non-executive members and firm 
performance under the OLS model. Based on the 2SLS and GMM model after 
controlling for endogeneity, we found a significant relationship with firm 
performance. Most of the participants suggested that non-executive members 
should have knowledge and experience that helps to improve firm performance. 
On the other hand, some of the participants believed that some of the listed 
companies had appointed wealthy non-executives with good relationships with 
large shareholders, but who lack sufficient experience or knowledge to monitor 
the company, leading to bad performance. 
3. This study found a positive relationship between family board members and firm 
performance based on ROA only. However, using the dynamic GMM model, 
which uses two lags of the Tobin’s Q as a control factor, we found a highly 
negative significant relationship between family members. Most of the 
interviewees mentioned a positive relationship between having a family board 
member and the firm’s performance. This positive relationship occurs when the 
family board member cares about the family’s investments and reputation. 
4. This study found a positive relationship between royal family board members and 
firm performance under the static model. However, the results after controlling for 
endogeneity, which depends on the GMM, indicated a negative relationship 
between royal family board members and firm performance. The sign flip is 
interesting and explains the bias that may arise from ignoring the unobservable 
heterogeneity and dynamics related to past performance. The interviewees 
mentioned that the royal family members who hold a significant number of shares 
have the power to increase the investment in the company by giving the company 
a good reputation, which leads to better performance in the future. On the other 
hand, another type of royal family member who acts as a non-executive without 
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owning a large number of shares may lead to bad performance because of a lack 
of experience and skill. 
5. This study found an insignificant relationship between board sub-committees and 
firm performance under the static model. However, after controlling for 
endogeneity and applying the dynamic GMM, the board sub-committees took two 
paths. The results that depend on ROA (backward-looking) were significant and 
highly positive. In contrast, the Tobin’s Q (forward-looking) achieved highly 
significant negative results. The interview results mentioned that to gain high 
quality sub-committee performance, boards of directors should appoint just one or 
two members to each sub-committee to reduce conflict among members and 
facilitate good decision-making.  
6. The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is positive 
with ROA only in the static model. Also, there were positive effects on both 
measures under the dynamic GMM. The interviewees suggested that managerial 
ownership with a large number of shares in the company leads to increased firm 
performance, because such managers take care of their shares and investments in 
the company. 
7. The current study found a highly negative significant relationship between family 
or individual ownership and ROA. Our results related to family or individual 
ownership based on the ROA still remain with the same sign (negative) after 
controlling for endogeneity and using a dynamic GMM controlled by one and two 
lags of ROA. The results regarding Tobin's Q were found to be significantly 
negative with family or individual ownership under the GMM model. The 
interview data analysis reflected that family or individual ownership plays a 
powerful role in enhancing firm value and can positively affect firm performance. 
The results indicated that family ownership seems to have a negative effect on 
firm performance and just concerns itself with family interests while destroying 
minority interests. 
8. This study found a highly positive significant relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance, even after controlling for endogeneity. 
Government ownership plays a vital role in the emerging markets. The existence 
of government ownership in a company indicates that the firm has a good long-
term plan, good feasibility studies and a good corporate governance system. 
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9. The relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is mixed in this 
study, depending on different measures and models. Based on ROA, the study 
found a negative relationship between foreign ownership and ROA. However, 
based on Tobin's Q it found a positive relationship with foreign ownership. The 
interview results indicated that foreign ownership is very important for improving 
and developing in emerging markets. However, the belief also exists that foreign 
ownership does not have any significant effect, for the present, in Saudi Arabia. 
10. This study revealed an insignificant relationship between the ownership of 
financial firms and firm performance. However, in the dynamic GMM the 
relationship between the ownership of a financial firm and the firm’s performance 
is significant (negative with ROA, and positive with TQ). Some interviewees 
believe that a financial firm’s ownership can lead to destruction of the firm, 
because the owners might loan the company money at high interest rates and the 
company may not be able to repay such a loan, leading to destruction of the 
company.  
11. The current study found a positive relationship between ownership by non-
financial firms and firm performance before controlling for endogeneity. 
However, after controlling for endogeneity in the dynamic GMM, the relationship 
between ownership by non-financial firms and ROA is highly negative and 
significant. On the other hand, the results with regards to Tobin’s Q were positive 
under the GMM model. The interviewees suggested that ownership by a non-
financial firm (corporation) has a negative impact on a firm’s performance 
because such an owner seeks to maximize its own interests, which negatively 
affects minority shareholders and decreases firm performance. 
The table below summarises the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance. 
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Table ‎10-1 Summary of the findings 
Variables Quantitative findings Qualitative findings 
OLS 2SLS GMM 
Board size Significant positive 
relation to ROA only 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA only 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA only 
The majority of interviewees supported the 
positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance, as well as concern for quality 
rather than quantity.  
Non-executive 
members 
None Significant negative 
relation with ROA only 
Significant negative 
relation with ROA, and 
significant positive 
relation with TQ, with 
two years of lag 
Most of the participants suggested that non-
executive members should have knowledge and 
experience that helps to improve firm 
performance. 
Family board members Significant positive 
relation to ROA only 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA only 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA only, 
and significant negative 
relation with TQ, with 
two years of lag 
Family members would be more careful about 
family investments and have the desire to 
increase the firm’s performance. 
Royal family board 
members 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA 
only 
Significant positive 
relation 
Significant negative 
relation  
Royal family members who hold large shares 
play a vital role the company. 
Board sub-committees None None Significant positive 
relation with ROA, and 
significant negative 
relation with TQ 
The interviewees mentioned that the majority of 
the sub-committee members must be non-
executive and have backgrounds related to the 
function of the sub-committee, which means 
appointing specialized members in order for 
performance to be of high quality. 
 
Managerial ownership Significant positive 
relation with ROA 
only 
Significant positive 
relation with ROA only 
Significant positive 
relation with both 
measures, but negative 
significance with TQ, 
with two years of lag 
Managerial ownership with large shares in the 
company leads to increased firm performance, 
because these managers protect their shares and 
investments in the company. 
Family or individual 
ownership 
Significant negative 
relation with ROA 
None Significant negative 
relation 
Family or individual owners have a strong and 
powerful role in increasing firm value and can 
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only affect firm performance in a positive way; the 
interview results are inconsistent with the 
quantitative results.  
Government ownership Significant positive 
relation 
Significant positive 
relation 
Significant positive 
relation 
The existence of government ownership in a 
company indicates that this firm has a good 
long-term plan, good feasibility studies, and also 
a good corporate governance system, all of 
which lead to better performance. 
Foreign ownership Significant negative 
relation with ROA, 
significant positive 
relation with TQ 
Significant positive 
relation with TQ only 
Significant negative 
relation with ROA, and 
significant positive 
relation with TQ with 
one lag and no 
relationship with two 
lags 
Foreign ownership is a very important factor in 
terms of improving the emerging market. The 
data from the interviews demonstrated that 
foreign ownership did not have any significant 
effect, at present, in Saudi Arabia. 
Financial ownership None None Significant negative 
relation with ROA, and 
significant positive  
relation with TQ 
When a financial firm owns large blocks of a 
company, it leads to enhancement of the firm’s 
performance through support of the listed 
companies through low-interest funds. However, 
some of interviewees believe that the existence 
of ownership by a financial firm will lead to 
destruction of the company 
Non-financial 
ownership 
Significant positive 
relation 
Significant positive 
relation 
Significant negative 
relation with ROA, and 
significant positive 
relation with TQ 
The large shareholders, such as corporations, 
have a negative impact on firm performance 
because they seek to maximize their interests. 
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10.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The main contribution of this study is that it considers the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance in Saudi Arabia for the listed companies in 
the Saudi capital market for the period 2007 to 2011. This study fills the significant gap in the 
literature regarding corporate governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia generally, and 
particularly the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Saudi 
Arabia. My hope is that this study provides a useful reference to study and examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in the MENA 
region, and also serves as a reference for the regulators, researchers, listed companies, and 
different stakeholders who have research interests in the corporate governance field in Saudi 
Arabia.  
There is a limit number of studies concerned with the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in the MENA region, e.g. (Al-Saidi, 2010; El Mehdi, 2007; 
Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006; Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007). However, each of those researchers took 
corporate governance and firm performance among different data (period and place). This 
means that the results from those studies may not be applicable to other countries, for 
example Saudi Arabia, because each country has specific features and corporate governance 
codes that are used to regulate the listed companies in the capital market. In addition, the 
ownership structures in Saudi Arabia differ from other countries; various families or 
individuals own shares in the listed companies in the Saudi capital market, and also the 
government owns significant shares in the some of the listed companies. These differences 
led the researcher to study the corporate governance and firm performance in listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia, and to fill the gap in the literature that concerns the study of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
The corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia were issued at the end of 2006. It has 
been seven years since the establishment of these regulations until now. This study seeks to 
understand corporate governance within the Saudi Arabian business environment by applying 
semi-structured interviews with some of the corporate governance stakeholders. In addition, 
these interviews aim to evaluate the current practices of corporate governance and reveal how 
it can improve and develop. These semi-structured interviews can be used as guidelines that 
help decision makers and board of directors members to develop corporate governance 
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mechanisms regarding some issues related to boards of directors and ownership structures in 
Saudi Arabian listed companies. 
Most of the previous studies that concerned the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance used statistical and econometric tests to examine this 
relationship. However, the current study used triangulation (mixed methods, quantitative, and 
qualitative). This researcher examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performances by using different econometric models. Moreover, the 
researcher conducted semi-structured interviews to explain in more detail the results of the 
quantitative analysis to examine the relationship between variables, and to help interpret the 
unexplained results from the quantitative data. 
This study used two main methodological econometrics tests, static and dynamic, with three 
different approaches (OLS, 2SLS, and GMM). Most of the previous studies concerned the 
OLS approach and 2SLS (static model). A few studies used the dynamic GMM model to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
This study provided three different types of regression models (OLS, 2SLS, and GMM) and 
compared the results between these models, while examining the endogeneity problem and 
unobserved heterogeneity that were detected by the dynamic GMM. Also, the researcher  
used the dynamic GMM to produce efficient and consistent estimations of the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance as a developing area of 
research. 
This current study attempted to build a full picture of the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, by using various mechanisms of board of directors and 
ownership structures. Most of the previous studies concerned just some mechanisms or 
focused on just the board of directors or ownership structures separately. However, this study 
examined this relationship by using most of the ownership structures and board of directors 
structures, and put them together in one model to see how can these variables work together 
and affect firm performance. Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by 
illustrating how corporate governance mechanisms can affect each other (endogeneity and 
causality).  
Finally, this current study contributes to the literature by using a new variable, which is the 
presence of a royal family member on the board. The royal family board members act as a 
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vital role to direct and manage listed companies in the Saudi capital market. This study used 
this variable as a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the board of directors have a 
member from the royal family, and 0 otherwise. To my knowledge, this study is the first 
study to consider royal family board members as one of the board of directors structures, in 
order to build a new avenue for this area of research. 
10.4 LIMITATIONS 
The researcher faced a number of important limitations faced the researcher in this thesis. 
One of the chief difficulties was collecting data manually from the Tadawul and Capital 
Market Authority websites, and from board of directors’ reports, and entering them into the 
Excel spreadsheet. This process took a long time; the researcher had data from five years, 
from a large number of companies, and each observation included fifteen variables. 
Unfortunately, there are no ready data for research purposes. The limitation is the reduction 
in the data’s reliability due to the risk errors in entering data into the spreadsheet. 
Nevertheless, the researcher has tried to reduce this limitation by having the data checked by 
another person. 
The second limitation was the difficulty of finding knowledgable members who had 
knowledge and information about corporate governance. Furthermore, when we did find a 
suitable member, communicating and arranging appointments with this member was very 
difficult, and it took a long time to find a suitable time and meet for a short time. This is 
because these types of members are very busy people, including board of directors members, 
large shareholders, auditors, regulators, and government agencies.  
The third limitation was that some of the interviewees did not give me permission to record 
our conversations. Unfortunately, this problem appeared in most of the developing countries 
(Alghamdi, 2012). Surprisingly, one of interviewees asked me to stop the recording when I 
asked about his opinion on a specific topic. The danger is that the interview data may have 
reduced reliability, because some notes taken may be inaccurate and incomplete, without a 
recording of what was actually said. 
The fourth limitation is that Saudi Arabia is a large country, and the companies are widely 
distributed. The researcher focused on the companies located in the eastern region, which 
includes industrial cities such as Jubail and Dammam. In addition, the researcher conducted 
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interviews with some participants in Riyadh, which included the Capital Market Authority 
and government agencies. There are a number of companies located in the western region, 
and the researcher was not able to conduct interviews with the boards of directors in those 
companies because of the study’s time frame (just three months) and the cost of travel to the 
western region. The limitation is the small sample size of the interview data, so when we 
have more time we may conduct interviews with more interviewees and participants from 
other cities and regions. 
The fifth limitation, unfortunately, is that the findings of this research cannot be generalised 
to other countries from the Arabian Gulf or the Middle East and North Africa regions. The 
results of this study are limited to the listed companies in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is 
impossible to also generalise the results to non-listed companies or non-profit organizations. 
Each country or sectors have specific features and regulations that regulate and control them.  
The sixth limitation is that there are a lot of missing data in the early years of studies because 
of a lack of disclosure regarding corporate governance variables. Also, some control variables 
that may have an effect on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance are not involved in this study because the lack of disclosure of these data, such 
as data on R&D. 
10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this thesis, some recommendations can be concluded: 
 General Recommendations 
1. All parts of the corporate governance regulation that were issued by the Capital 
Market Authority should be mandatory. 
2. The Capital Market Authority should publish the regulations of corporate governance 
with more details in clear, easily understood language, to help the companies 
implement them correctly and achieve corporate governance goals. 
3. Listed companies should be disclosed to the board of directors in English to enable 
the foreign investors to get more details about the company. 
4. More effort should be make to consider disclosure and transparency. These two 
elements are very important and have a vital role in increasing investments in the 
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companies, attracting foreign investors, and improving the reputation of the Saudi 
capital market. 
5. The Capital Market Authority is responsible for regulating and controlling the Saudi 
capital market. This authority has one department to take care of the corporate 
governance for listed companies. It is essential to establish a separate and independent 
agency with more responsibility to look after corporate governance for listed, non-
listed, and non-profits firms.  
6. Since foreign ownership is very important to improve and develop the Saudi capital 
market, the Capital Market Authority should facilitate the procedures for the entry of 
foreign investors to the Saudi capital market. 
7. The corporate governance regulations need to be developed and improved regularly 
by revising the current codes to be able to cope with changes in economic conditions.  
8. The Saudi Capital Market Authority should invite foreign members from international 
bodies, such as the OECD, UK, and US agencies, to develop the current regulations to 
reach the best practices. 
 Research and Training 
1. There is a lack of central research in Saudi Arabia for overseeing corporate 
governance. These types of central research (by official bodies) have a vital role to 
improve and develop corporate governance mechanisms by providing the companies 
and stakeholders with a new research area in corporate governance and to assist them 
to prepare some training courses for directors and employees.   
2. This study recommends increasing the awareness of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia through seminars that explain the positive side of corporate governance for 
developing the Saudi economy, and the Saudi market particularly. These efforts will 
ensure a decrease in investment risk and lower levels of company corruption. 
 Specific Regulations 
1. The Saudi regulations of corporate governance provided that the board size should be 
not less than three and not more than eleven members. The board composition should 
be concerned with the quality of the board members with more knowledge, 
experience, and skills, rather than number of directors alone. 
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2. The majority of the subcommittee members must be non-executive and have 
backgrounds related to the function of the sub-committee, which means appointing 
specialized members who are capable of high-quality performance. 
3. Put limitations on the bonus and travel expenses for the managerial staff, because 
when they receive higher salaries and some advantages, such as travel expenses, 
bonuses are unrelated to the performance of the company. Also, this study 
recommends increasing the number of shares required to become a board member, as 
1000 shares are insignificant and perhaps do not provide the board members with 
enough incentive to pay attention to the company's performance. 
 More Regulations (More details) 
1. There are no clear criteria to appoint non-executive members to the boards, so this 
research recommends that the Capital Market Authority issue regulations that explain 
the requirement for appointing non-executive members. 
2. There are a number of families, individuals, and large blockholders (corporations) that 
own a significant number of shares in many listed companies in the Saudi capital 
market. This thesis recommends more legal protection for the minority shareholders’ 
interests so they are protected from greed from the large shareholders. 
3. This study recommends increased activation of the board sub-committees, by 
enhancing the role of the audit, nomination, and remuneration sub-committees. 
Furthermore, it recommends the issuance of some mandatory regulations to appoint 
members to those sub-committees, and to activate the role of the board secretaries by 
providing them with some skills and training to be able to do their jobs to the fullest 
extent. 
10.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several potential avenues for future research and improvement in the area of 
corporate governance. One possible avenue for future research is to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using data from a cross-
section of Arabian Gulf markets. Aside from Kuwait, all of the Arabian Gulf countries 
currently have specific codes of corporate governance. The researcher suggest that a cross-
sectional study of one specific point or period be conducted and that the results of the cross-
sectional study be compared. This procedure may enhance researchers’ understanding of 
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corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm performance throughout the 
countries of the Arabian Gulf.  
The main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance for the listed companies in the Saudi capital market. The 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance for non-listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia may also be worth investigating. In addition, the relationship 
between corporate governance and organisation performance in non-profit organizations in 
Saudi Arabia should be explored. The information gleaned from these studies will fill gaps in 
the current knowledge base and are likely to open up new avenues of research for corporate 
governance studies. 
Future research can attempt to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance utilizing new means of measuring performance. Most 
previous studies focus on financial performance using ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q. Based on 
this study, the researcher recommends using efficiency as a measure of firm performance and 
adopting the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model as a tool with which to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Also, the 
researcher suggests using others measures of firm performance such as internal rate of return, 
cash flow return on investment, and discounted cash flow. 
A number of listed companies have women on the board of directors. The role that female 
board members play in listed companies in Saudi Arabia is a new variable in the country. 
However, literature about female board members (board diversity) in the emerging market is 
limited, which suggest the relationship between female board members and firm performance 
as one potential area of future research.  
Future research can also be conducted in the banking and insurance sectors (financial firms) 
with an emphasis on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. Most of the literature excludes financial firms from the sample investigated. 
The results of this study suggest that the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance be re-examined with the inclusion of financial firms in the 
sample. 
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This study focused on the internal corporate governance mechanisms (specifically, the 
structure of the board of directors and ownership structure) and their effect on firm 
performance. One important area of future research involves determining the role that 
external corporate governance mechanisms play, such as the takeover market and the legal 
and regulatory system, including audit, with regard to firm performance.  
10.7  SUMMARY 
This is the final chapter of this thesis. This thesis examined the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance through listed companies in the 
Saudi capital market. This study used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
to examine this relationship. 
Using quantitative analysis, this study used three different models to examine this 
relationship: OLS, 2SLS, and GMM. This study also examined the endogeneity and detected 
unobserved heterogeneity by using dynamic GMM to get more consistent results. This study 
found that a number of corporate governance mechanisms have significant effects on firm 
performance, while some variables did not have any significant effect. When I applied 
dynamic GMM, I found some unobserved heterogeneity that impacted the relationship 
between this variable and firm performance.  
Furthermore, based on the qualitative analysis, this study employed semi-structured 
interviews to support the results of the quantitative data, and also to cover some points that 
were not covered by the quantitative data and to explore in more detail the corporate 
governance mechanisms in Saudi Arabia. Most of the participants suggested that corporate 
governance definition must establish the relationship between board of directors, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders, and they recommended managing the company in the 
interests of both shareholders and stakeholders. Disclosure and transparency must be 
improved and developed according to the listed companies, including increasing the 
awareness of corporate governance in the Saudi Arabian business environment.  
On the basis of the interview analysis, this study proposed main results regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in Saudi 
Arabia: 
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1. Board size has a positive relationship with firm performacne in Saudi Arabia, with 
greater emphasis on the quality of the board members rather than the quantity. 
2. Non-executive members should have knowledge and experience that help to improve 
firm performance.  
3. The interviewees suggested that the relationship between the family board member 
and firm performance is positive, because a family member would be more careful 
about family investments and have a desire to increase the firm’s performance. 
4. The interviewees suggested that the sub-committee members must be non-executive 
and have backgrounds related to the function of the sub-committee, which means 
appointing specialized members in order for performance to be of high quality. 
5. The interviewees did not perceive that all royal family members play a vital role on 
the board of directors; some of the companies invite royal family board members to 
enhance their reputations and they did not have relevant knowledge and experience, 
which may lead to a decrease in firm performance. 
6. The relationship between large owners and firm performance is ambiguous. 
Sometimes, large ownership is believed to have a positive impact on firm 
performance and other times a negative impact. This relationship depends on industry 
type, the portion of the large shareholders, and the type of large shareholder. 
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Appendix 1:  Interview questions 
 
A- General questions about the concepts of corporate governance: 
1- In your own words, what is the definition of corporate governance? 
How would you define corporate governance? 
What do you understand to be the meaning of the term “Corporate 
Governance”? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
2- How is corporate governance currently regulated in Saudi Arabia? (directors 
and other stakeholders) 
3- Do you think the corporate governance code is important in principle for the 
companies listed in the Saudi Arabian capital market? Why do you think that? 
(board of directors and other stakeholders) 
4- Do you think the corporate governance code is actually useful in practice in 
Saudi Arabia?  Why? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
5- What is your overall evaluation of the corporate governance code in Saudi 
Arabia? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
6- Do you think that the current code of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
needs to be improved? What are the aspects that you think need to be improved 
the most and why? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
 
Turning to your own organisation: 
 
7- Do the corporate governance practices in your own organisation have any effect 
[or impact] on your own organizational work?  Think of both positive and 
negative effects. (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
8- Are you aware of [Do you know of] any difficulties that interfere with the 
practices of corporate governance in your company? (board of directors and 
other stakeholders) 
9- So based on your own experience, do you think that any provisions need to be 
added to (or, indeed, taken out of) the current Saudi corporate governance code? 
Please explain. (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
 
B- Board of Directors: 
 
1- In your own organisation, what are the responsibilities and roles of the board of 
directors? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
2- How is your board structured? Who is responsible for appointing board 
members?  Do you look for any particular qualification, experience, knowledge 
or ability when appointing board members? (board of directors) 
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3- Do you think there should be any requirements (such as business experience, 
knowledge, good contacts, qualifications) for the board members? (Other 
stakeholders). 
4- How many executive and non-executive directors does your company have? 
(board of directors) 
5-  What are the roles of the executive and non-executive directors? (board of 
directors and other stakeholders) 
6-  Do you think that the non-executive directors play a vital role in the company? 
Why do you think that? What are the requirements that influence the 
appointment of non-executive directors? (board of directors and other 
stakeholders) 
7- Do you think that there is any relationship between firm performance and the 
percentage of non-executive directors? Please explain the reasons and give 
more information. (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
8- Do you think that there is an optimal size for the board of directors?  If so, what 
is it? What are the main factors that may influence the size of the board of 
directors? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
9- Do you think that there is any relationship between firm performance and the 
size of the board of directors? Please explain the reasons and give more 
information. (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
10- Do you think that a family board member’s serving on the board plays a vital 
role in the board of directors? How? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
11- Is there any relationship between the service of a family board member and firm 
performance? Explain this relationship. (board of directors and other 
stakeholders) 
12- What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of a separation 
between the roles of the CEO and the Chairman? Do you prefer the CEO to 
serve as the board Chairman or not? Why? (board of directors and other 
stakeholders) 
13- What are the sub-committees of the board of directors at your company? Do 
you think that more sub-committees are needed or not? What is the effect of the 
sub-committees on financial performance? (board of directors and other 
stakeholders) 
 
C- Ownership Structure: 
 
1- What percentage of the shares should managers own?  Do you think that there is 
an optimal size for the percentage of shares owned by managers? (board of 
directors and other stakeholders) 
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2- Do you think that large managerial shareholdings are good or bad for the 
minority shareholders? Please give reasons for your answer. (board of directors 
and other stakeholders) 
3- Do you think that there is any relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance? How? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
 Many companies in Saudi Arabia have large blocks of their shares owned 
by particular types of shareholder, such as the government, financial firms, 
non-financial firms, foreign investors, and families or individuals.  Do you 
think that large blockholdings are good or bad for the minority 
shareholders?  Do you think that this applies for all types of blockholders or 
would you make distinctions between different types of blockholder? 
(board of directors and other stakeholders)  
4- Do you think that there is any relationship between large blockholders’ 
ownership described above and firm performance? How? (board of directors 
and other stakeholders) 
5- Do you think that ownership concentration creates problems in the Saudi capital 
market or not? Why? (board of directors and other stakeholders) 
Is there anything about corporate governance that we haven’t covered but that you want to 
tell me? 
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Appendix 2 : Corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabai 
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CAPITAL MARKET AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS 
IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority 
Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006 
dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006) 
based on the Capital Market Law 
issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 
dated 2/6/1424AH 
 
 
Amended by Resolution of the 
Board 
of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-10-
2010 
Dated 30/3/1431H corresponding to 
16/3/2010G 
 
 
 
 
 
English Translation of the Official Arabic 
Text 
 
Arabic is the official language of the Capital Market Authority 
 
 
 
The current version of these Rules, as may be amended, can be found aton 
the CMA website: www.cma.org.sa 
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PART 1 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
 
Article 1: Preamble 
 
 
a)  These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure 
their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure 
the protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of 
stakeholders. 
 
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies 
listed  in  the   Exchange  unless   any  other  regulations,  rules  or 
resolutions of the Board  of the  Authority provide for the binding 
effect of some of the provisions herein contained. 
 
 
c)  As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company  must 
disclose in the Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have 
been implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented 
as well as the reasons for not implementing them. 
 
 
 
Article 2: Definitions 
 
 
a)  Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear 
in the Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in 
the regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless 
otherwise stated in these regulations. 
 
 
b) For  the  purpose  of  implementing  these  regulations,  the  following 
expressions and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows 
unless the contrary intention appears: 
 
 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys 
complete independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute 
an infringement of such independence: 
 
 
1.  he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the 
company or any of its group. 
2.  Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or 
more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group. 
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3.  he/she, during the preceding two years,  has been a senior executive of 
the company or of any other company within that company’s group. 
4.  he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company 
or of any other company within that company’s group. 
 
 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the 
company or of any other company within that company’s group. 
 
 
6.  he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the 
company which he is nominated to be a member of its board. 
 
 
7.  If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with 
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 
preceding two years, had a controlling  interest in any such party. 
 
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not 
have a full-time management position at the company, or who does not 
receive monthly or yearly salary. 
 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
 
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as 
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
 
 
Accumulative  Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which 
gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds.   He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to 
divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes.  This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders 
to appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate 
votes for one nominee. 
 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of 
shareholders that does not control the company and hence they are unable to 
influence the company. 
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PART 2 
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
A  Shareholder  shall  be  entitled  to  all  rights  attached  to  the  share,  in 
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share 
of the company’s assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the General 
Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of 
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; 
the right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company’s interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to 
Information 
 
 
a)  The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify 
the procedures   and   precautions   that   are   necessary   for    the 
shareholders’ exercise of all their lawful rights. 
 
 
b)  All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their 
rights shall be made available and such information shall be 
comprehensive  and  accurate;  it  must  be  provided  and  updated 
regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use the 
most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation 
to providing information. 
 
Article 5
1
: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly 
 
 
a)  A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six 
months following the end of the company’s financial year. 
 
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of 
shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity 
share capital. 
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1 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (i) and (j) of Article 5 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G. 
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c)  Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and 
announced  by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting; 
invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange’ website, 
the company’s website and in two newspapers of voluminous 
distribution in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders. 
 
 
d) Shareholders   shall   be   allowed   the   opportunity   to   effectively 
participate and vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed 
about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure. 
 
 
e)  Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the 
greatest number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including 
inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time. 
 
 
f)  In preparing the General Assembly’s agenda, the Board of Directors 
shall take into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed 
in  that  agenda;  shareholders  holding  not  less  than  5%  of  the 
company’s shares are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. 
upon its preparation. 
 
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of 
the General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board 
members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the 
external auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a 
manner that does not prejudice the company’s interest. 
 
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by 
sufficient information to enable shareholders to make decisions. 
 
 
i)  Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General 
Assembly; the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of 
those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such 
meeting. 
 
 
j)  The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the 
General Assembly. 
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Article 6: Voting Rights 
a)   Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which 
shall not, in any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any 
action which might hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder 
must be afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise 
of such right. 
 
 
b)  In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board 
members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
 
 
c)  A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is 
not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the General Assembly on his behalf. 
 
 
d)  Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - 
e.g.  investment  funds-  shall  disclose  in  their  annual  reports  their 
voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material 
conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental 
rights in relation to their investments. 
 
 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
 
 
a)  The  Board  of  Directors  shall  lay  down  a  clear  policy  regarding 
dividends, in a manner that may realize the interests of shareholders 
and those of the company; shareholders shall be  informed of that 
policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto shall be 
made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
 
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of 
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares 
shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the 
records kept at the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the 
end of trading session on the day on which the General Assembly is 
convened. 
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PART 3 
 
 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
 
 
Article 8:Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
 
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 
supervisory rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law. 
 
 
 
Article 9 
2
: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report 
 
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the 
content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include the 
following: 
 
 
a)  The  implemented  provisions  of  these  Regulations  as  well  as  the 
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications 
for not implementing them. 
 
 
b)  Names  of  any  joint  stock  company  or  companies  in  which  the 
company Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of 
directors. 
 
 
c)  Formation  of  the  Board  of  Directors  and  classification  of  its 
members as follows: executive board member, non-executive board 
member, or independent board member. 
 
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions  and duties of the Board's main 
committees such as   the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their 
respective meetings. 
 
 
 
 
2   
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date 
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of the Board of the Capital Market Authority resolution mentioned above. 
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e)  Details  of  compensation  and  remuneration  paid  to  each  of  the 
following: 
1.  The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 
2.  The  Top  Five  executives  who  have  received  the  highest 
compensation and remuneration from the company.  The CEO 
and the chief finance officer shall be included if they are not 
within the top five. 
 
 
For the purpose of this paragraph, “compensation and 
remuneration” means salaries, allowances, profits and any of 
the same; annual and periodic bonuses related to performance; 
long or short- term incentive schemes; and any other rights in 
rem. 
 
 
f)  Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the 
company by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or 
judiciary body. 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control 
procedures of the company. 
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PART 4 
 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Article 10
3
: Main Functions of the Board of Directors 
Among the main functions of the Board is the fallowing: 
a)  Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and 
supervising their implementation; this includes: 
 
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the 
main work plans and the policy related to risk management, 
reviewing and updating of such policy. 
 
 
2. Determining  the  most  appropriate  capital  structure  of  the 
company, its strategies and financial objectives and approving 
its annual budgets. 
 
 
3. Supervising  the  main  capital  expenses  of  the  company  and 
acquisition/disposal of assets. 
 
 
4. Deciding  the  performance  objectives  to  be  achieved  and 
supervising the implementation thereof and the overall 
performance of the company. 
 
 
5. Reviewing  and  approving  the  organizational  and  functional 
structures of the company on a periodical basis. 
 
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this 
includes: 
 
 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of 
interest and remedy any possible cases of conflict by members of 
the Board of Directors, executive management and 
shareholders. This includes misuse of the  company’s assets 
 
 
3 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-33-2011) Dated 3/12/1432H 
corresponding to 30/10/2011G making paragraph (b) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2012. 
- The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
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corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 30/6/2013G. 
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and  facilities  and  the  arbitrary  disposition  resulting  from 
dealings with the related parties. 
 
 
2. Ensuring   the   integrity   of   the   financial   and   accounting 
procedures including procedures related to the preparation of 
the financial reports. 
 
 
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate 
for risk management by forecasting the risks that the company 
could encounter and disclosing them with transparency. 
 
 
4. Reviewing  annually  the  effectiveness  of  the  internal  control 
systems. 
 
 
c)  Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not 
contradict   the   provisions   of   this   regulation,   supervising   and 
monitoring in general the effectiveness of the code and amending it 
whenever necessary. 
 
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, 
for the membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them 
after they have been approved by the General Assembly. 
 
 
e) Outlining  a  written  policy  that  regulate  the  relationship  with 
stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective rights; in 
particular, such policy must cover the following: 
 
1. Mechanisms  for  indemnifying  the  stakeholders  in  case  of 
contravening their rights under the law and their respective 
contracts. 
 
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might 
arise between the company and the stakeholders. 
 
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with 
customers and suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of 
information related to them. 
 
4. A code of conduct for the company’s executives and employees 
compatible with the proper professional and ethical standards, 
and regulate their relationship with the stakeholders. The Board 
of Directors lays down procedures for supervising this code and 
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ensuring compliance there with. 
 
5. The Company’s social contributions. 
f)  Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company’s compliance 
with  the  laws  and  regulations  and  the  company’s  obligation  to 
disclose material information to shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendixes 
338 | P a g e  
 
Article 11 : Responsibilities of the Board 
 
 
a)  Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company’s Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers 
for the company’s management. The ultimate responsibility for the 
company  rests  with  the  Board  even  if  it  sets  up  committees  or 
delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors 
shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney. 
 
 
b)  The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated 
in the company’s Articles of Association. 
 
 
c)  The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible 
manner, in good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be 
based on sufficient information from the executive management, or 
from any other reliable source. 
 
 
d)  A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he 
undertakes to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the 
company, but not the interests of the group he represents or that which 
voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors. 
 
 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to 
the executive management and the procedures for taking any action 
and the validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters 
reserved for decision by the Board of Directors. The executive 
management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic reports on 
the exercise of the delegated powers. 
 
 
f)  The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for 
orienting the new board members of the company’s business and, in 
particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, 
where necessary. 
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g)  The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about 
the company is made available to all members of the Board of 
Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, 
to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an 
effective manner. 
 
 
h)  The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which 
spans more than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate 
of the company, or drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to 
do so by the company’s Articles of Association. In the case where the 
company’s Articles of Association includes no provisions to this 
respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General 
Assembly, unless such acts fall within the normal scope of the 
company’s business. 
 
 
 
Article 12 
4
: Formation of the Board 
 
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
 
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number 
of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall 
not be less than three and not more than eleven. 
 
 
b)  The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of 
Directors for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association 
of the company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three 
years. Unless otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of 
the company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
 
 
c)  The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non- 
executive members. 
 
 
d)  It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board 
of Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as 
 
 
 
 
4 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
-  The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
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corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraph (g) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G. 
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the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the 
general manager. 
 
 
e)  The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. 
 
 
f)  The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner 
in which membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all 
times, the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members 
of the Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association 
provide otherwise. 
 
 
g)  On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways 
of termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and 
the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination. 
 
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the 
Board of Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the 
same time. 
 
 
i) Judicial  person  who  is  entitled  under  the  company’s  Articles  of 
Association to appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not 
entitled  to  nomination  vote  of  other  members  of  the  Board  of 
Directors. 
 
 
 
Article 13: Committees of the Board 
 
 
a)  A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with 
the company’s requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the 
Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner. 
 
 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors 
shall be according to general procedures laid down by the Board, 
indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee, 
and the manner in which the Board monitors its activities. The 
committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities  of  such  committees  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  activities 
entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter 
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alia,    the    Audit    Committee,    Nomination    and    Remuneration 
Committee. 
 
 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of 
Directors shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with 
activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals 
concluded by related parties, nomination to membership of the Board, 
appointment  of  executive  directors,  and  determination  of 
remuneration. 
 
 
 
Article 14 
5
: Audit Committee 
a)  The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the 
“Audit  Committee”.    Its  members  shall  not  be  less  than  three, 
including a specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive 
board members are not eligible for Audit Committee membership. 
 
 
b)  The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation 
of the Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of 
the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and the 
procedure to be followed by the Committee. 
 
 
c)  The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the 
following: 
 
 
1. To supervise the company’s internal audit department to ensure 
its effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified 
by the Board of Directors. 
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written 
report on such audit and its recommendations with respect to it. 
 
 
3. To   review   the   internal   audit   reports   and   pursue   the 
implementation  of the  corrective measures  in  respect  of the 
comments included in them. 
 
 
4. To  recommend  to  the  Board  of  Directors  the  appointment, 
dismissal and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any 
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5 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory 
on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
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such   recommendation,   regard   must   be   made   to   their 
independence. 
 
 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve 
any activity beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to 
them during the performance of their duties. 
 
 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and 
make any comments thereon. 
 
 
7. To review the external auditor’s comments on the financial 
statements and follow up the actions taken about them. 
 
 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to 
presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion and 
recommendations with respect thereto. 
 
 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board 
of Directors of any recommendation regarding them. 
 
 
 
Article 15
6
: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
a)  The  Board  of  Directors  shall  set  up  a  committee  to  be  named 
“Nomination and Remuneration Committee”. 
 
 
b)  The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of 
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, terms of office and the 
procedure to be followed by such committee. 
 
 
c)  The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee include the following: 
 
 
1. Recommend   to   the   Board   of   Directors   appointments   to 
membership of the Board in accordance with the approved policies 
and standards; the Committee shall ensure that no person who has 
been  previously  convicted  of  any  offense  affecting  honor  or 
honesty is nominated for such membership. 
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6 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 30/3/1431H 
corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on 
all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2011G. 
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2. Annual   review   of   the   requirement   of   suitable   skills   for 
membership of the Board of Directors and the preparation of a 
description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board member 
should reserve for the activities of the Board. 
 
 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend 
changes. 
 
 
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of 
Directors and recommend remedies that are compatible with the 
company’s interest. 
 
 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent 
members and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board 
member also acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another 
company. 
 
 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of 
the Board members and top executives; in laying down such 
policies, the standards related to performance shall be followed. 
 
 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board 
 
 
1.The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their 
responsibilities, including the preparation for the meetings of the Board 
and the permanent and ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend 
such meetings. 
 
 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request 
by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen 
meeting upon a written request by two of its members. 
 
 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the 
Chairman should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. 
The agenda and other documentation should be sent to the members in 
a  sufficient  time  prior to  the  meeting  so  that  they  may be  able to 
consider such matters and prepare themselves for the meeting. Once 
convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the  Board  raise  any  objection  to  this  agenda,  the  details  of  such 
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objection shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting. 
 
4. The  Board  shall  document  its  meetings  and  prepare  records  of  the 
deliberations and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in 
chapters for ease of reference. 
 
 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
 
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of 
remunerating the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a 
lump  sum  amount,  attendance  allowance,  rights  in  rem  or  a  certain 
percentage of the profits. Any two  or  more of these privileges  may be 
conjoined. 
 
 
 
Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board 
 
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the 
General  Assembly,  to  be  renewed  each  year,  have  any  interest 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the company’s business and 
contracts. The activities to be performed through general bidding shall 
constitute an exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A 
Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal 
interest he/she may have in the business and contracts that are 
completed for the company’s account. Such notification shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be 
adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the 
Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall 
notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the activities and 
contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal 
interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared 
by the company’s auditor. 
 
 
b) A  Board  member  shall  not,  without  a  prior  authorization  of  the 
General Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity 
which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade 
in any branch of the activities carried out by the company. 
 
 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board 
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a 
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Board member with third parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary 
companies. 
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PART 5 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
 
 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
